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ABSTRACT

Migration, Colonialism, and Belonging: Tunisians around the First World War, 1911-1925
by
Chris Rominger

Advisor: Beth Baron

This dissertation analyzes the little-examined transnational experiences of ordinary North
Africans around the First World War, demonstrating how the war catalyzed a wide and
unexpected range of concepts of political and social belonging. With the Mediterranean once
again the site of massive migration provoked by war and economic inequality, scholars and
commentators have begun to revisit the First World War’s legacy in the Arab world. Yet much
work focuses on the emergence of Arab nationalism or on the diplomatic folly of the European
victors. My research confronts scholarly assumptions about the temporal and geographic
boundaries of the First World War and its social and political impacts beyond Europe. It is not an
overarching history of the war from a Tunisian perspective but rather examines a wide range of
war experiences among Tunisian men around the Mediterranean. It contends that the war
catalyzed a wider range of concepts of political and social belonging than nationalist, colonial,
and First World War histories have thus far accounted for. Integrating materials from the Arabic
and French popular press, colonial archives, and unexplored personal audiovisual archives from
Tunisia, France, Italy, and Switzerland, it reveals how the contingencies of war created spaces
for unprecedented encounters between North Africans and their neighbors from around the
Mediterranean. Through these encounters, I argue, Tunisians found themselves caught between
iv

the new promise of affinity with the French public and the tragic boundaries of colonial practice.
Just as my research presents a challenge to the temporal and geographic boundaries of the
war itself, it also offers a wider lens through which to understand how colonized men
experienced the war, whether due to their varied social and religious backgrounds or to the
serendipitous circumstances in which they found themselves. I treat in the same broad frame
both forced conscripts and exiles and those who chose to travel out of a sense of duty, adventure,
or ambition. Tunisians faced a spectrum from choice to coercion, with many having to choose
from options that few would hope ever to have. While attention must be paid to the violence and
oppression Tunisians faced at the hands of a colonial and military apparatus, it is clear that even
those facing the most brutal aspects of war, such as conscripted soldiers and laborers, lived,
acted, and made decisions within the evolving conditions of possibility through which they
passed. It is in this sense that the trajectories of even the most dispossessed and disaffected can
be considered alongside those who moved under very different circumstances, from the traveling
Francophone artists to those back home who were exempt from conscription. To the latter point,
this study also includes those who did not themselves travel or fight but for whom the war (and
the war experiences of other Tunisians) provoked new ideas and public debates about their
political horizons of possibility.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Albert Samama-Chikli had witnessed destruction before. In early 1909 he crossed the narrow
stretch of the Mediterranean between Tunis and Sicily to document, by film and photographs, the
deadly earthquake that struck Messina, Italy on December 28th, 1908. With at least 75,000 dead
and nearly the entire city in ruins, Samama-Chikli treaded carefully over debris with his
equipment, detailing for newspaper audiences in Tunisia, France, Italy, and beyond the terrible
scenes he witnessed. Just six years later, during the height of the First World War, the inventor,
artist, and self-dubbed “Prince of Chikli” (after the small island fortress he owned in the Lake of
Tunis) found himself on a whirlwind tour of duty with the French Section Photographique et
cinématographique de l'Armée (SPA), taking film and photographs from the Western Front to
the Sahara. His visual itinerary ran the gamut of war experiences. His eye for destruction, first
nurtured amid the rubble in Messina, found no shortage of material on the Western Front; his
gloomy shots of trenches and ruined churches will be familiar to most who have taken an interest
in the First World War. But Samama-Chikli took a particular interest in the war experiences of
his Tunisian countrymen and their comrades from Algeria and Morocco. Through his works, we
catch bittersweet glimpses of life at war for these colonial conscripts: soldiers tousling each
other’s hair while posing for the camera, others playing cards and dancing in the barracks, and
the wounded being attended to by French nurses and doctors.1
Linked by their place on either side of the lens, Samama-Chikli shared with these soldiers
an experience of mobilization across the Mediterranean and life in the trenches, yet under

1

Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense (ECPAD), SPA 32 L 1708: Albert
Samama-Chikli, “The military hospital for African Troops at Carrières-sous-Bois,” October 25, 1916; ECPAD,
14.18 B 299: Albert Samama-Chikli, March 15, 1918.
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significantly different circumstances. Most Tunisian soldiers were conscripts torn from the
country’s rural interior by French officials and their local intermediaries. Samama-Chikli,
however, was the son of a wealthy Jewish financier father and an Italian Catholic mother and
was a resident of the capital of the Tunisian Protectorate. As a result, he was exempt from
conscription, yet through some combination of curiosity, artistic ambition, and perhaps a desire
to prove his loyalty to the French Empire, volunteered for service. His career as a
cinematographer took off after the end of hostilities, with his films Zohra (1922) and Aïn el
Ghazal (1924) making him one of the first filmmakers from either the African continent or the
Arab world.2 Despite the rich literature on the First World War and on the French Empire in this
period, Samama-Chikli remains as forgotten as the anonymous soldiers of his films and
photographs. North Africans, separated by a sea from the most important zones of combat, have
in general gone largely ignored in these histories. Their experiences seem to demand more
attention, particularly as this war, more than any before it, showcased both the incredible
capacity of modern states to move great numbers of people globally and the often tragic and farreaching consequences of such efforts, from the Armenian Genocide to the Greco-Turkish
population exchange.
This dissertation confronts scholarly assumptions about the temporal and geographic
boundaries of the First World War and its social and political impacts beyond Europe. It is not a
comprehensive history of the war from a Tunisian perspective but rather examines a wide range
of war experiences among Tunisian men around the Mediterranean. I argue that the war
catalyzed a wider range of concepts of political and social belonging than nationalist, colonial,
and First World War histories have thus far accounted for. Arabic and French textual and visual

2

Guillemette Mansour, Samama Chikly, un tunisien à la rencontre du XXème siècle (Tunis: Simpact Editions,
2000), 238.
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materials from Tunisia, France, Italy, and Switzerland reveal how the contingencies of war
created spaces for unprecedented encounters between North African men and their neighbors
from around the Mediterranean. Through these encounters Tunisians simultaneously found
themselves caught between the newfound promise of affinity with the French or Ottoman
imperial cultures and a starker sense of the tragic boundaries of colonial practice.
Furthermore, just as my research presents a challenge to the temporal and geographic
boundaries of the war itself, it also offers a wider lens through which to understand how
colonized men experienced the war, whether due to their varied social and religious backgrounds
or to the serendipitous circumstances in which they found themselves. I treat in the same broad
frame both forced conscripts and exiles and those who chose to travel out of a sense of duty,
adventure, or ambition, such as Albert Samama-Chikli. Tunisians faced a spectrum from choice
to coercion, with many having to choose from options that few would hope ever to have. While
attention must be paid to the violence and oppression Tunisians faced at the hands of a colonial
and military apparatus, it is clear that even those facing the most brutal aspects of war, such as
conscripted soldiers and laborers, lived, acted, and made decisions within the evolving
conditions of possibility through which they passed. It is in this sense that the trajectories of even
the most dispossessed and disaffected can be considered alongside those who moved under very
different circumstances, from the traveling Francophone artists to those back home who were
exempt from conscription. To the latter point, this study also includes those who did not
themselves travel or fight but for whom the war (and the war experiences of other Tunisians)
provoked new ideas and public debates about their political horizons of possibility.

Centenary Concerns

3

The centenary of the First World War has prompted governments and their institutions to invest
heavily in commemorations, monuments, and other displays of appreciation for their “forgotten
heroes’” patriotic contributions to the nation.3 The resulting corpus is mostly biographical or
descriptive, if well-meaning, and leaves unanswered many questions which go beyond simply
honoring tirailleurs’ (as North and West African colonial soldiers were known) sacrifices.4
While such gestures may be deserved and meaningful to the descendants of these soldiers, in the
case of France, such tributes do little to address the colonial legacies of coercion and
discrimination bound up not only in this century-old story but also in the current realities facing
the republic’s North and West African communities, and indeed Europe’s growing population of
migrants and refugees as a whole.5 French history, for its part, includes many dark episodes that
were long forgotten or erased, from the treatment of Jews under the Vichy and occupation
regimes to torture during the Algerian War of Independence.6 But the ways in which these
memories are rescued and recreated have been hotly contested and politicized.7 In the case of the
First World War, it leaves us to consider how the racist and colonial aspects of North and West
Africans’ treatment at war have been glossed over in favor of “forgotten hero” narratives.
While I do not directly treat questions of memory in what follows, public attention to the

See, for example: Antoine Flandrin, “La mémoire des soldats coloniaux à l’honneur,” Le Monde 5 June 2014.
For example, see: Guillaume Guguen, “Hollande Honors African Role in France’s WWI Fight,” France 24,
August 11, 2013, accessed October 1, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20131108-african-troops-soldiers-worldwar-french-hollande-senegal-algeria-tunisia.
5
For critical scholarship on the remembering of French colonial soldiers, see Eric Jennings, “Remembering ‘Other’
Losses: The Temple du Souvenir Indochinois of Nogent-sur-Marne” History and Memory 15:1 (Summer 2003): 548; Jan Jansen, “Une autre ‘union sacrée’? Commémorer la Grande Guerre dans l’Algérie colonisée (1918-1939)”
[Another Sacred Union? Commemorating the Great War in Colonial Algeria], Revue d’histoire moderne et
contemporaine 2:61-2 (2014), 32-60.
6
Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994); Raphaëlle Branche, La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1962) (Paris: Editions
Gallimard, 2001).
7
For a critical overview of the contemporary politics of memory of the Algerian War in France, see: Claire
Eldridge, From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-noir and Hari Communities (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2016).
3
4
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centenary has also accompanied and encouraged seemingly endless international academic
conferences and research initiatives, many of which have recognized the relative dearth of study
on non-Western regions and participants in the war. Recent works on the Eastern Front, for
example, have emphasized migration and borderlands as frameworks for understanding both
violence and coexistence in a way that existing work on the Western Front has not.8 Others have
departed even further from Europe itself. This dissertation itself builds upon conversations and
research generated by initiatives such as the National Endowment for the Humanities’ 2014
seminar on the First World War in the Middle East and North Africa at Georgetown University
and the Volkswagen Foundation’s 2017 Herrenhausen Symposium in Hanover, Germany.
Historians of the Middle East have in particular taken advantage of these opportunities to
showcase a rich literature which does more than simply look “beyond Europe” or the Western
Front. Some have highlighted the emergence of political alternatives to liberal nationalism. In
Syria, for example, there is evidence that a “civic Ottomanism” endured long after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire.9 Ottoman Jews, long overlooked in this period, occupied a conflicted place in
that legacy.10 Other movements, such as populist Islam and early Arab feminism in Syria and
Lebanon, challenged the paternalistic arrangements dictated by the European victors.11 New
works have, like this dissertation, begun to uncover the extent and importance of the many forms
of migration which were caused by the war, from the emergence of Syrian nationalisms in the

8

For example see Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the
German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2013).
9
Keith David Watenpaugh, Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab
Middle Class (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
10
Devi Mays, “Recounting the Past, Shaping the Future: Ladino Literary Representations of World War I,” in World
War I and the Jews: Conflict and Transformation in Europe, the Middle East, and America, edited by Marsha
Rozenblit and Jonathan Karp (New York: Berghahn, 2017), 201-221.
11
Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and
Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 113-170; Malek Abisaab, Militant Women of a Fragile
Nation (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2010).
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Ottoman American diaspora to the pan-Islam fostered among North and West African soldiers
held in German prison camps.12 This work signals a renewed interest in an overturned social
order and a hotly-contested political life in the Arab world which goes far beyond the decisions
and prevarications associated with T. E. Lawrence and the legacy of Western diplomatic folly.
Despite these promising turns in the eastern Mediterranean, the war years in North Africa
remain little understood. This might be explained in part by the fact that no major combat fronts,
at least as are traditionally understood in historiography on the 1914-1918 period, were opened
there. This is not to say that historians of the First World War have only focused on the theatres
of military action – far from it. And armed conflict did, in fact, take place in North Africa around
the war, particularly if we consider that beyond Europe, WWI-related conflicts merged with anticolonial and other ongoing struggles. Just as scholars have considered the Ottomans’ Balkan
Wars and Turkey’s postwar expulsion of occupying forces under Ataturk to be part of a broader
WWI continuum, European armies and their colonial soldiers engaged in battles stretching from
Tripolitania in 1911 and southern Algeria and Tunisia in 1915-16 to Morocco in the early- and
mid-1920s.13 Martin Thomas has emphasized the common elements of French imperial and anticolonial conflicts in the interwar period, but I would argue that analysis of these conflicts deserve
to be integrated more into studies of the “long First World War.”14

Stacy Fahrenthold, “Former Ottomans in the Ranks: Pro-Entente Military Recruitment among Syrians in the
Americas, 1916-1918,” Journal of Global History 11:1 (March 2016), 88-112; Reem Bailony, “Transnationalism
and the Syrian Migrant Public: The Case of the 1925 Syrian Revolt,” Mashriq & Mahjar: Journal of Middle East
Migration Studies 1:1 (Spring 2013), 8-29; Eugene Rogan, “No Stake in Victory: North African Soldiers of the
Great War,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 14:2 (October 2014), 322-333; Akram Khater, Inventing Home:
Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870-1920 (University of California Press, 2001); Devi
Mays, “Transplanting Cosmopolitans: The Migrations of Sephardic Jews to Mexico, 1900–1934,” PhD diss.,
Indiana University, 2013.
13
Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: the Ottoman Empire and the First World War (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
14
Martin Thomas, The French Empire between the Wars: Imperialism, Politics and Society (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2005), 211-76. Other notable exceptions include Habib Belaïd, “La Révolte de 19151916 dans le Sud Tunisien à travers les archives du protectorat,” in Révolte et société: actes (Paris: Publications de
12
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Standing in the way, some have argued, is the tendency of scholars to approach the
Mediterranean as a frontier rather than as a borderland.15 The former represents an “end” of
geographical and civilizational Europe, whereas the latter accounts for the bustling exchange,
migration, travel, integration, and conflict that speaks to a modern iteration of Braudel’s
Mediterranean, or perhaps to the Mediterranean as the Romans saw it: mare internum.16 This
dissertation stands alongside other recent works that call for a renewed focus on the modern
Mediterranean as a unit of study. Yet as Madeleine Dobie illustrates, this approach demands a
careful consideration of the cultural and polemical baggage a Mediterranean category sometimes
carries. Some twentieth-century studies assumed a common cultural and climatic essence that
nonetheless could serve to depict its coastal societies as northern Europe’s “other,” if not quite its
Orient. Others were deeply implicated in an indirect (or sometimes direct) cultural, artistic, and
academic effort to make the French colonial presence in North Africa more humane or
palatable.17 But even among Arab writers and thinkers, “Mediterraneanism” has been criticized
as the intellectual basis for an identity that distances itself from Arab and Muslim identifiers, as
in Lebanon’s Phoenicianism. What is needed instead is an approach to the Mediterranean that
“reflects a critical stance toward one-dimensional or exclusive models of identity, e.g., certain
forms of postcolonial nationalism or linguistic or confessional identitarianism.”18
To this end, the work of Julia Clancy-Smith has been exemplary for its rejection of binary
categories often used to classify the diverse and moving peoples of what she calls the “central
Mediterranean corridor” linking Tunisia foremost to Algeria, Malta, and Sicily, Liguria, and

la Sorbonne, 1989); and Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity
(Cornell University Press, 2015).
15
Linda Darling, “The Mediterranean as a Borderland,” Review of Middle East Studies 46:1 (2012), 54-63.
16
Richard W. Clement, “The Mediterranean: What, Why, and How,” Mediterranean Studies 20:1 (2012), 114-120.
17
Madeleine Dobie, “For and Against the Mediterranean: Francophone Perspectives,” Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34:2 (2014), 389-403.
18
Ibid., 401.
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Marseille.19 A borderland society such as Tunisia, Clancy-Smith has argued, can be understood
as much by its own national or colonial boundaries as it can by the ways in which it fostered
encounters among local Muslims, poor European migrants, multicultural elites, and the like.20
Like Mary Lewis, I build on this work by bringing this understanding of Tunisian society into
the twentieth century, showing how it was tested against the increasing imperial rivalries and
consolidation of national identities that were so dramatically demonstrated by the outbreak of the
First World War.21 It is also in studying this later period that we have the opportunity to better
highlight the voices of Muslim Tunisians through the popular press and exiles’ publications.22
Another obstacle to understanding North Africans’ experiences of the First World War is
the residue of nationalist historiographies that have long attempted to locate the “roots” of anticolonial movements in an inevitable march towards revolution and independence. The result is a
telos that flattens historical narratives into binaries – the Manichaean world of colonizer and
colonized – and narrow chronologies that pay little attention to moments of great uncertainty in
which a variety of social and political horizons were possible.23 The transnational sprawl of
Tunisians’ migration experiences pushes us to reconsider the tightly-bound nationalist narratives
which continue to influence Tunisian and North African historiography on this period.
Nationalist histories written in the late twentieth century characterized the war years as a period

19

Julia Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800-1900 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2011), 11-15.
20
For an alternate focus on the Francophone Mediterranean along similar lines, see Patricia Lorcin and Todd
Shepard, eds., French Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories (Lincoln, Neb.: University of
Nebraska Press, 2016).
21
Mary Lewis, Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2014).
22
Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, review of Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c.
1800—1900, by Julia Clancy-Smith, The American Historical Review 117:2 (2012), 476-78.
23
This dissertation in general takes theoretical inspiration from Reinhart Koselleck’s notions of “horizons of
expectation” and “space of experience” in moving beyond determinist teleologies, as in Futures Past: On the
Semantics of Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
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of political “lethargy,” or one marked by loyalty to France in the war effort – or at best, an illdefined gap in an otherwise heroic and well-documented march towards Tunisian nationalism.24
Given the Protectorate’s censorship of most outlets of intellectual and political dissent, this is
understandable – those looking for the origins of the national movement in the popular press or
in the actions of political circles will not find many overly relevant sources from 1914 to 1918.
This is hardly a new problem, and historians have thoroughly addressed this nationalist
and postcolonial phenomenon in a number of ways, as will be discussed below. It is not this
study’s aim to only point out yet another example of the shortcomings of nationalist
historiographies; here I simply offer another explanation as to why the First World War has gone
overlooked by scholars focusing more exclusively on Tunisia and the Maghrib. The challenge of
this dissertation is rather to take these spatial and temporal stumbling blocks as a starting point,
prompting the following questions: how did the First World War change political and social
notions of belonging and difference for Tunisian men? How did experiences of war and
displacement catalyze productive, intimate, and provocative encounters both among Tunisians
and with Europeans, Ottoman subjects, and other Arab peoples? In addressing these questions,
what follows will also pose questions to the traditionally limited temporal and geographic
boundaries of WWI histories.
Various concepts of “mobility” inform the approach of my study, and I draw particular
inspiration from Thomas Nail’s exploration of “kinopolitics,” a social theory of movement based
on the contention that human groups and societies have historically functioned as continuously
moving “flows,” from the earliest hunter-gatherer societies to today. This upends the assumption
– often a teleological and anachronistic one – that the sedentary citizen, bounded and defined by

24

For example, see: Ali Mahjoubi, Les Origines du Mouvement National en Tunisie, 1904-1934 (Tunis: Université
de Tunis, 1982).
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their status within static territories and borders, is the “default” human subject and that migrants
are the exceptional or accidental runoff of populations that tend otherwise to be sedentary and
stable.25 For Nail, the migrant is the “figure of our time.” States have always developed
technologies and ideologies to create and enforce their “regimes of circulation.” Migrants and
these states (and the settled populations that compose them) are co-constitutive of one another,
leaving us room to consider both the ways in which migrants of all kinds have been produced
and oppressed by such regimes and the agency of migrants themselves in provoking new forms
of territoriality, border control, and citizenship.26
Colonial histories of the past two decades or so have demonstrated that colonial subjects,
like migrants, in fact always found ways to leave their own imprint on the colonial state, or to
skirt it altogether. Indigenous societies and their existing structures and practices made up the
waters into which underfunded, uninformed, and inconsistent colonial apparatuses had to wade.
And of course, even where the colonial state made interventions, they were frequently met by
resistance and less explicit responses from local subjects such as labor strikes, desertion, popular
satire, and even the cooption of European technologies and discourses to their own advantage.
Nail’s contention that human movement should be our starting point in examining social change,
rather than its stasis or restriction by state and juridical regimes, is therefore appealing to those
who would study critically the history of colonialism without privileging a state-centered view
and without fetishizing the hegemonic ability of those states to dictate human mobility for its
own ends.

The French Protectorate, Migration, and War
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Tunisia by the mid-nineteenth century found itself at the center of drastic shifts in Mediterranean
power dynamics. Still a nominal part of the Ottoman Empire, it had since the early eighteenth
century been ruled by hereditary monarchs, the Beys of the Husainid Dynasty. The waning
Ottoman central authority over Egypt, long a reference point for Tunisian religious and cultural
exchange, left the Beys free to exercise control over most state affairs both foreign and domestic
but also isolated it from its most powerful ally and suzerain.27 European imperial influence in the
Mediterranean took on its most daring incarnation with the French invasion of Algeria in 1830,
while the Ottomans reasserted their military presence in Tripoli in 1835. Facing these
transformations, Tunisian reformers moved, much like their counterparts in the Ottoman Empire
and Egypt, to shore up state control over key institutions from the tax system to military
conscription. Ahmad Bey (1837-1855) instituted a program of military modernization, staffing a
new military school at Bardo with European officers, importing updated weaponry, and
introducing wider conscription and direct taxation on the Tunisian populace. High costs, local
resistance, and catastrophic losses in their expedition to support the Ottomans in the Crimean
War nonetheless set Tunisia on a precarious path from the mid-nineteenth century, exposing it to
the machinations of French and British diplomatic and economic interests.28
This threat inspired reformers from the Bey’s Grand Council, a body established by the
1861 Constitution (the first in the Arab world) that included Turco-Ottoman elites such as Khayr
al-Din Pasha (Tunisia’s Grand Vizier, 1873-1877), to propose a controversial program of
modernization. This initiative included the liberalization of the Tunisian economy, the
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establishment of the prestigious Collège Sadiki which combined religious and secular education,
and increased participation of the local population in state affairs.29 Yet despite Khayr al-Din’s
measured success in these initiatives, a renewed spirit of cooperation between Istanbul and Tunis
coincided with a period of feverish European activity in the Mediterranean following the 1869
opening of the Suez Canal. By the late 1870s, France had largely won over the European
imperial community to its claims of interests in Tunisia and, using the pretext of tribal
insurrections along Tunisia’s northwestern border with Algeria, paved the way for a French
occupation in 1881.
Made a Protectorate of France by the Bardo Treaty later that year, Tunisia never
experienced quite the same level of violence, inequality, and dispossession as neighboring
Algeria did. Military conquest was relatively quick, and the Bey remained nominally sovereign
while a French administration was put in place to handle most aspects of governance as well as
the repayment of debts owed to France, Britain, and Italy. Under French occupation, migration
and overseas exchange remained an important part of intellectual, economic, and religious life in
Tunisia. Colonial expansion by the turn of the twentieth century encouraged the immigration of
laborers, farmers, and fishermen to the shores of Tunisia from Sicily, Malta, and other poor
regions of the Mediterranean.30 Tunisians, for their part, continued their travels to the Eastern
Mediterranean, often for pilgrimages to Mecca, which sometimes ended in permanent settlement
in the Ottoman Empire.31 North African intellectuals and statesmen in general continued to look
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east for inspiration despite the end of formal relations with the Ottoman Porte.32
French settlement in Tunisia expanded, but Italian settlers and their descendants
continued to outnumber their French counterparts well into the mid-twentieth century. By the
1910s, subjects of Italian descent or nationality numbered around 100,000, at least double the
number of French nationals living in Tunisia. Subjects of Maltese descent, protégés of Britain
after 1813, numbered about 11,000.33 In fact, the presence of so many Italians, along with
sizeable Maltese, Algerian, and Tripolitanian populations, made French domination in Tunisia a
slippery proposition, both on a local and international level. Mary Lewis argues that these
groups’ claims for consular protection in a variety of legal cases, much like the nineteenthcentury “forum shopping” described by Clancy-Smith, led by the early twentieth century to a
form of colonial rule more direct, but also more tenuous and controversial, than originally
envisioned.34 These diplomatic ambiguities had significant local consequences for Tunisian
subjects. Even those who did not or were not able to seek diplomatic protections or other special
statuses came up against the contradictions and blank spots in the protectorate arrangement. As
was the case across the various colonies and protectorates under “indirect rule,” such vagueness
often proved useful to European powers, allowing for the allocation of local resources to support
projects that were designed for European economic and strategic benefit under the guise of
benevolence to colonial subjects. However, the application of republican rhetoric and promises
in colonies such as Tunisia were often turned on their heads by local actors, sometimes simply as
a means to a mundane end – a more beneficial outcome in a divorce or inheritance case, for
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example – or sometimes in the name of ambitious reform, from equality before the law to,
eventually, anti-colonial activism.35
Significant inequality between Tunisians and European settlers prompted the rise of
political challenges to French colonialism during the first decade of the twentieth century. The
Young Tunisians, a cadre of bourgeois reformers drawing in particular from graduates of the
progressive Collège Sadiki, began calling for more Tunisian participation in government,
educational and judicial reform, and a constitution. Matters came to a head in 1911 when a
French plan to survey and repurpose parts of the historic Jellaz cemetery in Tunis were met with
large protests supported (though not organized) by Young Tunisian leaders; police and protesters
soon exchanged gunfire and dozens on each side were killed. A few months later, when an
Italian-operated street car struck and killed a Tunisian child, the Young Tunisians orchestrated a
boycott calling not only for reforms to the transportation system but also to the Protectorate’s
main representative body. A month into the boycott, French police arrested and deported a
number of alleged agitators, among them several prominent Young Tunisians. These
disturbances, shortly followed by the outbreak of the First World War, prompted increased
efforts by the Protectorate administration to silence political dissent in Tunisia. A state of
emergency imposed in 1912 proscribed most political meetings and publications until 1919,
disrupting years of increasingly assertive political activism within these mostly urban circles.

War and Human Movement
The outbreak of war in 1914 ushered in disruptions to more than just elites’ reform efforts. The
traditionally bustling movement of people, ideas, and goods between Tunisia and the Arab
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provinces of the Ottoman Empire was made illicit and irregular. Goods normally consumed
locally or exported to other parts of North Africa were redirected towards Europe, and shipping
and sea travel moved constantly under the threat of German submarine attacks.36 Pilgrimages to
Mecca and Medina were limited, as were the travels of North African intellectuals to and from
Greater Syria and its important centers of nahda-era learning.37 Further disruptions came in the
form of economic instability. The initial departure of French settler conscripts actually ushered in
a brief period of relative prosperity for Tunisian merchants, landowners, and urban functionaries,
but the return of demobilized settlers coincided with a ruinous harvest and famine in 1919 and
1920, leading to a wave of strikes and demonstrations throughout the country.38
Tunisian conscripts and exiles were evidence of an even more dramatic upheaval to daily
life. French agents and their local intermediaries targeted poor young men from from Tunisia’s
rural and interior lands to fulfill their conscription quotas, sending over 70,000 men first to port
cities such as Tunis and Bizerte then on to European ports, depots, and eventually combat.
Perhaps to avoid disrupting the local economy and upsetting influential intermediaries and
notables, several groups were exempted from conscription as a matter of policy: most residents
of the capital, Jewish Tunisians, those who enjoyed foreign consular protection such as Italian
and Maltese settlers, contracted teachers in government schools, students of the prestigious
Collège Sadiki, professors and some students of Zitouna Mosque and University, various
religious functionaries, and several ranks of the Bey’s royal guard.39 The burdens of the war
would fall overwhelmingly on the shoulders of young, illiterate men from rural areas and their
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families.
While many intellectuals and others of the urban middle classes were spared military
service, stringent censorship accompanied political repression of anyone suspected of
questioning the Protectorate and, by consequence, the French war effort as a whole. The French
administration was very anxious about North Africans’ potential loyalty to the Ottoman sultan
during the war, as demonstrated by the volume of ink spilled analyzing Sultan Mehmed V’s call
to jihad on 14 November 1916. Ultimately few Muslims beyond the Ottoman Empire rose up in
defense of the caliph, and indeed many turned on the Sultan and his political and spiritual
authority, as in Sharif Hussein’s “Arab Revolt.”40 Many Tunisian intellectuals suspected of
Ottoman sympathies were exiled, including Ali Bach Hamba (see Chapter Three) and Hassan
Guellaty (see Chapter Five) as well as other reformers involved in the protests of 1911-12.41
Others, including Ali’s brother Mohamed Bach Hamba, may have anticipated a similar fate and
left home voluntarily, settling in Ottoman lands or in neutral Switzerland.
On the face of it, experiences of wartime movement, disease and injury at the front, and
the strains of separation from family and home were undeniably brutal. To add insult to injury,
evidence from colonial and medical archives as well as veterans’ testimony reveals that
Tunisians were daily subject to the racial, colonial, and civilizational hierarchies of the French
imperial order. Tirailleurs earned less than half of what their French counterparts did, despite
likely facing disproportionate use as shock troops due to officers’ presumptions about their racial
proclivities to close range combat and their inability to understand complex weaponry and
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orders.42 Tunisian soldiers were also subject to officials’ efforts to segregate them from French
civilians, believing that they posed a sexual and pathogenic threat to French women in particular;
it was also feared that colonial subjects in general might be exposed to communist and anticolonial politics during their stay in the metropole.43 Such thinking impacted those who remained
home, as well. Some Tunisian Jews were accused by returning Muslim and French soldiers of
profiting from their exemption from conscription, leading to violent confrontations and a wave of
anti-Semitism in the settler press, which only played into French legitimization of its role as
“protector” (see Chapter Four).
As grim as were the circumstances of Tunisians’ forced mobilization or expulsion, there
is something more novel and significant to say about these unprecedented experiences than that
they were often violent and exploitive, evidence of the worst strands of colonial policy and
discourse. The exigencies of war also catalyzed encounters that produced new opportunities for
Tunisians of all backgrounds to explore entry to and affinity with French society or, failing that,
to better understand the implications and extent of colonial and racial boundaries. The war was
undoubtedly a colonial one, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the Tunisians
swept up by it in some way or another. It is in this sense that we might think of the “productive
power” of colonial encounters to catalyze or provoke – but not determine – changes to the social
and political horizons of colonized peoples.44 For now, two examples may suffice. The first is the
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subject of Chapter Two, which explores the transformative, humanizing encounters between
wounded Tunisian soldiers and their French nurses in military hospitals built specifically to
house, discipline, and reform North African colonial subjects. These spaces, deeply colonial in
their practices and epistemic basis, were also the products of wartime contingencies and were
shaped by the individual needs and desires of their Tunisian inhabitants. A second example is the
subject of the fourth chapter, which follows the construction of a “Jewish question” in Tunisia
during the First World War. A combination of discriminatory colonial conscription policies and
anti-Semitic settler discourse contributed to the violent episodes between demobilized Muslim
soldiers and indigenous Jews who had remained at home. One result of these encounters was a
vigorous debate among Tunisian Jews and their new contacts in France about their political
options in the future, ranging from seeking protection by Woodrow Wilson to joining Zionists
from around the world in their emigration to Palestine.
The point here is that taken alone, each of these trajectories would not reveal the extent of
political horizons opened up by Tunisians’ experiences of the First World War. A history
focusing only on rural North African conscripts, for example, would rely too heavily upon
reading “against the grain” of the colonial archives, since few written diaries and letters survive.
Likewise, a study limited to the instances of “anti-Semitic violence” in wartime Tunisia might
overshadow the extent to which some Jews took actions to question and redefine their place in
the Tunisian and French colonial political order. The reach of this dissertation itself is limited by
conspicuous silences in the various archives used, especially in state and national archives,
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diplomatic and military documents, and the popular press of Tunisia and France. Bodies of
sources such as these are often approached as the “official” record of events despite the anxieties,
contradictions, and generalizations they tend to make.45 In particular, they tend generally to say
plenty about women despite being largely masculine in voice. My exploration of the trajectories
of Tunisians on the move around the First World War is a largely male story, due in part to the
fact that the largest groups and most archivally conspicuous individuals to cross the
Mediterranean during the war were men, and mostly young men at that. There are likely many
important stories yet to be unearthed of other Tunisians – including women – who moved or
were displaced by the circumstances of this colonial war, in addition to others whose lives, while
geographically static, were profoundly transformed as a result of wartime migration.
Nonetheless, by restricting this study to a relatively narrow period (roughly 1912-1925), a
geographical subject (mobile Tunisians and the Mediterranean peoples they encountered), and
demographic (young men), we are free to integrate a breadth of different actors as they
experienced combat, exile, return, or other aspects of life at war. We might understand what
emerges from their encounters as a series “fragmented public spheres.” But beyond Habermas’
Masonic lodges, provincial academies, clubs, and salons – all venues mostly suppressed by the
French state of emergency – Tunisians at war also found themselves envisioning new futures in
military hospitals and depots, amid armistice demonstrations, or even as exiles in Switzerland.46
Taken together in this way, Tunisians’ stories demonstrate that Tunisia was not simply a “secure
hinterland for France” in this conflict.47 Rather, it was an important site of human movement
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undergoing an unprecedented reordering of its social and political life. These were parts of one
story through which we can better understand the impact of those very common but sometimes
poorly understood colonial encounters that exposed the limits of colonial, racial, and
civilizational thinking, and that provoked new ways of thinking about self, about France, about
Empire.
Colonialism and “Productive Power”
This study takes as its broader inspiration the important work of the last decade or two which has
questioned the primacy of nationalism as the key focal point in social or political history of
colonial societies in the early and mid-20th century. Elizabeth Thompson’s research on feminist,
populist, and Islamist mobilizations in Syria following the First World War demonstrated
important alternatives to the cautious nationalism of “paternalistic elites.”48 Frederick Cooper,
Ann Stoler, and Gary Wilder, similarly, have employed a focus on relatively brief moments of
uncertainty at the end of empire in French Africa, showing how a variety of possibilities
(including an altered form of affiliation with France) remained salient right up until and even for
some time following national independence.49 James McDougall employed a similar approach to
Algeria, critiquing the ways in which nationalist hagiographies have obscured important figures,
movements, and contingencies which stood as viable alternatives to liberal, ethno-religious
nationalisms in the Maghrib.50 Their work furthermore urges us to consider that colony and
metropole were not simply two opposed poles in an inevitable, Manichaean struggle, but rather
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that the end of empire could engender a diverse spectrum of expectations, grievances, and
visions for the future.51
The promise of transnational histories is especially great, not only for bridging colony
and metropole but also in highlighting “south-south” connections such as the one between
Maghrib and Mashriq, a link so important to pre-modern Mediterranean history yet so often
overlooked in studies of the First World War and its aftermath. Chapter Four deals most
intensively with this question, as the French construction of a “Jewish question” in Tunisia
played directly into the emergent international minority regime that was enshrined by the League
of Nations and the postwar establishment of the mandate system in the Middle East. The
language and underlying justifications for the mandate and the protectorate systems overlapped
significantly. But the Maghrib-Mashriq connection goes beyond France’s imperial ambitions.
Three dimensional shapes may be even more helpful than lines as an explanatory device here:
Simon Jackson saw Geneva, for example, as one point on a “triangle of transnational politics” of
the interwar period which also included Syro-Lebanese reformers in the Mashriq and the North
American mahjar.52 Switzerland in general played this role from an even earlier date, as Chapter
Three of this dissertation demonstrates through the case of new connections forged in Lausanne
between Tunisian reformer Mohamed Bach Hamba and his Egyptian counterparts at the Congrès
des Nationalités in 1916.
For the purposes of understanding the role of wartime mobility in the political and social
changes Tunisia faced around the First World War, the above works are significant in that they
interrogate the range of possibilities in such moments of rupture. That is, they treat carefully the
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various markers of identity and belonging provoked, upended, or even fostered by colonialism,
with special attention paid to colonialism’s limits and ambiguities and to the unintended
outcomes of its grey areas. Though each of the groups and individuals examined in what follows
are “Tunisian” in the sense that they were born in or lived within the geographic boundaries of
France’s Tunisian Protectorate, this identity marker was by no means uniformly accepted nor
fully articulated in the 1910s and 1920s. While it is significant that an important group of
reformers identified themselves as Tunisian by the turn of the twentieth century as an explicit
challenge to French colonial rule, they do not tell the whole story of Tunisian belonging, and the
futures they envisioned cannot encompass the diverse experiences and visions of other important
actors on this trans-regional stage. I need only point here to the “Ottomanist” exiles in Istanbul or
Berlin, the liberal nationalists in Geneva, the working-class and peasant soldiers in France, and
the Jews who appealed to the international community or even to a Zionist future. Still more
different was the opportunity war presented for Tunisians such as Albert Samama-Chikli to
demonstrate their loyalty to France.
In this sense, then, these are “Tunisian” stories only in their origin; some never left; some
never returned, and looked elsewhere, if not literally but rather discursively to make claims to
various levels of political authority, as in the debates over Zionism in the Jewish press. In
another sense, however, this dissertation does not discount the importance of French colonial
power and discourse in these stories – they were central, in fact, in provoking and catalyzing not
just the historical circumstances which led to these new conditions of possibility (war,
conscription) but also the rhetoric, categories, and other discursive forces channeled by Tunisians
in forging their own visions of community. In an effort to make colonial subjects legible to
European institutions of control and governance (censuses, taxation, conscription), colonial
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officials attempted to impose various categories of identification on local people, who of course
had their own preexisting categories in place. These categories were, in theory, to replace and
dominate existing systems of community and identity. But as historians have shown, these best
laid plans were hampered by all manner of limitations, inconsistencies, and resistance on the
ground. Colonial officials and intermediaries also often had their own ideas about the application
of various policies and bodies of knowledge. Thus colonial impositions were better understood
as “colonial encounters,” for what they produced was as much a product of colonial power as of
indigenous knowledge and practices.53
When Ann Stoler, writing about domestic spaces in the modern Dutch East Indies,
echoed Ian Hacking’s “contention that the power of categories rests in their capacity to impose
the realities they ostensibly only describe,” she meant that the naming of certain things –
peoples, events, diseases, and the like – was a political and aspirational act.54 That is, the terms
used to describe these things really matter precisely because they reveal not reality but rather the
instabilities and fluidities at the very heart of colonial encounters: material and discursive
conditions of possibility, the aims and anxieties of colonial officials, and the hopes and
tribulations of the colonized.
Since this study largely focuses on people and ideas in motion, my approach must
account carefully for the fluidity of various categories of identification, colonial boundaries, and
underlying historical contingencies. French authorities’ anxieties about the racial, sexual, and
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pathogenic threat posed by Tunisian soldiers and their assumptions about the “arrogant
mentalité” of Jews in Tunisia, for example, created the violence, discrimination, and boundaries
meant for Tunisians to operate within. Often, too, these boundaries provoked an awareness of
and desire to contest the colonial order. Such were the circumstances facing the volunteer soldier
Mukhtar al-‘Ayari, whose turn to communism and a violent rejection of colonialism coincided
with his denial of promotion and recognition while serving on the Western Front. At the same
time, colonial practices were not always cynical or intentional: some French figures had a
genuine (if misguided or ignorant) interest in the wellbeing of Tunisians, creating space for,
among other things, relationships between Tunisian soldiers and French nurses.

The Wilsonian Moment and North African “Identities”
Conscription, political repression, and the economic uncertainties and inequalities surrounding
the First World War contributed to discontent and activism across North Africa in the early
1920s. Global historians and historians of modern Europe have pointed to a “Wilsonian
Moment,” which ushered in a new era of internationalized dialogue reevaluating the colonizercolonized relationship. Erez Manela’s argument, for example, holds that Woodrow Wilson, in his
anti-imperial liberal vision and rhetoric, provided the language anti-colonialists needed to
undertake increasingly urgent efforts to secure their place in the world order, connecting a
generation of reformers and dissidents with an international audience and with one another.55
Many in the Arab world did appeal to principles we might recognize as “Wilsonian,”
such as the right of nations to determine their own future and the protection of oppressed
peoples. In the case of the exiled reformer Mohamed Bach Hamba and of the popular Jewish

55

Erez Manela, Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 219-221.

24

press in Tunisia, some even addressed the American president directly and regularly quoted his
speeches and writings. Yet recent scholarship suggests that we not go as far as to suggest that
emergent mass movements only took shape on the back of Wilson’s pronouncements, nor that
they depended only on the elite nationalists who traveled to Paris to make their case for
independence.56 Here, I suggest building on Manela by considering the ways in which Tunisians’
evocation of Wilson’s name and rhetoric acted not as a hopeful acceptance of the terms of the
President or his European counterparts, but rather as a foil against which they could position
their new or longstanding claims. Wilson’s legalistic language, if not a source of newfound
inspiration, was appealing in its apparent universality, even if it was unevenly applied. Indeed, it
did not always matter whether the ostensible target of such appeals (i.e., Wilson) listened or
acted upon them. Accordingly, this dissertation argues that political claims, made more urgent
and daring by the harsh circumstances of war, could be amplified on an international platform in
a way that called out the contradictions of the Great Powers, pointing for example to French
failures to uphold their own ideals of liberty and equality. In this sense, the “failure” of these
appeals was rarely just that. This perspective allows us to better account for how ordinary people
became involved in political movements over the course of the war, with a particular emphasis
on the role of trans-Mediterranean connections forged or reconfigured during the war.57 Points of
rupture like the First World War created plenty of space for such contingent possibilities. To this
end, my dissertation takes more seriously a variety of mobile actors as political subjects.
Considering this thesis’ focus on experiences of both affinity and difference with regard
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to French society, a final word is in order about “identity,” a term often evoked but less often
defined. Frederick Cooper noted in 2005 that the term identity, though not a useless concept, had
become so ubiquitous in the tens of thousands of academic articles which employed it as an
analytic category in the decade prior, that scholars had widely come to assume a broad stability
in the notion which was not borne out by the contingencies of historical moments – identity as a
term was seldom questioned.58 In what follows, I will at times employ terms to describe groups
or individuals who might be defined by particular identity terms such as “Tunisian Jews,”
“colonial soldiers,” or “elite exiles,” for the sake of simplicity or clarity. But with the above
critiques in mind, this dissertation does not take for granted that such identities existed
consistently or inevitably. Rather, it attempts to grasp the spectrum of possibilities born of the
wartime moment while remaining attentive to the ways in which certain terms of identity
emerged historically and historiographically, particularly where colonial residue often remains
the organizing principle of the archive.59
In cases where colonial authorities used certain identity markers in order to define,
control, or discipline a group, as in Protectorate authorities’ generalizations about the
“communauté juive” or “Israélites tunisiens,” I explore available sources in an attempt to
understand how the designated group identified themselves, if at all, and how these selfreferential terms interacted with the terms of the colonial state. This approach to identity is
informed by the work of Ian Hacking, whose “looping effects of human kinds” account for the
fluid and ever-changing nature of identity categories. Rather than accepting some such terms as
“real” and others as mere social constructions, the dialogue between “interactive kinds” (self-
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aware groups or types of people, usually) and other entities which seek to define them (state
institutions, majority groups, etc.) reflects the contingent nature of history itself. Space is left
both for a consideration of the disciplinary power of colonialism and for the lived realities and
choices of those subjected to it.60

Narrative Structure
Each chapter makes use of different kinds of sources and engages with different thematic
historiographies; the chapters are arranged only roughly chronologically, as each examines a
different group or individual as they experienced war and encountered colonialism across the
time period 1911 to 1925. Each chapter, reflecting the diversity of the archival sources consulted,
analyzes a different aspect of how the war’s circumstances provoked new understandings of both
difference and belonging among Tunisians during and following the First World War. For
example, some chapters follow Tunisians through a particular space or place of encounter (such
as military hospitals in France), while others follow the transformations of a particular group and
its categories of identification (such as “Tunisian Jews”). The general order of chapters, moving
from the ambiguously Franco-patriotic to the anti-colonial and revolutionary, was chosen in
order to provide the reader with an impression of how Tunisians’ war experiences cultivated new
and increasingly assertive articulations of their political horizons. Note that all translations from
Arabic, French, or Italian are the author’s unless otherwise noted. Where possible I have
followed the Arabic transliteration guide of the International Journal of Middle East Studies,
except in cases where certain names are most widely known in their Francophone transliteration.
I begin in Chapter One by examining the life and career of Tunisian artist Albert
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Samama-Chikli, the son of a Jewish financier father and Catholic Italian mother, who is often
called Africa’s first filmmaker. Samama-Chikli traveled everywhere from the Western Front to
the Sahara during the war and its aftermath, producing a distinct vision of his world during the
war while employed by the French Army’s Section cinématographique. I explore how SamamaChikli’s extraordinary trajectory took visual form, and how this vision differed from those of
other Tunisians on the move and of other French Army photographers. My project is the first
Anglophone work to make extensive use of his newly archived personal collection of film,
photographs, and correspondence at the Cineteca di Bologna. This chapter also draws from his
photographs and films held at the Etablissement de Communication et de Production
Audiovisuelle de la Défense (henceforth ECPAD), the French Army’s audio-visual archive. I
present an analysis of his role as an adventurous arbiter of visual culture, problematizing the
assumptions sometimes made about “cosmopolitan elites” in Mediterranean or French imperial
contexts and about Samama-Chikli’s Jewish background. More importantly, I demonstrate how
his elite trans-Mediterranean upbringing was strained, if not entirely disrupted, by the hardening
of national boundaries and imperial rivalries in WWI. By beginning with Samama-Chikli, I
introduce some of the tentative ways in which the war mobilized, but also tested, existing
loyalties to empire and to privileged transnational circles.
Few Tunisian men had the means to choose such a creative path. The greatest number of
Tunisians on the move were the rural conscripts sent to work and fight for the French Army
during the war. Chapter Two examines how colonial hierarchies were brought to bear on
Tunisian subjects in unprecedented ways and spaces due to the war’s exigencies. Here I examine
the humanizing relationships between French nurses and North African soldiers in French
military hospitals. Special attention is given to the “Muslim hospitals” at Carrières-sous-Bois and
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Moisselles, built specifically by the French with certain civilizational tropes, political goals, and
sexual and racial fears in mind. Drawing from personal correspondence, photographs (including
those of Samama-Chikli), and military and medical records, I argue that the individual needs and
desires of Tunisian soldiers and of French nurses, as well as material limitations and
contingencies particular to the war, created space for an unprecedented series of close encounters
which transgressed colonial and gendered boundaries. These encounters offer a layer of
historical precedent for the interracial relationships prevalent among the politicized North
African immigrant communities in interwar France.
But where colonial encounters in metropolitan hospitals initiated only an ambiguous
rethinking of racial and gendered boundaries, exile and expulsion could incite more clearly
articulated political visions. Chapter Three examines how exiled Tunisian political activists
engaged with reconfigured trans-Mediterranean intellectual networks, revealing the ways in
which the First World War presented both ruptures and continuities with North African political
concepts. In particular, it offers something of a prosopography of the Geneva-based Comité
Algero-Tunisien, an anticolonial group led by Mohamed Bach Hamba which attempted to draw
the attention of Woodrow Wilson and other leaders to the plight of North Africans under colonial
rule. This chapter draws on Bach Hamba’s journal La Revue du Maghreb, various Arab
reformers’ publications at wartime conferences in Switzerland, and the Francophone Swiss press.
I compare the trajectory of the Comité’s leader, Mohamed Bach-Hamba, with that of his brother
Ali, who turned toward a renewed Ottoman outlook after settling in Istanbul, mobilizing
longstanding ties with Anatolia and the Arab East in order to forge a future for Tunisia.
Mohamed’s exile in such a vibrant crossroads provided the physical and intellectual space for
new political visions to be cultivated. This chapter also provides an opportunity to better
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understand the assumptions, exaggerations, and stakes involved in French intelligence’s pursuit
of the “pan-Islamic threat” posed by exiles and their connections with the Ottoman and German
Empires.
Chapter Four returns to the Tunisian “home front,” where Jews faced attacks at the hands
of returning Muslim and French settler soldiers resentful of Jews’ exemption from conscription.
Here I examine the French construction of a “Jewish Question” in Tunisia during the war and its
immediate aftermath, within the emergent international context of minority regimes that would
inform membership in the League of Nations and the justification for the French Mandate in the
Levant. This offers the opportunity to bridge historiographies of the Maghrib and Mashriq. In
turn, I investigate how Jews in Tunisia responded to intercommunal violence and the upheavals
of the war, with a focus on new transnational political visions. In seeking justice, some Jews
turned to international protection while others turned to Zionism as a solution. Indeed, the very
term “Tunisian Jews” was itself constructed in the context of this imperial war, provoking
questions about how historians can approach colonial archives which so often reproduce
parameters that dictate boundaries how we understand communal identity.
The fifth and final chapter reckons with the nearly immediate political consequences of
the war by comparing the tribulations of the veteran-turned-communist Mukhtar al-‘Ayari and
the socialist reformer Hassan Guellaty. These two rather ordinary figures’ transnational
encounters crossed and eventually diverged by the mid-1920s, marking the narrowing of
Tunisians’ political horizons which had been momentarily blown open by the war, as
demonstrated by both of their publications in the popular Arabic and French press and in police
surveillance files. Their trajectories, when presented on their own terms rather than within the
longue durée frames of Tunisian nationalism or French colonialism, demonstrate the importance
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of the war in producing, if only briefly, trans-Mediterranean cooperation and political
alternatives such as communism and socialism.
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2. ALBERT SAMAMA-CHIKLI’S MEDITERRANEAN WARS
It seems that the Tunisian photographer Albert Samama-Chikli (1872-1934) was omnipresent in
the years surrounding the First World War: documenting the trial in Tunis which resulted in the
exile of Young Tunisian activists Mohamed and Ali Bach Hamba in June 1912,1 creating a
tourism brochure in 1914 with André Duran-Angliviel, the journalist and socialist leader who
later worked alongside Tunisian anti-colonial leftists such as Mukhtar al-‘Ayari,2 and behind the
lens in the Muslim hospital at Carrières-sous-Bois in October 1916. Thanks to his position as one
of just about a dozen photographers serving in the French Army’s the Section Photographique de
l’Armée (SPA) during the First World War, moreover, the Tunisian artist and inventor SamamaChikli played witness to some of the many encounters engendered by wartime mobility in
Tunisia, France, and the Mediterranean.
It takes a special sort to fashion oneself a moniker, and Samama-Chikli was not one to
disappoint: he adopted the tongue-in-cheek title of “Prince of Chikli,” named for the
synonymous island in the Lake of Tunis purchased by his father from the Tunisian Bey
Muhammad III as-Sadiq in 1866. The lighthearted honorific evoked both his upbringing in
proximity to the traditional palace elite and his notoriety as a modern and eclectic iconoclast.
Born to privilege and notoriety, Samama-Chikli died in relative obscurity, having squandered
most of his inherited wealth. Today not known widely, he is perhaps best recognized as one of
the first filmmakers in Africa and the Arab world, having made Zohra (1922) and Aïn el Ghazal
(1924). His brief postwar film career has been, if anything, the focus of the little extant literature
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in which he appears. Until the past decade, only a couple of film historians had touched upon
Samama-Chikli and his work and legacy.3 This chapter builds on those studies and
contextualizes his work within the scope of his early life and transnational career.
Inspired by his wanderlust and desire for adventure, Samama-Chikli often found himself
amid misery and destruction, even before the First World War: he traveled to Messina, Italy in
early 1909 to document the devastation of the December 1908 earthquake,4 and reported from
the Ottoman side of the Italian invasion of Libya in 1912. For the latter, he would be accused of
pro-Ottoman espionage by an Italian journalist, an allegation that fueled rumors about him well
into the First World War despite a lack of evidence and his deep loyalty to his professional and
familial connections with Europe.
At first glance, it is difficult to know what to make of Samama-Chikli’s profoundly
Mediterranean and imperial itinerary. What kinds of encounters did mobility produce for a figure
so apparently unique but at the same time so evocative of what has been described as a
quintessential nineteenth-century North African “cosmopolitanism”?5 To what extent did his
wartime experiences resemble the kind of jarring “rupture” that Tunisian exiles and conscripts
underwent, in social, cultural, and political terms? And what do Samama-Chikli’s experiences
reveal about the capacity of the war to harden borders and categories of identity?
The term “cosmopolitanism” has sometimes been used as a stand-in for describing elite
minorities of the Arab world, as discussed in the introduction. The term has been critiqued for its
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evocation of a nostalgic projection of a “more tolerant past,” particularly when contrasted with a
soured view of the present Middle East and its supposedly urban, Muslim, homogeneous masses.
This has been particularly true of studies of Tunisia’s historical Jewish “community,” often
romanticized as the embodiment of certain peaceful and diverse moments in time.6 I therefore
take Hanley’s suggestion that we avoid such a teleology by exploring the particular details of
Samama-Chikli’s family life rather than leaving the “cosmopolitan” label as assumed,
privileging “formal labels over content.”7 While it is difficult at times not to be captivated by the
undeniably daring and whimsical feats of his life and work, I emphasize Samama-Chikli’s
wealthy upbringing and access to Tunisian royalty and French administration in order to remind
the reader that his was not a trajectory available to most Tunisians around the First World War.
“Cosmopolitan,” in this Tunisian case, evokes for the reader a privileged social status that could
provide access to trans-Mediterranean networks of commerce and art but also of military and
empire.
This chapter draws from a number of largely untapped archives. Most of Albert SamamaChikli’s personal documents and photographs, collected and managed by his granddaughter
Djaouida Tamzali Vaughan and her husband Paul Vaughan, have recently been moved to the
Cineteca di Bologna and are, at the time of writing, still being catalogued and expanded. This
collection includes photographs along with some sporadic correspondence and memorabilia,
along with unpublished notes from a memoir manuscript (some of which were eventually
published in 19928) and biographical details compiled by Samama-Chikli’s daughter and only
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child, actress and writer Haydée Tamzali.9 A few thousand of Samama-Chikli’s wartime
photographs are housed at the Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle
de la Défense; he was perhaps the most prolific of the dozen-member SPA, and was one of the
only photographers at the Western Front to regularly place himself in his own compositions.10
This chapter will proceed with a chronological survey of Samama-Chikli’s upbringing
and pre-war career, with an emphasis on his overseas adventures and early journalistic
expeditions, including a controversial foray into Tripolitania during the Italian-Ottoman War of
1911-1912. I will then closely analyze his First World War service with the Section
photographique de l’armée in Europe and North Africa, connecting it to his brief postwar film
career. Samama-Chikli’s experiences serve as something of an ambiguous starting point for
Tunisians at war. He was not an overtly political man, and there is little indication of his views
on the colonial enterprise nor on the rise of Tunisian nationalism. His rare expressions of loyalty
were limited to France and to the Bey of Tunisia, though his constant border-crossing fueled
accusations of disloyalty amid hardening imperial rivalries in the 1910s. Nonetheless he
capitalized without reservation on his Francophone upbringing and elite connections to support
his creative aspirations, and he remained proud of his military service throughout his life. This
will serve as a counterpoint to later chapters which highlight the diverse but more thoroughly
articulated political horizons that other Tunisians (such as Mukhtar al-‘Ayari) embraced largely
as a response to their negative experiences at war.
This chapter’s broad temporal scope offers something of an alternative to that of the
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chapters to follow, which have focused more narrowly on the war years as a “moment.” In
Samama-Chikli, we see a unique and complicated individual who, as I argue, must be understood
in his extended life trajectory, not just within the scope of his wartime loyalty to France or of the
legacy of his postwar film career. Close attention will be paid throughout to the ambiguous and
shifting position of Samama-Chikli’s position relative to Francophone culture, which I
contextualize with discussions of literature on colonial and Arab photography and cinema in
addition to the political complications posed by the inhabitants of Tunis’ diverse ethnic and
religious makeup. At the same time, despite the exceptional aspects of his career and life,
Samama-Chikli’s transnational itinerary shared personal experiences common to that of many
Tunisians around the First World War. He was compelled to voluntary military service by career
ambition and loyalty to France and was profoundly affected by the encounters the war produced,
not unlike the soldiers and nurses whom he photographed at Carrières-sous-Bois. Moreover, I
contend that Samama-Chikli’s experiences at war, while no doubt a transformative experience
from a professional and emotional standpoint, demonstrate that the First World War did not
always represent a dramatic historical “rupture” for all its mobile participants. His case, rather,
speaks to the continuity provided by a privileged upbringing among a Tunisian urban elite long
accustomed to trans-Mediterranean travel and cross-cultural networks.

Beginnings
Born in Tunis on 24 January 1872, Albert Samama was the son of Daoud Ibrahim (usually
referred to as “David” in his descendants’ papers) Samama (1818-1885) and Henriette Rebecca
Grego (d. 1899). Grego was Catholic, likely of Italian origin. David, a Sephardic Jew of long-ago
Iberian origin, was born in Tunis, but split his time between Tunis and Marseille, where he had
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directed the Société Marseillaise de Credit Industriel et Commerciel, which later became the
Bank of Tunisia.11 He served as a key banker to the Bey of Tunisia and, according to his
granddaughter’s memoirs, boasted many impressive connections to Mediterranean royalty. He
kept horses at a property in Marseille that he claimed once attracted a visit from Napoleon III, to
whom he subsequently offered his best horse.12 David received French naturalization by order of
the French consul general in Tunisia in 1873 or 1874, a status which was apparently passed on to
his son Albert.13
Albert grew up in the presence of figures involved in both Tunisia’s precolonial financial
struggles and in France’s colonial project there. His father enjoyed a close personal relationship
with Théodore Roustan, a French statesman who was directly involved in the financial
negotiations surrounding Tunisia’s debt as well as the 1878 Congress of Berlin, at which Britain
and Germany agreed in principle to support a French incorporation of Tunisia. Roustan later
served as the first Resident General of France’s Tunisian Protectorate from 1881 to 1882.
Tamzali also recalled David’s close relationships with other diplomats such as Léon Roches
(French Consul-General in Tunisia 1855-1863), Richard Wood (British Consul-General to
Tunisia 1855-1879), and Licurgo Maccio (Italian Consul in Tunis 1878-1881).14 While his
personal papers reveal little direct stance toward French colonialism, it would not be
unreasonable to speculate that by the time Albert came of age in the French Protectorate,
colonialism – especially an indirect, less overtly violent one than in neighboring Algeria – would
have been a forgone conclusion. His life would not have been changed much, at least initially, by
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the establishment of the Protectorate in 1881.
The Samama family life, while exceptional in its wealth and access to power
transnational networks, was not anomalous of the elites of nineteenth-century Tunis. The port
city’s history was marked by great urban diversity drawing from its role as a privateer haven in
the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and from its relative openness under Husainid rule
in the eighteenth century.15 Albert’s father, David, traced his ancestry back to the Sephardic
Andalusian migrants who, fleeing the 15th- and 16th-century expulsions and executions by the
Catholic monarchs and inquisitors of Castile and Aragon, made their way to North Africa, some
of them by way of northern Italy, where they had been invited to settle by the Grand Duke of
Tuscany Ferdinand I at the turn of the sixteenth century.16 The family likely spoke the local
dialect of Arabic in the home, but Albert, as was common for members of the Tunisian urban
elite, was fluent in French and Italian.17 Most of his writings and interactions as evident in the
archives were in these three languages, though his daughter later claimed that he also spoke
English, German, Spanish (or perhaps Ladino), and a little Russian, which would have been
made possible to a certain extent by his many years of travel.18
In 1866, David bought the tiny island of Chikli from the Bey of Tunis for a nominal fee
of 40 piasters. The island, situated in the shallow Lake of Tunis, housed the remains of a
sixteenth century Spanish fortress, and by the turn of the nineteenth century would play host to
his son Albert’s many parties and film screenings, x-ray demonstrations, and yacht outings.
Samama-Chikli’s forging of a mock title of nobility from this tiny “principality” could be said to
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have marked something of a triumph for Tunisia’s now deep-rooted grana community, given the
Spanish conquerors’ historical cruelty towards Jews.19
Even though Samama-Chikli is today usually referred to as a “Tunisian Jew,” it is not
clear how he identified himself. Religion does not appear to have been an important daily
presence in the life of the Samama family.20 Mention of Judaism is nearly absent from the
historical record on Samama-Chikli; whatever his family’s religious convictions might have
been, it seems there is little trace of them either in his archives or in his daughter’s memoirs.
According to Jewish law, at least, Samama-Chikli would not have been Jewish, since his mother
was Catholic. I address the question of his “Jewishness” here primarily to illustrate the cultural
fluidity of his upbringing. The following analysis departs from the suggestion in some
contemporary and commemorative accounts that his Jewishness is central to understanding his
legacy and his having been rather overlooked by historians of North Africa and Tunisia.
Samama-Chikli was educated at a series of Catholic or Catholic-influenced schools,
including the elite Collège Saint-Louis, a school that was moved from the old city of Tunis to the
Carthage suburbs at the direction of Cardinal Charles Lavigerie, the pioneering archbishop of
Algiers with jurisdiction over much of colonial North Africa.21 Samama-Chikli later attended the
prestigious Collège Saint-Charles de Tunis, and then in Marseille, perhaps while traveling with
his father on business, he attended a Jesuit school.22 That Albert was sent to study with
Lavigerie, who dominated French missionary efforts in North Africa and beyond during the
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1870s and 1880s, suggests that for an elite family such as his, it was only fitting and practical to
send him to the most prestigious of Catholic educational institutions.23
Albert Samama-Chikli’s mother, Henriette, was apparently fond of celebrating holiday
traditions both of Tunisia and Europe. For example, in addition to hosting events on the major
Muslim holidays, on the Christian feast of the Epiphany, the family enjoyed the cutting of a cake
into which a “bean” had been baked; the person who received the piece of cake with the bean
inside would be “king” or “queen.”24 Albert had five siblings (three older and two younger), as
well as a younger brother Samuel who died at the age of three in 1872, just before Albert was
born. Digitized records from the diocese of Tunis suggest that a number of Samama-Chikli’s
siblings were baptized as Catholics.25 His sister Marie appears from a certificate in his private
archives to have been baptized as a Catholic in the parish of Batna, Algeria in May 1893, at the
age of 21, though it is unclear why.26 Perhaps Marie, unlike some of her siblings, was not
baptized as an infant and could have been baptized as part of her own marriage arrangement,
though the archives do not speak to this. In 1905 Albert married Blanche (Bianca) Ferrero, a
Catholic Italian tourist from an aristocratic family of Savoia who had been visiting Tunisia with
a sister who sought the healing sun.27
According to a rumor, circulated by the leading Italian-language newspaper in Tunis,
L’Unione – whose feud with Samama-Chikli will be discussed below – Albert himself was said
to have converted to Catholicism.28 La Depeche Tunisienne shelved the rumor alongside the
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volumes of the Chikli legend: “Marseille has its sardine, Tarascon has its Tarasque, Tunis has its
Chikli; this very name has been grabbed by one of our young fellow citizens, who has made it a
noble title… in Batna, lastly, the conversion, true or false, of the prince of Chikli, caused the
press to groan; Chikli, thanks to this peddling of hoaxes, has headed slowly towards
immortality.”29 Omar Khlifi, a Tunisian film historian, speculated in 1970 that the Masserini
circus tamers, who sponsored his sister’s baptism in Algeria, had extracted Samama-Chikli’s
conversion in exchange for whatever favors they might have proposed to him, though it is
unclear why they would have demanded such a thing.30 Corriou is skeptical about the veracity of
this account, but what is clear is that the Tunisian press hawked a considerable clamor
surrounding this rumor, including some amount of taunting from “anti-Semites” in the French
Algerian press.31
Corriou notes that Samama-Chikli’s burial in a Jewish cemetery in Tunis says little about
his religious convictions, calling him a “convinced republican and liberal.”32 To this I add the
relevant detail of his memberships in La Libre Pensée, a masonic atheist and anticlerical
organization, and in the masonic fraternity Le Grand Orient de France.33 Mansour ventures that
Samama-Chikli’s photograph of a monumental statue of Cardinal Lavigerie in Biskra, Algeria,
draped under a cloth preceding its unveiling ceremony and surrounded by similarly dressed
Algerian men, marked the pleasure Samama-Chikli took in an ironic iconoclasm.34
This religious fluidity, or rather a general lack of a defined religiosity, is unsurprising
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when we consider the pluralistic culture that permeated the Samama household. In Haydée
Tamzali’s memoirs, there are frequent anecdotes and memories emphasizing the extent to which
the family experienced Tunisia as little changed with the coming of the French Protectorate,
having built their overseas ties long before 1881. In this vein, for example, Tamzali notes that
her grandfather David “never backed away from making sacrifices to hold fast the name of the
French in Tunisia.”35 In the eyes of the Francophone circles to which he belonged, according to
Mansour, Albert Samama-Chikli was at once distinctly Arab and as “expressive and elegant” as
a Parisian.36 Theirs was a cultural milieu rooted in Tunisia but one which straddled a decidedly
transnational Mediterranean without borders – or at least without borders that hindered travel and
business for a family of such stature.37 It is this context, rather than “contemporary quarrels
about the ‘Tunisianness’” of Samama-Chikli, that is central to understanding his twisting
itinerary and the place the First World War held in it.38

Wanderlust
After studying briefly at a Jesuit school in Marseille, Albert Samama-Chikli returned to Tunis to
begin what would become a lifelong search for adventure, much of it entailing long-distance
travel. Around age seventeen, shortly after the death of his father, he left school and set off
against the warnings of his family and tutor to try a career as a sailor.39 He embarked on the
French sailing ship “L’Horizon” for a series of long journeys to Hamburg, the French Antilles,
Australia, and the Cape of Good Hope over the course of the next several years.40 Ultimately, on
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his second return to Tunis, his family demanded that he put an end to a career deemed below his
station, his brother-in-law writing that he must “honor your name that your poor father had
always sought to elevate.”41 For the time being, Samama-Chikli turned to his growing love of
photography and bicycling.42 He began selling photographs, antique weapons, jewelry, and
watercolors to support his photographic craft – he did not yet see this as a commercial venture,
but rather as an amateur passion.43
Photography in the first two decades of the twentieth century remained a gentleman’s or a
professional’s pursuit, largely because of the costs and time required to purchase, maintain, and
operate the requisite equipment. The difficulties associated with early photography in the Arab
world were in fact a constant subject of travel writing by visitors to the region, and were
“constantly reinscribed in the regions and its peoples within colonialist narratives of adversity
overcome and heroic endeavor.”44 All the same, photography soon after its invention came into
wide use by the most powerful figures of the late Ottoman world, as showcased in the early
daguerrotypes of Mehmed Ali and the widely-known collections of Sultan Abdulhamid II.45 By
the early twentieth century, educated elites and middle-class professionals’ pursuit of
photography marked, to some historians, a negotiation of new “modern” identities.46 Cameras
made for some of the most conspicuous means of consumption, not least in that they allowed for
the preservation of moments in time which could be compiled both privately in family albums
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and publicly through the emergent popular press, which itself was instrumental in creating the
“imagined community” of the nation.47 Beginning in 1921, moreover, Kodak’s consumerfriendly and affordable cameras grew increasingly popular around the Arab world.48 Educated,
wealthy, and well-traveled, Albert Samama-Chikli could be viewed in such a context of
emergent Arab and Ottoman consumption. Yet he was no amateur: perhaps more than the many
technological feats with which he occupied himself, photography emerged as a true profession
for him. He earned an income and a public presence for his photographs, and his expeditions to
southern Tunisia and Algeria, Sicily, and eventually, the Western Front of the First World War,
were daring and expensive undertakings.
Through the 1890s, Samama-Chikli’s work with imaging technologies began to draw the
public’s attention. Samama-Chikli was awarded the Bey’s prestigious civilian decoration Nichan
Iftikhar in 1891, at the request of the French Resident General for his introduction of the x-ray to
Tunisia and for conducting complementary x-ray scans for poor patients.49 He developed his
experience in travel photography while accompanying Algerian-born French explorer Gaston
Méry to the southern Algerian desert in 1893.50 Through the 1890s his photographs earned
awards at international exhibitions and expositions in Saint Petersburg, Carthage, and Paris. 51
During one of his trips to France in 1898, he befriended the Lumière brothers and acquired a
Cinematograph – an early film projector.52 Mansour claims that Samama-Chikli was the first to
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screen a projected film in Tunisia in October of that year, though Corriou has disputed this.53
Based at a shop on the Rue d’Algérie, he built a reputation for being among the first to take film
and photographs from an underwater submersible in 1903 and for taking the first photographs of
Tunisia by balloon in 1909.54
Samama-Chikli also developed an anthropological interest in activities that showcased
the medium of film. In 1910, for example, he shot a film commissioned by the Prince of Monaco
documenting tuna fishing in Sidi Daoud, an important fishing port east of Tunis on Cap Bon.55
His personal photograph collection at the Cineteca di Bologna includes many images of wild
animals (including lion cubs and monkeys he raised in his garden), Bedouin traditions from the
Tunisian interior, and landscapes from around the country.56 Samama-Chikli’s eclectic personal
collection also includes undated images in which the photographer, wearing his army uniform,
appears arm in arm with two men of unknown origin who wear only loincloths. It also includes a
portrait of a bare-chested female dancer whose entire body is covered with intricate tattoos, a
practice considered exceedingly subversive outside of European circus sideshows, Bedouin
camps, and prisons.57 Mansour supposes that the photographs from these journeys had always
been more journalistic than aesthetic; Samama-Chikli was most interested in practical questions
of daily life, particularly where that life was threatened by the very innovations he was busy
pioneering back in the capital.58
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Samama-Chikli’s promise behind the lens fueled his desire to explore, and before long he
had organized voyages by bicycle through Tunisia and Algeria.59 On one hunting expedition in
Guelma, Algeria, he dared to abandon his spotting post to head into the bushes, where he was
kicked in the chest by a wounded animal. The local newspaper, Le Petit Guelma, chided him
playfully as a fellow member of the Francophone elite: “We hope that this kind of unfortunate
accident will not happen again and that the young Prince will be a bit more prudent next time.”60
His family was decidedly less lighthearted about his often dangerous and expensive adventures.61

Fig. 1: Albert Samama-Chikli’s undated business card

Samama-Chikli in fact appeared quite at ease making light of his many adventures and
misadventures. In one of his tongue-in-cheek “business cards,” he even fancied himself a
successor to the “hardy explorers” Henry Morton Stanley and David Livingstone.62 Another card
(Fig. 1 above) listed a comically exhaustive list of distinctions and titles, among them “Amateur
photographer of the Principality of Chikli,” “Bicycle Explorer of the Arad [lands] of the Algerian
and Tunisian Sahara,” and “Honorary Member of the Société des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Tunis.”
The latter, a charitable group, soon came to be known as the life of Chikli’s island parties, his
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Principality’s royal guard.63 Samama-Chikli was even a fan of elaborate pranks: according to his
daughter’s memoirs, he even used his knowledge of chemicals and photographic lighting to stage
something resembling a shadow puppet show in a successful effort to spook his unruly tenants
into moving out of their home at 13 Rue Sidi Sifiane.64 Between his surviving documents and the
words of his descendants, it is clear that Albert Samama-Chikli’s princely nobility was
something of a whimsical farce.

Italy and Tripolitania
Samama-Chikli’s adventurous spirit eventually pushed him toward grim and violent places. He
traveled in early 1909 to Messina, the Sicilian city in which over 75,000 had perished in a
December 1908 earthquake, as a reporter contributing to French metropolitan newspapers
including the well-known weekly L’Illustration as well as the daily Le Matin. While most of the
photographs from this trip were lost, a few were published; notable in particular is one in which
Samama-Chikli himself stands atop the mountainous urban ruins, his heavy gear draped over his
arms and shoulders as he faces the camera.65 This composition evoked a fascination with
destruction that foreshadowed the many photographs Samama-Chikli would later take of
destroyed landscapes, buildings, and dead bodies at the Western Front of the First World War,
including some in which the photographer himself was depicted – a relative rarity in wartime
photography of the era. This fascination with destruction was not without its emotional impact,
however. In an article for La Dépêche Tunisienne, he reported that upon first arriving in Messina,
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he found himself unable to take a single photograph as he walked past flattened buildings, the
smell of death and the sight of dog-eaten corpses strewn about. Walking beside a four-story
building left standing as an aftershock hit, Samama-Chikli described “an emotion which had
never in my life seized me… and my only thought was carried to Tunis, toward my wife and my
child, and I started to cry in spite of myself.” Dangers abounded, as Italian soldiers shot several
looters on sight; Samama-Chikli was stopped frequently and questioned about his business there.
Nonetheless, urged on by a journalist’s sense of duty, he took about nine dozen photographs and
some 1600 meters of film.66
Samama-Chikli’s relationship with Italy, much like that of Tunisia itself, was a long and
complicated one. Italians had long been a presence in the Bey’s court as advisors, doctors, and
bankers, and at the turn of the century Italian settlers still vastly outnumbered French settlers in
the Protectorate.67 Italian was also widely spoken among Tunisian Jews who traced their ancestry
back to the Ligurian coast and maintained familial and commercial ties there; the Samama family
originated in this community, though they did not live in the rather isolated grana ghettos of the
old city. Recall too that since Samama-Chikli himself spoke Italian, and his wife was Italian, it
would not have been unusual for him to enjoy connections and travels to Italy during his
journalistic and artistic career.
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Fig. 2: Samama-Chikli amid the ruins at Messina, January 1909.68

The Italian conquest in neighboring Tripolitania shocked and alarmed nearly all social
strata in Tunisia.69 France and Italy had since the 1878 Congress of Berlin competed for a
presence in North Africa, and tensions escalated with the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881.
A secret convention between France and Italy in 1902 acknowledged Ottoman Tripolitania as a
potential site for Italian expansion in exchange for recognition of a free French hand in Morocco
and Tunisia. Nonetheless, Italian settlers in Tunisia continued to outnumber their French
counterparts by more than double in the early twentieth century, their consular protection and
various privileges proving a frequent challenge to French sovereignty.70
Tunisians, for their part, had long maintained important commercial, cultural, and
religious links with Tripolitania. A number of prominent tribes straddled the Tripolitania-Tunisia
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frontier, and Tripolitanian workers migrated to the Gafsa region in southern Tunisia where they
participated in colonial railroad construction and mining projects.71 Political and religious
reformers from the Maghrib (including Salah al-Sharif and was Muhammad al-Khidr Husain,
examined in Chapter Three) continued to look to Istanbul, with Tripolitania as its closest
territorial presence by the turn of the twentieth century.72 The educated and political sectors of
the Tunisian public therefore watched closely and with some trepidation when the OttomanItalian war broke out in late September 1911. Samama-Chikli had been in Paris at the time and,
according to Mansour, was encouraged by the various professional contacts he had established
there to head to Tripolitania.73 With cultural familiarity with the people of Tripolitania, a deft eye
for Francophone newspaper audiences, and a command of French, Italian, and Arabic, he was
well-suited for the task. He found himself onboard the French mail steamer Carthage bound
from Marseille to Tunis when it was stopped by the Italian navy on 16 January 1912 and held in
Cagliari in the midst of Italy’s operations in Tripolitania. Italian authorities accused the French
of shipping Turkish contraband (including an airplane) and personnel, a claim bolstered by the
stopping of the vessel Manouba two days later as it carried 29 Turkish medical officers to
Tunis.74 The Carthage was allowed to proceed only after the intervention of the French consul.75
The Turkish medical personnel, as it turned out, were members of the Ottoman Red
Crescent making their way to Tripoli. Samama-Chikli crossed paths with them the next month in
Gabes, a southern coastal Tunisian city, as reported in La Dépêche Tunisienne on 18 February
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1912, one of a crowd of some 3,000 Tunisians and Frenchmen who welcomed the Ottoman
humanitarian contingent waving French and Tunisian flags. While France itself remained a
neutral party, many Tunisians, including members of the Young Tunisians, worked to support
the Ottoman war effort.76 Such displays of solidarity were apparently not always clandestine:
Samama-Chikli had prepared fireworks for the arrival of the Ottoman contingefnt as he filmed
them. The Red Crescent delegation, led by the renowned doctor Emin Bey, was thronged as it
made its way to the café of the Grand Hotel, marking Tunisian public sentiment about what the
newspaper proclaimed to be the organization’s “noble task,” carried out “despite the Italian
attacks, contrary to the laws of humanity.”77 It seemed that Tunisians and French settlers alike
shared their disdain for Italian meddling in North Africa. For Tunisians, the arrival of a
triumphant and upstanding Ottoman delegation represented the promise of a nascent pan-Islamic
solidarity. Christelow argues that the Red Crescent was fast becoming “an expression of the
rising tide of Islamic resistance to European imperialism,” supported by donations collected from
Muslims in Algeria, Tunisia, and beyond.78
For the French Protectorate and Tunisia’s colons, however, pan-Islamism had not yet
emerged as the threat that it later would during the First World War. The neutral Ottoman
delegation was instead welcomed as a counterpoint to what was seen by many as an Italian
aggression aimed not only at the conquest of neighboring Tripolitania but also at Tunisia itself
through its Italian subjects in the latter. More than this, Italy’s declaration of their sovereignty
over the province (now renamed “Libya”) claimed its inhabitants as its own subjects, which in
theory was to include the Arab Tripolitanians who had long lived in Tunisia as well as the many
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who had fled the former for the latter during the Italian invasion. This represented a serious
obstacle to French sovereignty in Tunisia, and helped lead the French to later develop the
concept of “co-sovereignty” with, rather than just “protection” of, the Tunisian monarch.79 This
conflict set the backdrop to the Franco-Italian negotiations that eventually saw the Red Crescent
contingent aboard the Manouba freed from Italian containment, a victory followed closely in the
European and Tunisian press.80
Samama-Chikli made for Tripolitania with his friend Ali, whom his daughter described in
her memoirs as an old but strong man with a white beard who could usually be found selling
brik, a popular street snack, at Tunis’ central market.81 In traveling to Tripolitania, SamamaChikli seized the opportunity to understand certain dynamics of daily life at war. While pursuing
his curiosity aboard a sponge fisher’s boat off the coast of Zouara, for example, he was prevented
from lighting his cigarette by the captain, who revealed himself to be part of an illicit arms
smuggling ring.82 Samama-Chikli went on to write a detailed exposé on this practice and its
fascinating technical particularities.83 It was also during this trip, according to his daughter’s
memoirs, that he helped geographer and geologist Léon Pervinquière to write La Tripolitaine
Interdite, a survey of the city of Ghadames and its surroundings near the Tunisian-Tripolitanian
border, though he was not credited in the edition published in 1912 in Paris.84 The book,
dedicated as a “token of gratitude” to the Resident General Gabriel Alapetite and Colonel
Foucher, commander of the French military forces in southern Tunisia, would have been quite
useful for French authorities when they confronted tribal revolts in the region throughout the
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First World War.85
In a context which saw Italian journalists reporting patriotic propaganda from the Italian
side, Samama-Chikli’s desire to report from the Ottoman side was seen by some as a partisan
effort. He developed a feud with Luigi d’Alessandro, the former editor-in-chief of the Italianlanguage bi-weekly L’Unione. D’Alessandro had written an article on the arrest of SamamaChikli upon his arrival in Turin en route to Paris. The suspect, according to the editor, was a man
of average height, “of olive complexion, dressed in a full somber grey.” At the station, “our
police were found in large numbers,” and they tailed him to his hotel. Suspected of being a
“Turkish spy,” Samama-Chikli had apparently identified himself as a Tunisian and a professional
photographer; ironically, he had had to make the same explanation to Red Crescent volunteers he
had encountered at the Tunisian border near Ben Gardane.86 The editor coyly continued that
considering the “extremely difficult judgments facing [Samama-Chikli] in his comings and
goings between the frontier and the Turkish camp,” his constant contact with Ottoman officers,
and his presence aboard the Carthage, “these are testimonials that we believe we must reproduce
here.”87 The editor explained, moreover, that Samama-Chikli had displayed “sickening behavior”
by “twisting the words and acts of our officers for a French audience, contributing to the creation
of a hateful and hostile ambiance against the Italians” in Tunis.88
Samama-Chikli took the opportunity to explain his side of the story to La Tunisie
Française on 13 August 1912. As a correspondent of war in Tripoli, “in all the cities where I
stopped, I noticed that I was tailed continuously by certain people. At first I just smiled, but by

Léon Pervinquière, La Tripolitaine Interdite – Ghadames (Paris: Librarie Hachette et Cie, 1912).
Mansour, Samama Chikly, 199.
87
Cineteca documenti blu 1-2, press clipping from “Espionnage turc en Italie; les vicissitudes d’un Tunisien,” La
Tunisie Française, 14 August 1912.
88
Mansour, Samama Chikly, 207.
85
86

53

the end I grew considerably irritated.” Upon his arrival in Turin he was met by officers whom he
asked to rid him of the surveillance, “indicating the purity of my intentions with regard to [Italy].
I explained that I traveled as much for business as for pleasure, and that as a result I couldn’t be
treated and considered as a spy.” Ever maintaining his good humor, Samama-Chikli could not
resist relating to La Tunisie Française that after his release, he repeatedly noticed the officer who
must have been assigned to continue surveilling him during the rest of his stay in Italy, and even
introduced himself to the officer. This “literally made him furious,” and despite “exhausting
himself in denials” he continued to follow Samama-Chikli.89
Another Italian-language newspaper was less interested in Samama-Chikli than in his
findings on arms smuggling on the Tripolitanian coast. L’Italia published an interview with him
on 20 February 1913, when an indigenous anti-Italian resistance movement continued despite the
formal conclusion of hostilities with the Treaty of Ouchy in which the Ottomans ceded the
territories that would become Italian Libya. In the interview in Rome, Samama-Chikli described
in some detail the way that smugglers would drop sealed boxes of weapons and ammunition at a
depth of up to 40 meters, where sponge fishers would retrieve them under cover of their daily
work. When asked about the broader nature of Arab resistance to the Italian invasion, SamamaChikli estimated that the resistance could endure for quite some time thanks to consecutive years
of strong date harvests, which were among the most important commodities to the Bedouins who
made up the backbone of the resistance. He also responded to questions about the rebel leader
Sulayman al-Baruni, a Berber and ‘Ibadi scholar who, “notorious among the tribes of
Tripolitania,” led the insurrection first against Italian forces from 1911 to 1913 and then again
during the First World War.90 Interestingly, Samama-Chikli noted that al-Baruni had actually
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been imprisoned by the Ottomans for killing a rival prior to the outbreak of war with Italy, but
that the Italian invasion had allowed him to escape prison before organizing bands of resistance
fighters.91
Still, d’Alessandro’s accusations in L’Unione had a lasting impact on Samama-Chikli,
with rumors and suspicions circulating even into the First World War – this will be discussed
further below. His daughter, in her notes prepared for a 1973 radio interview about SamamaChikli, claims that her father even dueled on three occasions with d’Alessandro, ultimately
defeating the Italian journalist with a wound to the arm as he was “skilled with a sword.”92
Clearly there was much at stake for Samama-Chikli, and if true, the duels reveal a man deeply
concerned with his reputation and with such an honor-based and increasingly outmoded rite.
While the war (and Samama-Chikli’s controversy) unfolded, tensions had spilled over
into Tunisia’s internal affairs. In November 1911, protests against the French plan to survey the
Muslim cemetery of Jellaz turned deadly, implicating not only Protectorate forces and Muslim
Tunisians, but also residents of the Italian quarter, who fired potshots from their homes into the
crowd of Tunisian protestors. Mass boycotts broke out the following spring after an Italiandriven streetcar struck and killed a Tunisian child, compounding for many Tunisians their
exclusion from employment by the tramway company.93 Samama-Chikli had returned home
from Tripolitania in time to document the resulting expulsion of several Tunisian political
leaders and the trial which saw the conviction of thirty-two men of rebellion – none of them
representing political leadership of any kind, and seven of them being sentenced to death. The
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“absurdities of French repression” were not lost on Samama-Chikli, who was present to cover
the trials in June 1912: he took photographs of many of the accused, including a close-up of an
eight-year-old child at the defendants’ bench.94

Samama-Chikli Goes to War
While most historians recognize the Jellaz affair as the spark that ignited the Tunisian nationalist
movement, none of this would have been clear by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
In fact, the state of emergency and heavy censorship initiated in 1912 silenced most traditional
outlets of dissent. There is little indication that Samama-Chikli’s Francophone patriotism had
been fundamentally shaken by these events, as he attempted to enlist in the French Army as a
volunteer at the start of the war. Like all Jews in Tunisia, and like many urban elites in the
capital, he had not been subject to conscription; at 42 or 43 years old, he was also past the prime
age for conscription. 95 With little documentation to work with, it is difficult to know why
exactly he made this decision. Given his family history, with its close ties to Tunisian royalty and
to French imperial figures, as well as his generally Francophone cultural orientation, it would not
be unreasonable to assume that Samama-Chikli, like many men of his era, was compelled to
demonstrate his patriotism and manhood. But perhaps even more compelling, given his track
record, would have been the opportunity to document and experience the war. It would be one
more adventure in a life spent seeking it.96
Samama-Chikli’s daughter noted that he feared because of his age that he would be
relegated to service in the territorial reserve, perhaps guarding railroad tracks.97 Instead, he found
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a particularly fruitful home for his talents when he secured an assignment to the Section
Photographique et cinématographique de l’Armée (SPA), where he was five years older than his
average comrade.98 This unit employed about a dozen photographers and cameramen, among
them Abel Gance, a pioneering filmmaker who later directed and produced some of France’s
most notable films of the 1920s, and Louis Feuillade, whose 1913 silent masterpiece Fantômas
inspired a generation of thriller and fantasy films.99 The SPA was tasked primarily with
generating images that could be circulated to the domestic and international press and to foreign
governments as evidence of France’s military strength.100 Members of the unit usually did not
work together, however, being dispersed across the various French armies either individually or
in teams of two (including a photographer and a film cameraman).101 This meant that certain
photographers, depending on the officers in their assigned zone and the variable circumstances at
the front, could carve out considerable creative license in their opus; Samama-Chikli was
perhaps the most exceptional in that sense.102
Samama-Chikli’s assignment with the SPA began with a mission in Algeria and southern
Tunisia, where he took photographs of strategic landscapes, conscription centers, prison camps,
and military transport vessels.103 France maintained a strong military presence in this region
throughout the First World War, as the Senoussi rebellion, with its roots in the now formally
concluded Italian conquest of Tripolitania, continued and even spilled into the Tunisian
Protectorate. The 1915-16 revolt in southern Tunisia attracted deserters and others displaced by
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wartime disruptions, requiring the deployment of French Army units to quell a distraction which,
though never threatening the existence of the French Protectorate itself, could not have come at a
worse time amid manpower shortages in Europe.104
In 1916, Samama-Chikli was sent to the Western Front, and soon found himself an
intimate participant in and observer of some of the most brutal stretches of combat at Verdun,
taking nearly 2800 photographs from June 1916 to December 1919.105 But early on in his foray
into Europe, the earlier accusations of espionage for the Ottomans – now France’s enemy –
doggedly followed him. These accusations became official when the French Army suspended
him from service at the front until he could be cleared of wrongdoing. On 14 October 1916, he
wrote to the Resident General of Tunisia in order to settle the affair, relating what his own
commander had told him:
I [Commander Pierre Marcel] am happy with you [Samama-Chikli] as well as your work
and I have no reproach to make to you; I ask you then to tell me frankly if in your past,
you have nothing to reproach you, because for the second time, during one of your
missions in Tunisia, I received a note telling me that you were suspect, and now again an
officer of the 4th Army who knew you without a doubt in Tunisia told me the same thing.
I want to know what to do. I want very much to believe that this is just slander. Also, that
I have great confidence in you, I must know how you might be able to defend yourself if
what they told me is not true. You will understand that with you facing such an
accusation, I cannot just send you to the front or any army.106
Samama-Chikli then explained that the accusations had come from the editor of L’Unione, after
his reporting from the “Arab side” of the war in Tripolitania. He backed up his account by
referring to his published works and other relevant articles, particularly on the incident of The
Carthage, in L’Illustration. It appears that even after the conclusion of that war and SamamaChikli’s return to Tunisia, the “Italian colony” in Tunis conspired to create a scandal out of
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d’Alessandro’s account in L’Unione. Ultimately, he explained, the journal extended him an
apology and a payment of 1000 francs; Samama-Chikli wrote that he kept these and other
exonerating documents in a dossier that he was ready to send if needed.107
Samama-Chikli invited the Resident General and any other authorities to conduct an
investigation which he was sure would reveal him to be an “honorable,” “patriotic,” “honest,”
and “loyal” person, noting that this would be easy to prove because in Tunis, “my family and I
have been honorably known.” At worst, Samama-Chikli explained, “any faults of youth or
deviations of conduct that I could have committed are those shared by all fun-loving young
people.”108 The photographer’s stature must have been important enough to attract press
attention to this story, if only briefly. Samama-Chikli’s personal collection includes a clipping
from La Tunisie Francaise, the most popular newspaper of the settler community in Tunisia,
which explained that he had run into trouble with military authorities because of accusations of
espionage. “Not without enormous difficulties, he managed to convince the judges of his
innocence, about which, incidentally, there was no doubt.” The article added, dryly: “Finally, to
make him forget the painful time he had passed waiting for his case to be dismissed, they sent
him back to the front of the Somme.”109
While Samama-Chikli had been taken off the front during the investigations into these
accusations, he explained to the Resident General that he also took the opportunity to return to
Tunis to spend time with his wife and child.110 During the many more months and years he spent
away from home, he kept up correspondence with both, with a few letters being preserved in his
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family’s personal collection at the Cineteca di Bologna. Letters with Blanche, his wife, were
warm and loving even while describing difficult wartime circumstances. In one letter from 1915,
Blanche expressed delight that her husband’s previous letter “was almost a love letter,”
comforting her greatly; “I’ve seen finally that you are thinking of the future, something I no
longer counted on.” Blanche described the great loneliness that accompanied his absence, as well
as some of the material shortages which effected even such an elite household as theirs.
Nonetheless, Blanche and their daughter, Haydée, continued activities that could help fill the
gap, such as knitting and crocheting.111 Haydée also wrote her father on multiple occasions. In
December 1915, for example, she promised her father that she would be well-behaved until his
return, telling him that she “finished her soup almost every time” and she would work hard on
her studies.112 She was also sure to provide updates on the many animals the family kept.113
Samama-Chikli also received letters from his niece who lived in Alexandria, Egypt in March
1917. Replying to a letter he had sent from Paris, she congratulated him on his medals,
expressing her pride in his display of patriotism: “We too love France and would very much wish
for the war to end so that all of the soldiers can return home.”114
The accusations against Samama-Chikli remained unsubstantiated and after a few months
he returned to the Western Front. Notably, he spent several months between December 1916 and
September 1917 at Mort-Homme, Côte 304, and Bezonvaux, some of the most bitterly contested
combat zones around Verdun.115 It was at these sites, his daughter explained, that the
photographer was exposed to the poison gasses that caused his lungs to slowly deteriorate,
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resulting in his early death from lung cancer in 1934.116 According to his brigade commander,
Samama-Chikli demonstrated great courage in carrying his work under heavy enemy artillery
and bombardment in August 1917.117 His daughter’s memoirs relate that at one of the battles at
Verdun, he joined soldiers in a counter-attack wave, a heavy camera on his shoulder, as he
pursued fleeing Germans. This apparently had inspired some of the more hesitant infantry to rise
out of the trenches to follow him, reassured by the sight of a photographer crossing the parapet
toward enemy lines. It was for this particular action that General Pétain himself, standing before
the citadel of Verdun, pinned a medal on Samama-Chikli’s jacket, according to his daughter.118
He later received the Croix de Guerre and the Médaille militaire for his efforts.119
It is not just Mansour’s hagiographic account that points to the exceptionality of
Samama-Chikli’s service in the Section photographique et cinématographique de l’armée (SPA).
The SPA, a group of photographers operating under the Ministry of War’s bureau of press
information, was responsible for documenting the war and producing photographs for the
purposes of propaganda, artistic history, and military history.120 Archival evidence and historical
accounts reveal that Samama-Chikli was perhaps the most prolific of the SPA, and was the only
operator to serve for the entire duration of the SPA’s existence.121 ECPAD archivist and historian
Hélène Guillot notes that Samama-Chikli was also the sole operator to shoot both photographs
and film regularly.122 Like other SPA operators, in keeping with the War Ministry’s instructions
for the Section, the majority of his wartime photographs depicted scenes of French military
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strength – often the most sensitive images which were also the most likely to be censored from
circulation to the press.123 But the SPA, according to Mark Levitch, also celebrated artistic
presentation, thanks in part to its leadership under Pierre Marcel Lévi (1878-1953) who before
the war had been an art history professor and an archivist at the Louvre.124 With this license,
Samama-Chikli, according to Guillot’s analysis, took the most photographs of daily life in
military zones.125 He was unique in that he often took photos in a “straightforward” manner,
which often included brutal scenes of death and destruction, unlike most other photographers
who focused on upbeat, “contrived” photos for the purpose of propaganda publication.126
Guillot’s thorough and statistical analysis corroborates this assertion; he took more images of
corpses than did any of his SPA colleagues.127
Yet the conclusions Guillot draws from this and other aspects of Samama-Chikli’s
wartime record are more critical, and open up questions about the role of class and age in his
outlook. First, even in Samama-Chikli’s candid photographs depicting everyday scenes or

123

Ibid., 104, 191.
Levitch, “The Visual Culture of Modern War,” 46-47. He later dropped “Lévi” from his name.
125
Guillot, Soldats de la mémoire, 116-17.
126
Levitch, “The Visual Culture of Modern War,” 162-167.
127
Guillot, Soldats de la mémoire, 118.
124

62

Fig. 3: “Father at the Front, 1914-1918.” Cineteca di Bologna.128

somber scenes not normally the subject of glorifying propaganda, Guillot notes that individual
soldiers are not often identified or identifiable, their faces being obscured. Rather, she argues,
common soldiers and even (or especially) the gravely wounded, are featured only as “part of the
environment” and as a result lack a certain intimacy which one might expect. Soldiers heads and
faces are frequently photographed from the side or the rear, as the lens points, as do soldiers’
weapons, toward the objective or the enemy.129 One wonders whether this might have been due
to Samama-Chikli’s attraction to the front lines to the extent that he became a participant in
battle, rather than just a witness. It could also speak to the photographer’s desire to preserve the
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anonymity and privacy of his subjects; he might have considered doing otherwise exploitive.
Levitch suggests that even in capturing images of dead soldiers, Samama-Chikli composed such
photographs in a way that “offers some dignity while still making the corpse legible” to the
viewer.130
Second, Guillot introduces the scant archival correspondence between Samama-Chikli
and his commanding officers – a single letter, and the only one of its kind preserved in the SPA
collections at ECPAD, in which details about pay, provisioning, and other aspects of daily life
are revealed – to argue that his elite upbringing amounted to an obstacle to his camaraderie with
common infantry. On February 20, 1916, Samama-Chikli wrote to SPA commander Pierre
Marcel asking for more money while still on mission in Algeria and Tunisia. He had run short on
funds because, “being obliged to stay in hotels and to eat in restaurants where the civilian
population is not at all friendly to soldiers we are made to pay more that the locals in certain
cities.”131 Guillot asks why Samama-Chikli was staying in hotels and eating at restaurants when,
in theory, he might have been provided for in cantonment with his military unit. The speculative
answers given are that perhaps he was simply being opportunistic, or that given his wealthy
upbringing, he did not want to give up the daily comfort that he had come to expect.132 I would
suggest that in addition to his upbringing, his age might well have been a factor – SamamaChikli was likely some fifteen years older than most of the soldiers with which he was
embedded. Guillot interprets this as indicative of a lack of intimacy resulting from SamamaChikli’s background in Tunisian high society – “read: French [voire français].” Guillot supposes
that he was unable to identify with common soldiers, showing himself to be far more
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comfortable with officers and authority figures, even in his wartime correspondence and visual
record.133 The author goes as far as to suggest that his “grandiloquence and megalomania,”134
along with his more favorable traits such as “gratitude and, of course, professionalism,”135 helped
create and preserve an oeuvre so valuable to historians today.
There is no question that Samama-Chikli stood out during his wartime service with the
SPA. The breadth and quality of his extensive output has been noted already. It is certainly true,
too, that given his higher rank and long experience as an adventurer, artist, and reporter, that he
found ways to leave his creative stamp on an effort that might otherwise have rendered only a
sanitized body of propaganda. He was even alone in his propensity for appearing in his own
photographs, including those such as Fig. 3 (above) in which he sat atop ruins, and others such as
Fig. 6 (below) which featured important authorities and personalities – this had changed little
from his surviving photographs from Messina in 1909.136 We may only speculate as to the
intention or meaning behind this self-depiction. Some such images present the photographer
alone amid ruined and largely vacant landscapes, evoking the solitude of a life spent largely in
transit. Perhaps, as Levitch suggests, Samama-Chikli sought to upend the impression of the
anonymous photographer given by the production of thousands of images for military purposes,
restoring agency to the artist.137 Other evidence distinguishes Samama-Chikli’s unusual war
experience: scattered letters in his private archives (and not preserved in the official ECPAD
archives), including correspondence with SPA commander Pierre Marcel, are indeed written
almost as if to a peer rather than with the stern formality normally expected of a superior officer.
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Again, Samama-Chikli’s age was likely a factor, as was the respect one might expect between
two accomplished artists.138

Fig. 4: Samama-Chikli with daughter Haydée, c. 1906-7. Cineteca di Bologna.139

I would not go so far as Guillot to speculate that Samama-Chikli was self-obsessed or
was incapable of identifying with common soldiers. Corriou, as a historian focusing on the
cultural import of Samama-Chikli’s film and photography, argues similarly that his compositions
reflect a man at ease and with a familiar air, his compositions “stand[ing] in contrast to most of
the shots of the era when most posed, in a formal manner, in bourgeois ceremonial dress. Sitting
on a camel, driven by a ‘native,’ he waves his hand joyfully for the photographer.”140 To a
certain extent, the wealth he inherited permitted him to use expensive plates and equipment for
scenes that others might find frivolous, though photograph in general remained a hobby of the
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wealthy in this period. Yet fragments from Samama-Chikli’s private collection are also
enlightening in this regard: a contact sheet from late 1906 (Fig. 4 above) depicts Samama-Chikli
in an affectionate moment with his newborn daughter Haydée, lifting her up while dressed down
in his undershirt; another series depicts his wife Blanche in bed with Haydée in a similar
manner.141 It may be the case that in his own comfort with the lens, so too were his subjects
comfortable. Some scenes filmed behind the lines near Verdun in March 1918, preserved at
ECPAD (Figs. 5 and 6 below), reveal not a detached and distant outsider’s view, but rather an
insider’s view. Two Moroccan soldiers pose before the camera, smoking cigarettes and laughing;
one steals the other’s cap, revealing a surprising hairdo which he then tousles playfully.

Figs. 5 and 6: Stills from a film by Samama-Chikli. ECPAD, 14.18 B 299. 15 March 1918.

If anything, the most candid work he produced, from the warm-hearted film of Moroccan
soldiers joking around behind the lines to the sensitive photographs from the Muslim hospitals at
Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, speaks to his talents as a genuine reporter and witness,
rather than to an elitism or arrogance that detached him from common soldiers. Albert SamamaChikli forged perhaps the greatest reportage of his life at the Western Front, despite his role as a
broker of images of power for the propagandizing demands of the War Ministry, and despite the
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technical and ethical difficulties of capturing images in such highly-charged, violent, and
terrifying spaces. With extensive experience crossing physical and cultural borders, he could
move with relative ease through many different settings to capture human moments at war, both
the mundane and the dramatic.

Postwar film career
Samama-Chikli returned home to Tunis at the conclusion of the war, and the SPA was eventually
disbanded in 1921. Mansour speculates from the comparison of two of Samama-Chikli’s selfportraits that life at the front had taken its toll on his appearance, revealed in the deeper lines and
weary eyes that marked his facial expression.142 The war experience did not seem to derail
Samama-Chikli’s ambitions, however, as his most widely-known legacy was to come in the
war’s aftermath.
His artistic direction took a decidedly different turn after the war than did that of Abel
Gance. In the waning months of the war, the latter directed J’accuse, known perhaps as one of
the earliest and most famous pacifist films for its depiction of the war dead rising to question
whether or not the survivors had “remembered the dead by living good lives in their absence.”143
To create the battle scenes, Gance even briefly re-enlisted in the SPA after his earlier dismissal
for health reasons and shot film in September 1918 at the battle of Saint-Mihiel; other scenes of
the “undead” drew from some two thousand soldiers on leave. The film seems to have mixed its
message of pacifism with patriotic praise for the sacrifices of soldiers, but what is clear is that the
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war experience had had a profound effect on the artistic output of Gance.144
For Samama-Chikly, the longest tenured of the SPA operators, perhaps the war’s
violence had finally exhausted his fascination with destruction so as to rule out the topic of war
in his films. His work in the 1920s can be located in a contemporary movement that turned
toward fictional narratives and provoking scenarios, and away from the pre-war films that tended
to focus on depicting simple scenes of daily life.145 His first such film, Zohra (1922), opened at
the Omnia Pathé cinema in Tunis. It played in some ways on the increasingly popular “oriental”
mythologies and fantasies based on One Thousand and One Nights. The film cast his daughter
Haydée, then sixteen years old, in the leading role as a young French woman stranded in a
Bedouin camp community. Yet this was not purely the realm of fantasy: Samama-Chikli,
experienced in ethnographic travels to the Tunisian interior, set the scene in a real Bedouin
community.146 Haydée’s character, taken under the wing of the villagers and their local chief, is
quickly dressed up in Bedouin clothing. Henna is applied to her face to match that of the village
women who have cheerfully welcomed her. She stands out even while smiling amid the groups
of women: her dress is more colorful and intricately patterned, and her complexion is much
lighter than theirs. She soon “desires to make herself useful to her new family” by gathering and
carrying jugs of water and grinding wheat for flour with the help of other women. Still, she
misses home, and she prays to be returned safely to her parents. This continues until an intrepid
aviator arrives, allowing her to return home to her parents.147
Samama-Chikli’s second narrative film, Aïn el-Ghazel, ou la Fille de Carthage opened in
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1924.148 The film once again starred Haydée and was a romance and much more a dedicated
fiction than Zohra was. His daughter played a young woman who, refusing to marry her brutal
arranged suitor, flees to the desert on the wedding night, meeting her true love, a teacher, who is
then shot by the family of the groom. Much as Zohra had with its airplane on set, Aïn el-Ghazel
allowed Samama-Chikli to demonstrate his elite connections: the film featured scenes shot in the
personal palace of Bey Mohamed El Habib in Carthage. Only Tunisians, among them a few
professional actors, were featured in the film. Haydée by then had caught the eye of Hollywood,
and even had a part alongside Ramon Navarro in the 1924 film The Arab, which had been shot in
Tunisia. American-Irish director Rex Ingram invited Haydée to pursue her career in the United
States starting with a five-year contract, but she was forbidden by her father given that she was
still a teenager – a refusal that Tamzali later described as her “first sorrow.”149
Haydée Tamzali, reflecting on the films in her notes for a radio interview in 1973, wrote
that her father had “distanced himself from touristic Orientalism in realizing an encyclopedia of
images of Tunisian life. The scenes were absent exoticism and ‘local color.’ He spent long weeks
amid [Bedouin] communities and scrupulously translated the rural tradition of the era.”150 This
differs from Kenneth Perkins’ brief evaluation which claims that Samama-Chikli’s films
exemplified the “‘mysterious Orient’ genre popularized by Paramount Pictures’ 1921 hit, The
Sheik.”151 To be sure, there are elements that, given the context of French portrayals of North
Africa at the time with which Samama-Chikli was familiar, might strike the contemporary
viewer as exotifying. In Zohra, the stranded European girl’s experience with the timeless work of
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the village (including the carrying of a water jug) evoke tropes of photographs from what Malek
Alloula called the “Golden Age of colonial postcards” between 1900 and 1930.152 The twenties
and thirties also saw the growing popularity of the Cinéma Colonial in France, a genre to which
fellow SPA veteran Abel Gance contributed, though there is no evidence that Samama-Chikli
had known the film pioneer personally.153 That a Tunisian with important educational and
cultural ties to France should have been involved in producing images that might be recognized
as “Orientalist” is unsurprising if we consider Ali Behdad’s understanding of Orientalist
photography as a “network of aesthetic, economic, and political relationships that cross national
and historical boundaries.”154 On the other hand, the almost documentary style of the film clearly
draws on Samama-Chikli’s experience as a reporter, taking no liberties to depict the kinds of
menacing, violent, or sexualized images of Saharan nomads characteristic of French colonial
depictions. Ouissal Mejri notes that the choice of jewelry and tattoos adorning Haydée’s
character in Aïn el-Ghazel actually reflects a mixture of Tunisian Jewish traditions, rather than an
essentialized “Arab” culture.155
I offer the preceding brief discussion of Samama-Chikli’s films to provide an impression
of his eye for recreating the kinds of cross-cultural encounters he might have envisioned for
himself over the course of his career. At most, I argue, his work reveals the real curiosity of a
self-consciously modern urbanite; retroactive assumptions of a position between a “colonialauthentic” binary serve only to simplify a complicated individual.
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Conclusion
Samama-Chikli struggled over the ensuing years with his health, the depletion of his family’s
fortune, and the departure of his wife Blanche who, according to Mansour, had struggled with his
tumultuous and itinerant lifestyle. She lived out the remaining days of her life modestly as a
nurse caring for children in remote villages, and during the Second World War witnessed many
of the same horrors her late husband had during the First World War, tending to the wounded on
both sides of the war.156 Samama-Chikli died much earlier, in 1934, after succumbing to cancer
caused by gas inhaled at Verdun and exacerbated, perhaps, by his smoking habit.157 His
gravestone epitaph reads: “Former Volunteer Soldier; Decorated by the Military; Unceasing in
Curiosity; Intrepid in Courage; Audacious in Enterprise; Stubborn in the face of Challenge;
Resigned in Woe; He leaves behind Friends…”158 It is unclear who wrote the memorial, and
although people do not often write their own epitaphs, the omission of Samama-Chikli’s family,
as well as its somber conclusion, suggests that he may have done just that, a possibility not out of
the question for the eccentric figure. The words, moreover, speak to the weight of SamamaChikli’s war experience, and indeed it was one of which he was very proud: letters and
newspaper clippings attesting to his distinguished service and battlefield successes make up a
large portion of the contents of his private archives in Bologna.
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Fig. 7: “Verdun and its surroundings after the French reconquest. Président du conseil Georges Clemenceau at MortHomme, during a visit to the battlefield after the offensive of 20 August 1917.” 159

Raised around foreign dignitaries, educated in both Tunisia and France, and given access
to the palaces of the Beys and an island in the Bay of Tunis, Samama-Chikli fed his passion for
travel and photography in a way that few other Tunisians could. Many of his foundational skills
as a photographer and cinematographer were acquired in France, and the Lumière Brothers were
perhaps his greatest inspiration. Yet several factors complicate any reduction of Samama-Chikli
and his work to assimilated mimicry or amateur dabbling. Even in his official capacity with the
SPA, Samama-Chikli’s gaze through the lens took a different direction, crossing the
Mediterranean to document soberly the unthinkable violence of trench warfare and total war in
Europe. His photographs of common North African conscripts, to be discussed in the next
chapter, approached tirailleurs with the interest of a documentarian but with few assumptions
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about any essential ways in which they might have differed from European infantry. Later, his
film Zohra starred his daughter as a stranded French woman in a North African Bedouin
community, but one depicted with little of the exoticism one might expect. Aïn El-Ghazel
featured a nearly exclusively Tunisian cast and crew. His works, when placed in their social
historical context and in the particular biographical context of Samama-Chikli himself, reveal a
hybridity of experiences which are not usefully placed on an abstracted spectrum between the
local or “authentic” to the Orientalist, no matter his steadfast loyalty to France and its war effort.
Given the place Samama-Chikli held in his heart for France and for his experiences there
during the war, it is altogether appropriate that his wartime photographs include several in which
he appears proudly alongside French dignitaries and military leaders, most often in motion and at
work rather than in rigid poses. In a photograph dated August 1917, in particular, we find the
photographer trudging through the trenches near Verdun beside Georges Clemenceau, who less
than three months later would become France’s Prime Minister (for a second time) and Minister
of War (Fig. 7 above).160 Proud of his loyal service to France, distinctly Tunisian, and at ease
whether traveling to Tripolitania or Italy, Samama-Chikli was more suited than most to navigate
the Mediterranean, even amid its hardening national and imperial boundaries. It was precisely
this fluidity that at once allowed for his productive trans-Mediterranean adventures while
simultaneously attracting accusations of espionage for the Ottoman Empire. And while SamamaChikli’s wealth and upbringing set his war experience apart from that of most others involved, he
shared in the ambiguity of colonial encounters at war – including those of rural Tunisian
conscripts, to whom we now turn.
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3. HEALING WOUNDS, NURSING TRANSGRESSIONS
Gravely injured and blinded on Europe’s Western Front, ‘Amr, a Tunisian soldier in the French
Army, found himself far from home as he lay in a hospital bed in Lyon in 1917.1 In a certain
sense, the First World War was as much “his” war as it was that of French soldiers in hospital
beds across the country. Like them, he had been called upon to fight France’s enemies; his
homeland, a Protectorate of France since 1881 and only nominally autonomous, was said to
benefit from France’s tutelage and must therefore partake in its defense. In another sense,
however, his war experience would have been quite different from that of a French conscript: all
tirailleurs faced lower wages, fewer avenues to promotion, and isolation from French civilian
life.2 Several scholars have even argued that colonial soldiers were used disproportionately as
“cannon fodder” on the Western Front.3
Yet despite the French rhetoric that informed such discriminatory policies, ‘Amr’s
experience of convalescence opened up new possibilities that transgressed the boundaries
between colonial and metropolitan life.4 In particular, he struck up a close personal relationship
with his nurse, Berthe Cantinelli. For months, Cantinelli took ‘Amr out on long walks around
Lyon, often with other young women who admired how he endured his injuries with dignity. She
invited him to dinner at her family’s home each Sunday, opening up a window onto a French
society that bore little semblance either to the brutal conditions of the trenches or to life at home
in North Africa where he had little exposure to white women. When ‘Amr eventually succumbed
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to his wounds in May 1917, Cantinelli organized a burial ceremony attended by a number of
local women, who laid flowers on his coffin.5 Tragically, it seems in his convalescence and even
in his death, ‘Amr’s tentative admission into a new community contested his place in the colonial
order, so much so that Protectorate officials reacted with a paternalistic anxiety when they
discovered that Cantinelli had written to ‘Amr’s mother in Tunisia to inform her of his death.
Cantinelli disclosed, among other sentiments, that “what touched us the most was when ‘Amr
told us that he did not want to tell you that he was blind; alas, Madame, today you know the
truth.”6
Great losses of human life on the war’s Western Front meant that Tunisians would face
mass conscription into the French army and labor force from 1914 to 1918. Up to 73,000
Tunisians joined 140,000 Algerians and 25,000 Moroccans in making up a North African force
of some 211,000 out of the roughly half million colonial subjects sent to work and fight for
France. Nearly 90 percent of Tunisian tirailleurs were conscripts rather than volunteers.7 The
French public, including many officials, were wary of the presence of so many Arabs on French
soil: in the trenches, factories, cafés, and cabarets of the metropole, the fear was that young
soldiers and laborers from the Maghrib were not only liable to spread disease and chaos, but
were also easily corrupted by anticolonialism, communism, and other subversive ideas. Military
and colonial authorities thus took it upon themselves to ensure that tirailleurs would fight and
work like modern, obedient subjects while being kept at a safe distance from the dangerous
temptations of French women and the kind of seditious discussions that could lead North
Africans to question their place in the colonial hierarchy. It was concerns such as these that led
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Protectorate officials to single out Cantinelli’s letter to ‘Amr’s mother and the subversive
relationship it had exposed.
These anxieties led to new policies and practices, informing the creation of a number of
hospitals specifically for Muslim North African soldiers during World War I. The “Muslim
hospitals” built to contain and rehabilitate these soldiers could have become spaces of great
discontent, magnifying the daily inequalities of colonial difference.8 Some medical and military
officials at these hospitals drew harsh lines of racial difference through orientalist re-education
films and surveillance measures aimed at keeping tirailleurs away from French women,
attempting to recreate colonial conditions within these metropolitan spaces—yet this was only
part of the story. Wounded Tunisians faced a more ambiguous set of circumstances in their
encounters at Muslim hospitals in Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, and even at general
hospitals such as the one in Lyon in which ‘Amr spent his last days. Their relationships with
French nurses, emotional by nature of the very work of healing and rehabilitation, tested the
patriarchal demand for a stoic distance separating them. Moreover, Tunisians’ self-recognition of
their important role in the French war effort prompted new efforts by military and colonial
officials to cultivate a “modern but oriental” subjectivity among the wounded.
But what was it like for a Tunisian to heal, to learn new methods of labor, and to be cared
for within the confines of these hospitals? What led French authorities to establish such spaces in
the first place? And in light of Tunisians men’s largely unprecedented encounters with French
women and civilian life in general, what can medical spaces tell us about how war experiences of
this kind provoked new understandings of belonging or difference? Through a critical reading of
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personal correspondence, photographs, and military and medical records, we can better
understand the impact of these encounters within the physical, racial, and gendered confines of
French military hospitals. Approached with the analytical tools of historians of colonial medicine
and gender, these little-understood spaces reveal how the war marked a significant rupture not
only for Tunisia but also for North Africa as a whole: soldiers’ wartime experiences included a
wide array of moments in which they could grasp, question, and even cast aside the harsh sense
of difference imposed by French colonial practice.9
Scholars have often highlighted how colonial medical projects’ material and personnel
shortages could exacerbate the dehumanization of non-European subjects. Despite the grandiose
aims of European medical and colonial officials, local concerns and conditions often proved
unavoidable. The same medical discourse that Fanon critiqued for its “depersonalization” and
“systematic dehumanization” of the colonized could be equally alienating and oppressive when it
was applied unevenly or unsuccessfully.10 In French West Africa, for example, heavy-handed
public health measures, informed by racist presumptions and lacking in resources, resulted in the
violent relocation of entire indigenous communities; meanwhile, yellow fever, malaria, and the
bubonic plague persisted through the 1910s.11 In India, frugal British spending throughout the
early twentieth century meant that psychiatric asylums were critically understaffed and short of
provisions, making these spaces at best only occasionally medically effective and at worst up to
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five times more deadly for their patients than life at home.12
Similarly, during the First World War, French military and medical authorities faced
shortages, significant input (usually unsolicited) from their patients, and conflicting visions for
how policies would take shape on the ground. Yet whereas such limitations in many cases
exacerbated the inhumane treatment of colonial subjects at the hands of French authorities,
wartime contingencies also produced more personal encounters than normally occurred or were
permitted between French women and Tunisian men. And while the cases outlined below were
likely closer to the exception than the rule, they were significant enough to provoke a sustained
response from French authorities, offering a glimpse at how the war strained colonial policies
toward and discourses about their Muslim subjects. In military hospitals, I argue, material
limitations and nurses’ and soldiers’ individual motivations created space for humanizing
encounters unimaginable in prewar Tunisia. Tunisian tirailleurs found themselves caught
between a newfound sense of belonging with the French public and a starker sense of the
boundaries of French colonial practice. These encounters and relationships, unfolding within the
confines of these military-medical “colonies within the metropole,” could in this way be
understood as a precursor to the many Franco-Maghribi relationships that nurtured the anticolonial and feminist politics of the metropole in the 1920s.13
This chapter begins by establishing the circumstances of Tunisian soldiers’ presence on
French soil during the war, with particular attention given to how French fears and racial
presumptions shaped tirailleurs’ treatment as pathogenic and sexual threats. I then proceed to
show how Tunisians’ ambiguous encounters with French nurses strained norms of gender and

James H. Mills and Sanjeev Jain, “Mapother of the Maudsley and Psychiatry at the End of the Raj,” in Psychiatry
and Empire, eds. Sloan Mahone and Megan Vaughan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 164-165.
13
Jennifer Anne Boittin, Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar
Paris (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010), 77-110.
12

79

racial segregation, offering to both a space for humanizing interactions not commonly available
during peacetime. I conclude by examining how Tunisians (as well as some Algerians and
Moroccans) in Muslim hospitals experienced French authorities’ uneven efforts to isolate and reeducate them, problematizing the notion that military and medical officials, despite their racially
informed presumptions, were successful in—or even always interested in—preventing contact
between Tunisians and French civilians.
A final clarifying note is in order with regard to the scope of this chapter’s subjects: in
documents concerning the hospitals at Carrières-sous-Bois, Lyon, and Moisselles, French
officials only sometimes discerned between soldiers of different North African countries, and
often grouped them together as “North African,” “Maghribi,” “Muslim,” or even “African.”
These terminological choices could have been made out of convenience, ignorance, or a desire to
generalize about the racial, religious, or “civilizational” traits of their colonial subjects. But
French stereotypes themselves sometimes distinguished between North Africans. Moroccans, for
example, were apparently assigned frontline combat more often than Tunisians, who were seen
as less than keen warriors.14 Moroccans were also presumed to be more religious than Algerians
and Tunisians and were thus treated differently by some French physicians.15 Where possible,
given the focus of this dissertation on the experiences of Tunisian migrants, I have highlighted
Tunisian examples. On the other hand, North African soldiers regardless of origin shared the
rough contours of their wartime experience, and their relationships with one another remain an
important aspect of that experience deserving of further study beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
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Saviors and Suspects
Insufficient manpower troubled France throughout the war, but its turn to its colonies to fill the
army’s thinning ranks generated much debate.16 Many worried that demanding military service
of tirailleurs without granting them French citizenship would provoke resentment.17 In
particular, Muslim North Africans were not, with few exceptions, French citizens. Moroccans
and Tunisians were technically considered subjects of their nominal “protected” sovereigns. In
the army, they were treated much like their Muslim Algerian counterparts who, despite living
under direct French sovereignty, nonetheless remained colonial subjects because of the perceived
incompatibility of their Islamic personal status with the French civil code.18 Whereas all North
Africans had once been “Muslims” or “indigènes” on their home soil, their experience on the
front and in the factories of France won them praise as “adopted children,” “heroes” fighting for
the cause of their French protectors.19 Gilbert Meynier has argued that while Algerians suffered
some discrimination at the front, they found the military hierarchy generally more egalitarian
than the colonial order and found temporary purpose in the paternalistic calls for solidarity in the
face of a common enemy.20
It would seem, however, that French preoccupations with loyalty reflected continued
anxieties about how North and West Africans’ position in the French colonial hierarchy might be
overturned during the war. These anxieties formed the basis of a complex intelligence apparatus
dedicated to tracking the activities of exiled intellectuals and religious figures, some of whom
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became Ottoman and German operatives (as further discussed in the next chapter). The latter
distributed pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman leaflets to North African soldiers in the French trenches,
causing much concern among French authorities about North African conscripts’ loyalty. Postal
censors also noted that North African tirailleurs, aware of French concerns over their loyalty,
developed secret codes to pass along the news of defeats and losses suffered in France and
Belgium.21 But despite some qualms about the lack of religious facilities and halal foods in
Europe, Tunisian soldiers were largely indifferent to pro-Ottoman or “pan-Islamic” overtures.
This was perhaps due in part to their low literacy rates or to the difficulties of circulating
propaganda materials under French censorship, but more to the point, French authorities vastly
overestimated the extent to which these mostly rural and illiterate young men felt any sort of
attachment to an Ottoman Empire about which they knew very little.22
While the French administration was cautious in its concern for Tunisians’ loyalty during
the war, it recognized that it was important that France show itself to be the protector of Muslims
around the world in order to justify its international and imperial ambitions, particularly if the
Ottoman Empire were to crumble. The loyal Muslim soldier, it was hoped, would prove
incontrovertibly that France was well-suited to this role and that it had been recognized as such
by its subjects. As Gregory Mann explains, proclamations of tirailleurs’ loyalty became “all but
obligatory” platitudes in colonial officers’ memoirs, and were later recycled by generations of
historians.23
While on leave from the front, Tunisians and other colonial soldiers were initially free to
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enjoy the trappings of metropolitan French society. They indulged in the pleasures of this
lifestyle alongside European soldiers and civilians, frequenting cafés, cabarets, and brothels –
spaces that could offer alcohol, sex, and subversive political discussions. Of course, Tunisians
were no more likely than their French counterparts to seek out or engage in activities deemed
seditious or immoral. It was simply that military and colonial officers, informed by their
collective wisdom from the colonies, believed they understood the “special mentality” of their
Arab subjects in a way that French civilians could not. While tirailleurs were dismissed as
primitive and harmlessly childlike, they were also said to be dangerous and duplicitous.24
French medical discourse was deployed in a variety of ways to explain and neutralize
these dangers during the First World War, tinged in no uncertain terms by the racial or
civilizational ideologies of colonial difference and notions of indigenous peoples’ “mentalité.”
Richard Keller’s study of the development of colonial psychiatry shows that the cutting edge
Algiers School, for example, reinforced a hierarchy of racial distinction in determining that
“mentally debilitated” North African soldiers, including those who demonstrated “passivity,
inertia, nonchalance,” were in fact “not … inferior to the mean of their race.”25 Syphilis,
moreover, was described by physician Georges Lacapère as “the Arab disease,” its prevalence in
Morocco attributed not to race exactly, but rather to cultural habits and civilizational
differences.26 Other French physicians produced medical narratives about North Africans as
simultaneously “shameless” and “pathologically modest” about syphilis and the difficult efforts
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to treat it, both in the colonies and among tirailleurs in the metropole.27 Their bodies were
considered a pathogenic threat to the colonial order: improperly trained and restrained, they
could upend the gender relations, biomedical safety, and public order central to French imperial
rule.

Inverting the Colonial Gaze
The threat of contact between white French women and colonial soldiers appears to have
provoked urgent apprehension among French authorities. Such encounters could overturn the
entire colonial order, an order dependent on patriarchal hierarchies of command in both military
and civilian life.28 At stake was the “prestige” of white women who, carefully guarded across
European empires as “bearers of a redefined colonial morality,” in Ann Laura Stoler’s words,
were suddenly exposed to indigenous subjects’ perceived promiscuity.29 To those who sought to
abolish prostitution for this reason, for example, such prestige was “one of the undisputed
foundations of our civilizing initiative.”30 Colonial troops’ circulation of thousands of letters and
postcards with photographs of nude French women further threatened to invert the hierarchy
which placed the subjection of “exotic” indigenous women to a male European gaze at the top of
the order.31
Prior to the First World War, mixed-race relationships and marriages were exceedingly
rare in North Africa. In Algeria, home to far more European settlers than Tunisia, less than a
dozen Franco-Algerian marriages per year were reported from 1891 to 1914. Less policy than an
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accepted norm, Neil MacMaster explains, this “mutually self-reinforcing segregation of the two
communities reflected complex social, cultural, and political barriers between the dominant
settlers and a subject colonial people.”32 During the First World War, then, encounters between
colonial troops and European women, ranging from as mundane as nurse and patient to as
controversial as husband and wife, exposed Tunisians to the highly-guarded, intimate domains of
white French men and women.33 Many North African soldiers expressed amazement that France
behind the lines seemed to be nearly entirely composed of women, with so many men having left
for the front.34 Others were struck that French women in the metropole appeared much more
welcoming than those they had encountered in the colonies.35 Marraines de guerre (“godmothers
of war”), French women who wrote letters to soldiers to boost their morale, often built close
personal relationships with their pen pals, inviting them to their homes, taking them out to cafés,
and buying them gifts. This practice was not limited to white soldiers.36
Sometimes these friendships developed: the “nightmare” of mixed-race couples and their
progeny was perhaps the greatest embodiment of racial and gendered anxieties.37 In official
rhetoric North Africans were largely described as seductive and manipulative, with French
women dismissed as naïve or even “hysterical” in their “benevolence” towards them.38 The
Tunisian soldier Salah ben Meneddes, for example, had been engaged to a French woman named
Lucienne Bernard, whom he had met during his recovery at a hospital in Bordeaux. Bernard’s
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letter requesting information about her fiancé’s wellbeing in January 1919 prompted a report
from Tunisian officials describing him as a criminal despite his apparently clean record.39 In a
similar case, one Maria Ayroles requested information about the family of her fiancé, a wounded
Tunisian soldier named Mohammed Boukali. Officials suggested in their reply that Ayroles had
little concept of what a “painful life” she was in for among the indigenous people of her fiancé’s
hometown, the Berber-speaking mountain village of Sened, nor of the “intolerable” laws of the
Muslim religion. They recommended that she end the engagement and distance herself from
Boukali.40
To mitigate concerns over mixing with Europeans, military authorities subjected North
African soldiers to a series of initiatives aimed at limiting their contact with French society, and
with French women in particular. Jean-Yves Le Naour has argued that colonial soldiers, confined
to barracks and hospitals under the uniquely vigilant watch of the military and colonial
apparatus, were subject to far stricter measures of isolation and control than colonial workers in
the metropole.41 Stovall has also noted that by the end of the war, French officials prioritized
their efforts to limit contact between French women and colonial subjects and were often
successful in doing so by imposing fines, censoring mail, and even forbidding certain interracial
marriages.42 While on leave, North African soldiers fell increasingly under heightened levels of
surveillance by the Service de l'organisation des travailleurs coloniaux. They were often
restricted to “Moorish cafés” in military depots and prevented from visiting French families.43
Moreover, as early as September 1914, North Africans’ standard red and blue uniforms were

CADN 1TU/125/14 – Le Contrôleur Civil du Kef à Flandin, 15 January 1919.
CADN 1TU/125/14 – Au sujet d’un marriage entre Française et indigène, 25 October 1915.
41
Jean-Yves Le Naour, “La question de la violation de l’interdit racial en 1914-1918. La rencontre des coloniaux et
des femmes françaises,” Cahiers de la Méditerranée 61:1 (2000), 173-174.
42
Stovall, “Love, Labor, and Race,” 312-13.
43
Meynier, L’Algérie révélée, 416; Le Naour, “La question de la violation de l’interdit racial,” 180-181.
39
40

86

replaced with khaki uniforms and chechias (the Maghrib’s ubiquitous red caps), such that they
could be easily distinguished from European soldiers.44 West and North African sex workers
were even hired to fill military brothels to prevent non-white soldiers’ encounters with French
civilians or with each other.45 These efforts were intended to “keep the indigènes in their
barracks or units, sheltered from the temptations of the metropolitan cities” – a common
refrain.46 Such prophylaxis, it was hoped, would mitigate the dangers tirailleurs supposedly
posed to French society, while sculpting obedient subjects out of them.
But how effective were such measures, and were these efforts extended effectively to
medical spaces? With regard to treatment and reeducation efforts, it is true that the hospitals at
Carrières-sous-Bois, Lyon, and Moisselles offered potent avenues for experimentation with
racial theories and policies of colonial difference. Yet in the course of daily life for recovering
tirailleurs, wartime exigencies demanded of French officials a more ambiguous, heterodox
approach towards rehabilitation. As a result, efforts at segregation were unevenly applied or
often skirted completely, opening the way for encounters even more transformative than what
these soldiers might have come across in France’s cafés or brothels. Between the presence of
female nurses, French lessons and vocational training, and opportunities to claim recognition for
their important role in protecting France, Tunisians found ways to cross colonial boundaries in
ways unimaginable before the outbreak of war. It is with such a rupture in mind that I now turn
to the relationships between wounded Tunisian soldiers and French nurses.

Nursing Transgressions in a Mixed Hospital
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Some officials’ attempts to isolate North Africans from civilian French society were simply
confounded by the circumstances of war.47 As casualties mounted, male nurses and doctors
struggled to keep up. The need for more doctors at the front drained medical facilities from both
the colonies and France behind the lines, as nonprofessionals increasingly took up medical
tasks.48 Meanwhile, women joined the effort in droves, with some 100,000 French women—
many of them middle-class Red Cross volunteers with little more than a couple months of
training or experience—serving as nurses by the end of the war. And while French officials often
pressed for more stringent training and qualification requirements for nurses, the sheer extent of
wartime need, combined with women’s ardent desire to contribute to national service, took
precedence.49 It would be a mistake to understate the extent to which women, despite certain
officials’ misgivings, were widely considered to play an invaluable role in the French war
effort.50 Still, as female nurses had not been allowed into military hospitals until 1907, nursing in
France was far from the established “feminine profession” that had begun to take shape in
Britain and elsewhere from the time of Florence Nightingale.51 In their relative novelty, French
women nurses drew both praise and criticism, colored by the expectation that they act as heroic,
selfless, and saintly “mothers.” But failing this, nurses could be accused of frivolity and sexual
impropriety, their feminine presence supposedly softening the will of the nation’s soldiers.52
French authorities were not all in agreement about limiting contact between French
women and North African men, both within and beyond hospital walls. For example, Center-

Meynier, L’Algérie révélée, 415.
Clark, “Expressing Entitlement in Colonial Algeria,” 456-57.
49
Katrin Schulthiess, Bodies and Souls: Politics and the Professionalization of Nursing in France, 1880-1922
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 159-161. See also: Christine E. Hallett and Alison S. Fell,
“Introduction,” in First World War Nursing: New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013), 2-5.
50
Margaret H. Darrow, “French Volunteer Nursing and the Myth of War Experience in World War I,” American
Historical Review 101:1 (1996), 82-84.
51
Schulthiess, Bodies and Souls, 151-153; 174-175.
52
Ibid., 160-162.
47
48

88

right parliamentary deputy Albin Rozet, a friend of Young Tunisian reformer Abdelaziz Thaalbi,
supported a policy of “association between the two races,” arguing in June 1915 that French
families should be allowed to host tirailleurs on leave.53 Director of the Service de Santé de
l’Armée Justin Godart, by contrast, allegedly responded to soldiers’ “misinterpretations” of their
nurses’ care by calling in 1916 for female hospital personnel to be prevented from giving direct
care to Muslim soldiers. Some medical officers listened: one Dr. Maclaud in Marseille sent away
his female contingent of nurses from the Red Cross. But women on the whole remained an
important part of the care given to Tunisians, Algerians, and Moroccans at many other
hospitals.54
The experience of ‘Amr, the wounded and blinded Tunisian soldier cared for by nurse
Cantinelli in Lyon as first described in this chapter’s introduction, gets to the heart of these
charged encounters. The closeness of their relationship is suggested by the leaves of Cantinelli’s
personal letter to ‘Amr’s mother, which sit squeezed in between pages of a Protectorate official’s
report at the French diplomatic archives in Nantes. In the handwritten letter, Cantinelli wrote that
‘Amr’s “death has been truly felt in our house, where ‘Amr came regularly to eat on Sunday for
the past three months.” ‘Amr was taken by Cantinelli on walks around the city, and based on
what we know about marraines de guerre, one could imagine that he learned some basic French
and participated in a number of leisure activities and games. The kind of close contact already
controversial within the confines of the hospital could prove even more profound when it moved
to the civilian spaces of France. Cantinelli wrote to ‘Amr’s mother that “once I got to know your
little ‘Amr, I became interested in him; I took him out myself twice a week, and other days …
other young girls and I all adored him and learned to admire his beautiful nature which suffered
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nobly through his disabilities.” The nurse assured ‘Amr’s mother that he was well taken care of,
surrounded by “affection”: she held his hands in hers, ensuring his good spirits right up until his
death. His final words, according to Cantinelli, were: “Tell my brother never to go off to war.”55
Tragically, it seems that in his convalescence and even in his death, ‘Amr’s tentative
admission into the French civilian realm had so contested his place in the colonial realm that
Tunisian Protectorate officials reacted to Cantinelli’s letter with a paternalistic anxiety.
Cantinelli’s letter was perhaps only preserved because it had drawn the attention of the Civil
Controller of Kairouan, a provincial official appointed by the Resident General to oversee local
civilian affairs, who was dismayed by this “touching” but ultimately ill-conceived and naïve
gesture. The report, notably sent directly to Tunisia’s highest authority, Resident General Gabriel
Alapetite, acknowledged first that Cantinelli’s letter would “certainly provoke [‘Amr’s mother’s]
deep gratitude.” The agent went on to note that “one can only be moved when reading it, and
filled with admiration and respect for these women who follow with so much gentle devotion,
even in in the face of death, the noble path to which they’ve been drawn.”56
From there, however, the report turns to its ultimate purpose: to warn the head of the
Tunisian Protectorate of the dangers posed by nurse Cantinelli’s letter. She had bypassed the
established protocol for notifying kin of fallen colonial soldiers. No doubt the Civil Controller
would have been caught off-guard if ‘Amr’s family had come unexpectedly to claim their son’s
pension, Cantinelli’s letter in hand. The report noted a series of indiscretions: informing ‘Amr’s
mother that her son had been blinded, sending along his remaining possessions directly including
a watch and chechia (the popular red cap worn across the Maghrib) she had given him, and
arranging a burial with flowers and a palm laid on the coffin by “pious and maternal Catholic
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women,” as the nurse had put it. The latter, the Civil Controller noted, was bound to “produce
unease and anxiety instead of the desired effect.” The report goes further, however, revealing the
deep apprehension evoked by the representatives of the French colonial system:
The signatory of this letter would perhaps be sorry to hear my criticisms, however
convinced I am of her sincerity and of the goodness of her intentions; but this is precisely
because these women do not know the mentalité and the habits of the indigènes, whom
they risk misunderstanding or being misunderstood by.57

What French officials held to be “misunderstandings” were, in this case, a dramatic
reconfiguration of colonial understandings. While it is not clear whether Cantinelli was a career
nurse or a volunteer, the Civil Controller’s report seems to suggest that her misconduct was
accidental and common to many of “these women” who served during the war. It is also evident
from the report that nurses like Cantinelli were not always steeped in the discourses and policies
of colonial and racial difference. “Mentalité,” for example, was a frequent refrain in French
writing about the indigenous “mind,” both among colonial administrators and academics. The
term was often deployed to explain all manner of non-European cultural practices (as in Lucien
Lévy-Bruhl’s 1922 work La mentalité primitive).58 It was also used to explain away indigenous
resistance to European policies and practices. If the civilizing mission was meant to bring order
and reason to non-European peoples, then would not a rejection of such a mission amount to
irrationality or even insanity?59
In this case, Cantinelli’s failure, willful or otherwise, to adhere to colonial and military
protocols was precisely what had catalyzed her humanizing encounter with ‘Amr and, by
extension, his family. In writing her letter, she had presumed a certain rationality in and parity
with ‘Amr’s mother, whom she may have seen as her counterpart. To Protectorate officials,
57
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however, ‘Amr’s mother was at risk of reacting harshly to news of her son’s blindness, death,
and non-Muslim burial. Certainly Amr’s grim warning to his brother would not have inspired
confidence in the French war effort. But more than this, the ambiguous nature of her and other
European women’s relationships with wounded tirailleurs were best not exposed to North
Africans back home. The point here is not to determine whether Cantinelli’s care for ‘Amr arose
from romantic, maternal, or pious sentiment; at any rate, her true emotions or intentions are
unknowable to the historian. Rather, what is significant is that Cantinelli’s expression of such
compassion in a letter to ‘Amr’s mother amounted to an act of transgression.
Cantinelli’s letter, and the reaction it provoked, was not an altogether exceptional
occurrence. Nurses frequently pledged their love for and admiration of these soldiers who
claimed to have “saved France,” leading one officer to suggest that tirailleurs be reminded
sternly and in the presence of nurses that they had been mobilized to defend their own homes as
much as they were to defend France.60 It was enough that these soldiers had begun to feel that a
certain debt or elevated status was owed to them, to say nothing of the blow to French
masculinity symbolized by the need to recruit non-European soldiers. French authorities had
already faced calls from figures as influential as Blaise Diagne to extend greater political rights
and even French citizenship to colonial soldiers.61 While tirailleurs were paid less than their
French counterparts, injured veterans of North Africa – regardless of race, religion, or political
status – were eventually granted equal pensions in a 1919 law. The orphans of indigenous
Algerian soldiers, moreover, later became the center of much debate over the empire’s
responsibility for repaying the “blood tax.”62
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Much has been written about the important psychological and emotional roles played by
nurses in military hospitals during the First World War. They, like soldiers, felt the need to live
up to certain patriotic ideals—in their case, the “ministering angel” who approached the
wounded with a stoic compassion.63 Through such care they consciously sculpted their roles to
mimic those of soldiers’ sisters and mothers, often acting as the wounded’s only emotional link
to home, or in the case of Cantinelli, literally opening their homes to soldiers.64 Given the
incredible physical and psychological burdens nurses faced in their daily work, moreover, I
propose that the professional, stoic distance demanded by French authorities may not always
have been possible.65 As Paul Fussel explained in his seminar work on First World War
literature, just as men’s physical strength had been bested by the emergent technologies of heavy
artillery and machine guns, so too had their ability to “penetrate” and “thrust” through enemy
trenches.66 In other words, the unprecedented nature of this war had wrought male impotence on
a mass scale. Carol Acton explains that British nurses and wounded soldiers were brought into an
interdependence through the fulfillment of their gendered roles at war, men wearing the “badges”
of their wounds and women dressing those wounds dutifully, restoring men as best they could to
their masculine physicality.67
Yet whereas such a reading of the interdependence of British nurses and soldiers points to
an overstepping of gendered boundaries, the interdependence between French nurses and
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Tunisian soldiers could violate both gendered and colonial boundaries. In such an encounter,
what other dynamics did the nurse–patient relationship assume? First, it seems that the intimacy
of their close quarters sometimes gave way to romance and even sex. Military authorities
lamented that wounded colonial soldiers, often hospitalized for months on end, found themselves
pampered by nurses while they “malingered.”68 French reports, citing incidents of “sexual
favors” given to the wounded, criticized the “hysterical folly” of the nurse-mondaine, the
“emancipated woman” who had brought her assertive sexuality out of sequestration and closer to
the front.69 Nurses presumably had their own reasons for building relationships with their
patients (sexual or otherwise), be they out of compassion, patriotism, religious devotion, or
romantic desire. Furthermore, non-white men and French women, disenfranchised and facing
inequalities and disciplinary measures, shared the fact that they were both outsiders suddenly
asked to perform duties central to the preservation of the French nation.
Despite the possibility of sex and romance, more innocent dynamics were usually at play
between French nurses and Tunisian soldiers. First, although officials had begun efforts to
secularize hospitals by the turn of the century, nurses of religious congregations and their ideals
of pious commitment remained central to the character of nursing in France.70 Secondly, nurses
often took on the character of “nurse-as-mother” for wounded soldiers who were far from home,
and referred to their patients as “boy,” “my dear little one,” and so on.71 North and West Africans
were in fact regularly described in such an infantilizing manner, as in the popular “Y’a bon!”
slogan of Banania advertisements which played on the image of the smiling, harmless West
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African, or the more general characterization of colonial soldiers as “adopted sons.”72 Perhaps
then a familial relationship could flourish where a sexual or romantic one could not. In other
words, such a relationship could afford the sort of safe distance expected between Tunisian men
and French women in such a setting while still providing a moment of exploration that pushed,
but did not quite breach, the normative racial and gendered boundaries of colonial difference.
This “innocent” kind of affection fell, or could appear to fall, within the scope of a nurse’s
duties.
Historians of emotion have rightfully warned against attempting to determine the true
emotions or “gut feelings” of our historical subjects; we can only interpret the historically
mediated expressions of those experiences. Analysis of emotional expression, Nicole Eustace
explains, “requires critical attention to the contemporary ideas about emotion that defined the
message conveyed by the expression (or omission) of emotion in any particular historical
context.”73 In the case of Cantinelli’s letter, close attention to the trajectory of the text itself also
offers a compelling window into the historical stakes of both expression and omission. That is,
the letter itself represented a certain expression of her sentiments, shaped of course by her
personal feelings, but also by nurses’ social and gendered expectations, and by the norms of
writing such a letter of condolence. In turn, officials’ dismay that this expression had not been
“omitted” reflects wider French anxieties about women’s changing roles, Muslim anticolonialism, and the long-term political impacts of the war.
While we lack the biographical details that might allow for a more substantial exploration
of the role of emotions in this encounter, the textual evidence suggests that nurses such as

72

Fogarty, Race and War in France, 157-159.
Nicole Eustace, Eugenia Lean, Julie Livingston, Jan Plamper, William M. Reddy, and Barbara H. Rosenwein,
“AHR conversation: The historical study of emotions,” The American Historical Review 117: 5 (2012), 1505.
73

95

Cantinelli and patients such as ‘Amr could find themselves in relationships marked by varying
degrees of romance, maternalism, and piety. It is clear, moreover, that encounters between
French nurses and wounded Tunisian soldiers could provoke an overturning of the colonial order
and of the polite fictions of patriotic duty on which it insisted. Such provocations also laid bare
for tirailleurs that they could, to a certain extent, attain aspects of a “French” life. For a seriously
wounded soldier like ‘Amr, finding oneself taken into the familial domain or quite simply feeling
the touch of a nurse like Cantinelli, went beyond official recognition of their sacrifices at the
front line.

The “Muslim Hospitals” at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles
Would ‘Amr and Cantinelli’s encounter have been different within the confines of a “Muslim
hospital,” such as those at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, rather than at the general hospital
in Lyon? On the one hand, the wartime spaces that afforded such boundary crossing were for the
most part short lived and tightly policed. Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, designated
specifically for Muslim North Africans, offered French officials an opportunity to better isolate
and re-educate their subjects along lines deemed more appropriate to colonial interests. On the
other hand, it would be an exaggeration to think of France’s wartime Muslim hospitals simply as
prisons, despite the disciplinary methods of surveillance and control they featured.74 Rather, one
might think of them as “colonies within the metropole,” in the sense that they too often lacked
funding, supplies, personnel, and a coherent vision for their operation. Such wartime
contingencies meant that Muslim hospitals allowed and even produced the spaces in which
otherwise-proscribed encounters between Tunisian soldiers and French women could take shape.
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Specialized hospitals were not constructed only for North African Muslims. Senegalese
soldiers were brought to isolated hospitals in southern French towns such as Fréjus for the
winter, where it was hoped that they could recover from weather-related afflictions while being
“re-Senegalized” so as not to get used to being treated as anything other than colonial subjects. 75
Similarly, the Jardin Colonial at Nogent-sur-Marne housed perhaps the largest and most diverse
group of colonial soldiers at the time, its Hôpital bénévole serving over 300 wounded tirailleurs.
Its “oriental” architecture, prayer spaces, and non-Christian cemeteries reflected its role as a
flagship for French propaganda, which had been one of the grounds’ primary functions since
hosting a colonial exposition for the Société française de colonization in 1907. The massive
Brighton Royal Pavilion, built to evoke an imperial Indian grandeur, would serve a similar role
on the southern English coast during the war.76
French efforts to build Muslim hospitals during the First World War were unprecedented.
It was not until 1935, after a controversial decade of planning, fundraising, and political
negotiations, that the well-known Franco-Muslim hospital would be built in Bobigny, outside
Paris.77 The Muslim hospitals at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles were established much more
haphazardly amid the turmoil of war. Neither complex was built for the occasion, both having
been repurposed for their new roles in 1915. Carrières-sous-Bois, located a few miles north of
Paris, had been a sanatorium prior to the war. Moisselles, found just beyond Paris’ western
suburbs, had been a civilian psychiatric asylum. While studies of the Jardin Colonial and the
Brighton Royal Pavilion may reveal much about how colonial soldiers factored into the

Gregory Mann, “Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa,” American Historical Review
110: 2 (2005), 414-416. See also: Mann, Native Sons, 166-168.
76
Samuel Hyson and Alan Lester, “‘British India on Trial’: Brighton Military Hospitals and the Politics of Empire
in World War I,” Journal of Historical Geography 38:1 (2012), 18-34.
77
Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control Between the Wars (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006), 172-176.
75

97

international politics of colonialism, the smaller and decidedly lesser-known hospitals at
Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, through documents preserved in Tunisian and French
archives, reveal more about how North Africans encountered, contested, and constituted those
politics on a daily basis.
One article in France-Maroc, a monthly review aimed at publicizing French national and
economic interests in Morocco, marked these hospitals as part of an effort to honor North
Africans’ sacrifices in the name of French civilization. These “tough children of Africa” would
not have to suffer their own presumed fatalism:
It is a fact that the dispositions common to the French cannot be entirely applied
to these brave indigènes so different in spirit, manners, language, religion, and
race, and the political and military statuses which unite them with the metropole
are distinct, according to whether they come from our colonies or protectorates in
Africa, Asia, or Oceania. It is above all recommended to the hospital directors to
ensure that the natives receive the same care and are surrounded with the same
solicitude as the soldiers of the mother country [France].78
At least in such a promotional statement, the care provided to colonial soldiers would have to be
equal to that given to French soldiers, yet the methods of such care were said to depend on the
race and civilization of the patients in question. Such contradictory logic was commonplace in
colonial rhetoric. The author of the report went on to highlight a few observations on daily life
during his visit to Moisselles, including the varieties of food served: French dishes cooked with
butter or oil rather than pig lard, and couscous served every Thursday. The Ramadan fast was
facilitated for those who wished to observe it; burial rites and other religious affairs were
administered by North African imams.79 The hospital at Carrières-sous-Bois had a total of 150
beds, but it is unclear from this or other reports just how many patients or staff were present at
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Moisselles or Carrières-sous-Bois at any given time, or what types of injuries of illnesses were
most prevalent. Given their distance from the front and their emphasis on the retraining and
behavioral transformation of their patients, they likely housed soldiers with chronic or long-term
medical conditions. Undated photographs reveal that doctors at Moisselles used electrotherapy, a
controversial but increasingly popular practice during the war.80 We also learn from one report
that at Moisselles thirty-eight tirailleurs died of their wounds between June 1916 and July 1919,
twenty-nine of whom were buried in plots on the grounds of the hospital; the remains of six
others were repatriated after the war.81
Despite being designated specifically for Muslim North African soldiers, the hospitals at
Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles included women on staff, most of them nurses with the Red
Cross. The sheer shortage of available men meant that women had to fill such roles even where
they were not preferred by officials, particularly at such ad-hoc institutions as these.82 Yet the
presence of female nurses might also suggest a more practical and open-minded approach to
providing care to North Africans. French officials should not be taken as a monolith on this
subject, as it is likely that the value of well-supervised nurses’ work outweighed the potential
risks that some associated with their presence. Considering that wartime photographs were often
(though not always) posed and arranged deliberately, images taken by Tunisian photographer
Albert Samama-Chikli of the French Army’s Section photographique et cinématographique
suggest that despite officials’ misgivings, some military hospitals demonstrated a relaxed
atmosphere open to daily proximity between nurses and North Africans.
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Fig. 8: ECPAD SPA 32 L 1724D. “Military hospital for African Troops at Carrières-sous-Bois.” 25 October 1916.
Samama-Chikli, Albert.

Fig. 9: ECPAD SPA 32 L 1724D. “Military hospital for African Troops at Carrières-sous-Bois.” 25
October 1916. Samama-Chikli, Albert.

Much like Cantinelli’s letter, these photographs offer few biographical details about those
depicted. Nonetheless, when closely examined, they reveal some clues about the possibilities for
100

close daily contact between tirailleurs and French nurses. In Figure 8 (above), two nurses stand
relaxed and smiling among a group of wounded but well-humored North Africans. The nurse on
the right, in particular, appears comfortable and accessible as she leans against a balcony and
looks, smiling, at a standing soldier, their backs to the Seine. In Figure 9 (above), a nurse sits on
a soldier’s bed watching closely as he plays checkers with another seated soldier. In these
arrangements, as in many other photographs from this particular visit, nurses are frequently
portrayed seated at the level of the colonial soldier while male officials are almost always
standing, perhaps reflecting the different gendered roles and hierarchy expected in such a
medical-military setting.83 Segregation does not appear to be a factor; in fact, daily intermixing
almost appears to be celebrated by the photographer. For all the rhetoric and policies surrounding
the perceived threat of interracial intimacy, in these medical settings, gendered roles ironically
set French men apart from North African men, while women, presumed to have a greater
capacity to provide comfort and support, found themselves right alongside tirailleurs.
The scene in Figure 10 (below) is decidedly more somber, as an injured soldier is tended
to by a doctor and two nurses; another official stands to the side taking notes. Quite striking in
this photograph, however, is the nurse who sits on the hospital bed closely alongside the soldier,
holding his hand which, exposed below a bulging swath of bandages, appears to be heavily
swollen or perhaps artificial. The nurse, who wears white gloves, looks down solemnly at his
hand in her lap.
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Fig. 10: ECPAD SPA 32 L 1708. “The military hospital for African Troops at Carrières-sous-Bois.” 25 October
1916. Samama-Chikli, Albert.

Without speculating about the specific circumstances of the scene depicted, it is worth
considering the importance of the physical touch which “can be said to open up the body at a
more intimate, affective level.”84 While nurses’ hands were involved in the most gruesome and
taxing aspects of wartime surgery and amputation (often without anesthesia), there were many
cases like the one pictured here in which nurses’ hands did the enduring work of steadying and
reassuring the wounded. Touch could be tender, but it could be also be violent and bruising, a
tactile witness to the “frenzied grips” of a soldier in physical or emotional pain.85 In this sense,
this single image dramatically encapsulates the ambiguities of this encounter, its distances and
proximities, and its understandings and humanity. One wonders about the importance of touch
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for ‘Amr who, robbed of his sight at the front, would have held many a hand during his final
months in Lyon.

Reeducation, Recreation, Difference

Fig. 11: ECPAD SPA 87 D 5172. “French classes, Moisselles, Muslim Hospital.” Seine-et-Oise. 8 May 1918.
Brissy, Edouard.

The hospitals at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles played host to a number of efforts to
proactively re-educate its patients, as officials were concerned with more than just North
Africans’ encounters with French women. In fact, one function of the hospital at Moisselles, as
described by its head doctor, was to teach North Africans to read and write French (see Fig. 11
above). While this decision might appear to contradict the widely expressed desire to limit rather
than promote North Africans’ access to French civilian life, it was a tactical one: closely
monitored lessons for a small number of noncommissioned colonial officers could help
compensate for the utter lack of French officers who understood Arabic.86 North Africans were
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sometimes taught by teachers from a local public school, one of whom described his half-dozen
students as “applying themselves well, very attentive, and making marked progress,” though
there were not enough French teachers available to teach more than about three hours per week.87
Once again, the exigencies of war sometimes demanded practical actions that permeated the
stricter boundaries of colonial rhetoric.
Still, recovering North African soldiers faced the daily iterations of French notions of
colonial and racial difference. Officials and physicians around the French Empire often
expressed that moral uplift was central to economic development and public health projects.88
Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles were no exception, as doctors and support staff believed their
mandate to be both medical and moral. Since few North African conscripts could read,
magazines and books typically enjoyed by European soldiers were nearly useless to all but a
“very small elite.” Doctors tried to introduce a variety of French lawn games, such as tonneaux,
boules, and tennis, but they were met with little success, confounding French authorities who
presumed that such games would be enjoyed universally: “Arabs have in effect a childish
mentality, and, like children, break their toys after having a moment of fun. In any case, they are
not used to this type of recreation and do not appreciate its charm.” Cards, dominoes, and other
indoor games were slightly more successful in officials’ eyes, but were still marred by gambling
and fighting. Moisselles soldiers went on supervised walks through the neighborhood during the
midday “free quarter” on Thursdays and Sundays, but if they were caught drinking, they often
found themselves imprisoned for this proscribed practice. Similar scenes played out among
countless other groups of European soldiers behind the lines, yet embedded in such descriptions
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of North African soldiers was the presumption of a primitive or childlike mentalité.89
Morale was a continued concern, as officials reported that North Africans still exhibited
all manner of “dark ideas,” “critical attitudes,” and “boredom” attributed to their many injuries,
to inactivity, or to “quasi-religious qualms.”90 Consul General M. Piat, of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, supported an initiative that brought theatrical performances and film screenings to
hospitals in and around Paris; Moisselle’s staff hoped that this approach would address North
Africans’ morale problems.91 Medical officials were particularly proud of the Army’s efforts to
re-educate their colonial soldiers through cinema, a cutting-edge approach increasingly used by
both the Entente and the Central Powers. Such screenings at Moisselles were a major occasion
for all involved; even the head doctor, “despite his many duties,” would attend these three-hour
sessions before dinner on Sunday.92
The head doctor noted proudly that not one wounded soldier had been forced to attend
these screenings, but that sheer curiosity had given way to increased interest in the films, with
fewer and fewer North Africans choosing to leave the building on their days of leave. Neither
“by threat nor by punishment,” but rather by “gentleness, by persuasion, and above all by
example,” the French had “imposed [their] authority and safeguarded discipline. We have often
come to hear one of the wounded saying to a comrade who had made a mistake: ‘don’t do that,
the head doctor won’t be happy.’” Helpful in this regard was a Tunisian interpreter named
Mustapha ben Saïdane, who had been wounded in action and was “of an elite class of North
African society and of an education far superior to his coreligionists.” He was described in
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reports as having kindly volunteered to help explain the films to his North African comrades,
often leading to prolonged discussions about topics ranging from agriculture and natural history
to the appreciation of cinematography itself.93 Pharmacist G. Louchet’s report reveals that
screenings were held on Thursdays and Sundays, chosen precisely because these were the
soldiers’ days of leave: the goal was “keeping [them] in the hospital. Have we succeeded?
Certainly yes; the great number prefers the cinema to the cabaret.”94
The educational promise of film went further: according to Moisselles’ Head Doctor, the
goals to be fulfilled by propaganda films included, in the following order, “the reestablishment of
discipline through healthful distraction,” “education and the development of intellect and artistic
sense,” “attachment to [France] and to their native country in particular,” and “physical
reeducation.”95 The films featured a variety of scenes from the war effort, many of them aimed at
reinspiring and “bringing them back” to the front. Popular naval and air scenes were interspersed
with pastoral views from France, “to make them know, esteem and love their country of
adoption.”96
Such cinematic scenes would complement carefully supervised tours of daily life in
France: one report describes a tour of a factory, expressing the hope that the visit would provide
North Africans with an alternative image of French society, outside of the trenches and brothels,
which “did not represent France in sum.” Rather, in the factories, tirailleurs would be able to
“judge that the majority of France and the French were workers, and that it was only by their
intelligent labor that they acquired themselves well-being and wealth,” adding that “their trust in
us [the French] has been strengthened, and they haven’t failed to communicate this to their
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comrades in the hospital and the trenches.”97 Paternalistic views of colonial subjects were never
far beneath the surface: Louchet’s report concludes by praising the effects of this propaganda on
wounded soldiers who, “like large children,” were making strides towards “correct[ing] vicious
attitudes” that had resulted from their various injuries and maladies.98 It was thus an image of a
benevolent French tutor, rather than access to French life itself, that films and tours of this nature
would extend to North Africans—a France untarnished by the terrors of trench warfare,
compromising encounters with French women, and other potentially disturbing aspects of the
wartime experience.
Film-based re-education efforts also integrated physical activities. At a plot of land near
Moisselles hospital, for example, wounded North Africans learned how to cultivate crops and
use agricultural equipment. These lessons would be accompanied by twice-weekly instructional
films. The initiative reflected the “physiocratic” approach to artisanal and agricultural retraining
favored by French authorities by the end of the war.99 There remains a larger question, however,
about the sort of “modern but oriental” subjecthood the French hoped to inculcate in
convalescing North African soldiers—a question to which we now turn. If tirailleurs were not to
be corrupting, subversive pathogens to the colonial body, what would they be?
Tunisians at Moisselles reportedly preferred films with scenes of landscapes and cultural
traditions from Carthage, Tunis, and the like—“this was their native soil.”100 Hospital officers
hoped the films would not just “evoke dear memories” but also remind them of the resources and
advantages offered to them by their “native lands” so as to discourage the threatening prospect
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that North Africans might wish to stay in France after the war, made all the more possible by the
relationships and families being built with women in the metropole. Here was where the tactical
need for loyal and satisfied soldiers aligned with the strategic need for a return to the prewar
colonial status quo.101 As one report explained:
The Orient which exalts their religious ideas or fanaticism has an attraction very
particular to them. Some exaggerated or even willingly falsified stories have
portrayed the Orient as a sort of dreamland, the marvelous and famous country of
Scheherazade’s ‘One Thousand and One Nights.’ An easy life, lucrative
commerce, abundance and riches—this, for them, is to be the land of promise …
The Arab of our North African possessions is indispensable to French prosperity
in these regions, and it is our duty to try, by any means possible, to keep it that
way.102
The report did not consider whether tirailleurs might simply have enjoyed the relaxation and
novel distraction offered by these films, as all soldiers generally did. With great faith in the allure
of such a fantastical image of the Orient, these particular films mobilized these willfully
fabricated visions to counteract what authorities saw as North Africans’ dissatisfaction with and
corruption by industrialized European life. Similar educational films at Carrières-sous-Bois were,
according to one report, the “only way suitable for these illiterates” to begin the transition from
“primitive and traditional” to “real and rational methods” of thought and work.103 In each case,
racialized and civilizational hierarchies were deployed to relegate North Africans to their
“proper” position in the colonial hierarchy. This wishful thinking, confidently deployed in
racialized terms, held that tirailleurs were better suited to a pastoral lifestyle far from the
metropole. If successful, the effort would fulfill the French need for a placated overseas labor
force untainted by access to a French life offered by compassionate nurses and civilian families.
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Much as Kairouan’s Civil Controller had done in response to Cantinelli’s letter to ‘Amr’s
mother, these methods reflected the tendency of French officials to use terms like mentalité to
explain away the grim realities of the European war and France’s discriminatory policies towards
North Africans. Officials turned instead to vague explanations of the unintended consequences of
tirailleurs’ encounter with modern technologies. Algiers-based psychiatrist Antoine Porot, for
example, commented in 1918 that “profoundly ignorant and gullible” North African conscripts
had been taken from their “free, peaceful, and archaic lives” and exposed instead to “a life where
the most scientific and infernal inventions loomed before their eyes, which had only known the
calm serenity of infinite horizons.”104 French colonial discourse was not alone in this respect; a
similar trope took hold in Britain’s colonial imagination of Africa: while the dreams of “paradise
regained” were seen as unattainable in an industrialized England, “the open vistas of the nonEuropean world seemed to offer limitless possibilities.”105 In the case of the films shown at
Moisselles and Carrières-sous-Bois, however, French medical staff and military authorities
envisioned for wounded tirailleurs not a wholesale return to a timeless, oriental lifestyle, but
rather a selective hybrid that would balance North Africans’ supposed primitiveness with a
limited education that would produce obedient and productive colonial subjects.

Conclusion: Ambiguous Encounters
In French military hospitals, North African soldiers witnessed a confluence at which many of the
tensions of French colonialism came to a head. The wounds of colonial violence,
institutionalized hierarchies of racial difference, gendered transgressions, and shifting labor
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ideals all marked the life of a convalescing Tunisian soldier during the First World War. At
“Muslim hospitals” such as Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles, and even at ‘Amr and
Cantinelli’s mixed hospital in Lyon, Tunisians built new types of relationships across the
colonial and racial divide, learned new trades and languages, and came to articulate their value
and contribution to (or even in spite of) the French enterprise. In the calm behind the lines,
however painful their wounds, they were mostly free to test the limits of their colonial confines.
That they were considered inherently different from French citizens had been made apparent
enough in their discriminatory treatment at the front lines, if not earlier. Once wounded, this
difference was further driven home in their medical seclusion through propaganda films,
restrictions to their movement and activities on leave, and forced isolation from the “corrupting
vices” of life in France. Yet this isolation was never complete. Lawn games, long walks, and
Sunday dinners with French women and their families offered Tunisians and North Africans a
taste of what it meant to belong to French metropolitan society. Relationships with French
women, though exceptional, presented to Tunisians the possibility of an inextricable link forged
through war despite – or rather, as partly a result of – the colonial inequalities that had brought
them to France in the first place. For better or worse, the First World War had in this way
produced a set of spaces and encounters not seen by most Tunisians prior to 1914, opening the
doors to new articulations of self and of awareness of the stakes of the colonial relationship.
If the Muslim hospitals at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles really were like colonies
within the metropole, they were as imperfect as any colony in terms of French authorities’ ability
to control and re-educate their subjects, and as experimental and contradictory in nature as other
colonial spaces understood as “laboratories” for the technologies and ideologies of European
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empires.106 To be sure, colonial medical institutions and discourses often sought to reduce their
colonial subjects to biological or statistical objects, or even to vectors of disease themselves.
France’s novel Muslim medical colonies at Carrières-sous-Bois and Moisselles were designed to
address threats of miscegenation and racial corruption while experimenting with new ways to
sculpt obedient subjects of a paternal French order. On the other hand, while historians of
colonial medicine have underlined how material limitations often exacerbated the conditions of
de-humanization, the cases explored here reveal how such contingencies could also produce
spaces for humanizing encounters which crossed racial and gendered boundaries. Wartime
shortages of space and personnel, as well as the individual desires of those who lived and worked
in these spaces, meant that such efforts bore limited or unintended results: Tunisian subjects still
mixed with French women, enjoyed the benefits of French metropolitan life, and increasingly
demanded recognition or even a measure of political and social parity in exchange for their
sacrifices.
Uprooted by conscription, tirailleurs’ experience of war was decidedly different from
that of exiled intellectuals and political figures like Mohamed and Ali Bach Hamba, whom we
will meet in the next chapter. For as marginalized as the average colonial conscript might have
been, however, transformative experiences such as that of ‘Amr in Lyon may not have been
altogether exceptional, effecting some of the nearly 100,000 Tunisian soldiers and workers
forced or coerced across the Mediterranean. For most, this marked a novel and intense exposure
to Tunisians’ position in the colonial hierarchy, and to the realities both of colonial violence and
the limitations of colonial power to accomplish its aims.
The direct political consequences of Tunisian soldiers’ encounters with French women
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would be difficult to measure, but there is a conspicuous postwar context for mixed-race
marriages: the apparent preponderance of marriages between French women and the North
African men who relocated to France during the 1920s and 1930s. By some accounts, these
mixed couples outnumbered North African couples in the metropole. This phenomenon can be
explained by factors such as the disproportionately male population of North African laborers in
France, the commercial and cultural expedience of partnering with French women, and perhaps
the wartime losses of white French men.107 But these relationships also had political import, as
famously attested by the relationships of at least two North African nationalist leaders. In 1925
Habib Bourguiba met Mathilde Morrain (Moufida Bourguiba, after her conversion to Islam), a
law student in Paris, and the two married in 1927. It was also in Paris that Messali Hadj,
Algerian founder of the nationalist group Étoile Nord-Africaine met the labor and anti-colonial
activist Émilie Busquant. Much as white French wives and partners played a salient role in the
political activism of Paris’ anti-imperial “black colony,” so too did those of North Africans,
whose colony in France was much larger and more prevalent in the industrial sectors most
disposed to political engagement.108 The occurrence of Franco-Maghribi relationships and
encounters in France under the emotionally trying circumstances of the First World War, then,
might well have paved the way for the kinds of mixed-race unions in which all manner of
political horizons later flourished.
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4. EXILES AND THE ‘SPIRIT OF SWITZERLAND’

In 1914, Mohamed Bach Hamba (1881-1920) found himself compelled to leave his home in
Tunisia for good, an exile under the suspicious eyes of the French Empire. He joined a number
of North African intellectuals who either passed through or settled in Switzerland during the First
World War, spending his final years until his death in December 1920 in Geneva, an emergent
hub for international politics, humanitarian work, and anti-colonial movements during the First
World War and its aftermath. The Swiss Confederation, unlike the French Empire, was far less
interested in the surveillance of its citizens and guests than it was in maintaining its delicate and
profitable role as neutral arbiter between belligerent powers. Francophone cities such as Geneva
and Lausanne were thus already home to international organizations such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Bureau international de défense des indigènes by the start of
the war; still less need be said of Switzerland’s important role in hosting the postwar
negotiations. It was in such an environment that Bach Hamba and his colleagues in the Comité
Algéro-Tunisien published the anti-colonial journal La Revue du Maghreb, represented Tunisia
and Algeria at the Congrès des Nationalités in Lausanne in 1916, and adapted Woodrow
Wilson’s rhetoric to critique French colonial hypocrisy in an effort to secure North Africans’
independence.
French intelligence officials remarked in 1917 that Switzerland had become the “center
of German-Turkish propaganda” during the war, conflating the political project of Bach Hamba
with that of fellow Tunisians Salah al-Sharif and Ismail Sfaihi, whose pan-Islamic and Ottoman
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loyalty informed their propaganda efforts in support of the Central Powers.1 While some
Tunisians certainly did work proactively to support the Central Powers, this alone does not
suffice in capturing the evolving and multifaceted political visions of those who passed through
Switzerland. Bach Hamba denied serving Germany or the Ottoman Empire, claiming that he
only had the “Algero-Tunisian” people’s wellbeing in mind. Whatever the case may be, these
exiles, though cut off from home by stringent wartime restrictions, still made the most of their
new homes and contacts with the many intellectuals and activists who passed through them.
It is important to remember that these mobile elites did not live in complete confinement
or isolation. Free from some of the constraints of colonial rule, they rubbed shoulders with
contacts both familiar and new from around the Mediterranean and beyond. James McDougall
has written about the place of Algerian exilic tradition in the construction of a nationalist
historical memory from abroad. It was a similar tradition that was mapped onto some of the
Tunisian grievances for political change which I will examine below.2 In what follows, I show
how the experience and space of exile could help expand Tunisians’ political horizons in such a
moment of uncertainty. In particular, through an examination of the trajectory of Tunisian
thinker Mohamed Bach Hamba’s exile in Switzerland, and his interactions with a number of
Arab and European interlocutors, I argue that exile afforded the distance, safety, and
international cooperation needed to catalyze viable visions for North Africa’s future. But more
than this, the particular contours of exiles’ trajectories demonstrate both the resilience of
Tunisia’s historical ties with the Ottoman center and the diversity of political options initiated by
wartime mobility. I begin with an overview of the political and cultural links between Tunisia,
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neighboring Tripolitania, and the Ottoman center by the outbreak of the First World War, before
exploring the biographical trajectories of Ali and Mohamed Bach Hamba. The remainder of the
chapter reconstructs the relationships and political context of Mohamed’s exile in Switzerland
and its implications for the transnational development and reception of his anti-colonial platform.

Tunisians Looking East
The endurance of the Ottoman Empire’s presence and influence in North Africa has been
overshadowed in the historiography on the late Ottoman period by an emphasis on the Empire’s
Arab and Anatolian heartlands, where violence and famine had perhaps their greatest impact.
While Tunisia had been a French Protectorate since 1881, and neighboring Algeria had been
subject to France’s expanding conquest and colonization since 1830, the Ottoman Empire was
far from absent in the Maghrib by 1914. Recent works such as Mostafa Minawi’s The Ottoman
Scramble for Africa have shed light on the Empire’s attempt to reassert itself beyond these lands,
countering narratives about an exclusively inward-looking and defensive country hardly
deserving of study as an “empire” as such.3 Andreas Tunger-Zanetti’s research has demonstrated
the extent to which Tunisian reformers at the turn of the twentieth century still looked in the
reverse direction – to Istanbul – for inspiration and resources.4 Tripolitania (later Libya), which
shared important links and a border with Tunisia, was an important if overlooked imperial
flashpoint in the 1910s.
After nearly two centuries of nominal rule through the Karamanlı Dynasty, Ottoman
Africa, stretching over modern Libya and deeper into the eastern Sahara toward the Lake Chad
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basin, was subject to Istanbul’s campaign to reestablish direct rule and tanzimat reforms in the
1830s and 1840s. That rule was most present in the coastal Mediterranean cities of Benghazi and
Tripoli; in the hinterlands and the Sahara, alliances with largely autonomous tribes marked the
extent of Ottoman sovereignty. Through the second half of the nineteenth century and much of
the early twentieth century, the Sanusiyya, a religio-political order organized around
transnational tribal networks, dominated the Libyan interior; its relationship with Istanbul
fluctuated between partnership and rivalry. With the Ottomans’ loss of Balkan territories in the
1870s, followed by the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 and the British of Egypt the
following year, some pinned high hopes on the region as a site for imperial ambitions.5
Tunisians had longstanding commercial and cultural ties with Tripolitania, the western
region of Ottoman Africa with which they shared a border. Sites of religious pilgrimage such as
Kairouan and date palm oasis towns such as Nafta and Tozeur made central and southern Tunisia
a useful haven from which to organize political action against the neighboring colonial state after
the French invasion of Algeria in 1830.6 Even after the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, an
‘Ibadi diaspora populated by border-crossing Algerians, Tunisians, and Tripolitanians
established intellectual and spiritual links from Egypt to as far afield as Zanzibar, leading to a
Nahda-era “rapprochement” between ‘Ibadi and Sunni Salafi reformism.7 Certain tribes
continued to cross the Tripolitania-Tunisia border long after 1881. In fact, the French building of
roads, railroads, and mines attracted some 2,500 Tripolitanian workers annually around the turn
of the century.8 Through these religious and economic networks, many in Eastern Algeria,
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including merchants such as ‘Abbas Bin Hamana, religio-political figures like Sulayman alBaruni, and ‘Ibadi communities of the Mizab in the northern reaches of the Sahara, maintained
ties to Ottoman Tripolitania through Southern Tunisia.9 Another interlocutor was Muhammad alKhidr Husain, a reformist member of the Algerian diaspora in the southern Tunisian oasis town
of Nafta. Husain combined his criticism of French colonial rule in Tunisia with a call for
Tunisian volunteers to fight the Italians in Tripolitania in 1911. These activities drew authorities’
attention and pushed Husain to flee to Syria, where he joined Tunisian exile Salah al-Sharif (see
below). During the First World War Husain was, like al-Sharif, employed by Enver Pasha to
propagandize and recruit from among North African prisoners in German camps, though he fell
under the suspicion of Cemal Pasha during his 1916 crackdown on Arabist reformers. After the
war he settled in Cairo as an imam at al-Azhar and continued to speak out in support of North
African nationalists.10
Beyond these regional ties, cultural and religious ties to the Ottoman center in Istanbul
also endured in Tunisia well after the French occupation. In the decades preceding the
Protectorate, Mamluk functionaries in Tunisia, inspired in part by tanzimat reforms in Istanbul,
embarked on their own program of centralization and modernization. These Mamluks were
originally slaves captured or bought from various Balkan and Caucasian regions of the Empire,
after which they converted to Islam and were trained to serve as administrators and soldiers
throughout the Empire’s provinces, including Tunisia. This practice, though largely defunct by
the late nineteenth century after reforms suppressed military slavery in the Empire, endured in
some forms until the final days of the Ottoman presence there. Few embody the resilience of the
Ottoman-Arab legacy more than Khayr al-Din Pasha, a Circassian-born official who, after being
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sold off to an envoy of the Tunisian monarch during a visit to Istanbul, rose through the ranks of
Tunisia’s political and military elite to become Grand Vizier under the Bey Muhammad III asSadiq from 1873 to 1877. Ousted after his controversial efforts at reforming the tax, education,
and military systems in Tunisia, he was invited by the Ottoman Sultan to return to Istanbul,
where he briefly served as the Empire’s Grand Vizier before being forced into retirement in
1879. To Julia Clancy-Smith, Khayr al-Din exemplified the “unwavering loyalty” of Mamluks to
the Ottoman sultans, even as he embraced Western European political traditions and worked to
dismantle the Mamluk system of which he had been a part.11
Other members of this heterogeneous group of Ottoman extraction had even deeper local
ties and had for centuries intermarried and settled in Tunisia, mobilizing their Mamluk and
imperial networks to become important landowners and power brokers.12 By the French
occupation in 1881 and well into the early twentieth century, while the mamluks’ slave origin
had been largely forgotten, the group adapted to colonial rule. As they had once served as
intermediaries between the Ottoman center and the local Tunisian subjects, they now mediated
for a French administration desperate to secure loyal and effective local know-how without the
costs associated with direct rule in neighboring Algeria. M’hamed Oualdi has demonstrated how
these aspiring functionaries delicately positioned themselves as particularly well suited to
represent an imperial authority but with “indigenous” legitimacy. But from the French
perspective, they were always suspect: as job applicants they were scrutinized for all manner of
continued Ottoman associations, from their visits to Istanbul to the reputation of their
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ancestors.13 This was the small but upwardly mobile minor nobility from which some early
twentieth century political reformers such as ‘Ali and Mohamed Bach Hamba came.
Given the feverish stream of French intelligence reports about pan-Islamic propaganda
and organizing activities around the world throughout the war, and the scholarship that these
documents have provoked, it is important to ask just how significant these pro-Ottoman
sentiments and ties really were in North Africa by 1914. Thousands of pages in the French
military, colonial, and diplomatic archives paint the picture of a widespread and determined
underworld of pan-Islamic activists whose meetings, writings, and movements threatened to stir
up latent fanaticism for the Ottoman sultan, the erstwhile caliph and, in theory, protector of
Muslims worldwide. The Sultan’s call to jihad on 14 November 1914 ultimately provoked no
worldwide uprising of zealous North African Muslims in defense of their caliph and their God;
even in the Arab heartlands of the Ottoman Empire, the outbreak of war and subsequent
mobilization was “foreboding.”14 While certain aspects of a pan-Islamic “threat” were credible,
French preoccupations point clearly at the outset to their assumptions and attitudes toward Islam
and their Muslim colonial subjects. This is unsurprising given that colonial discourse generally
explained away subjects’ resistance or dissent by appealing either to Muslim indigènes’
incapacities and “mentalities” or to the machinations and manipulations of more capable
outsiders such as imperial rivals or elite locals.15
Nonetheless, political intrigue has attracted historians to the efforts of pro-Ottoman
operatives and circles around the First World War. Some initiatives began at the Western Front.
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Germany established prison camps specifically for Muslim soldiers captured from French and
British lines, and these spaces featured prayer rooms, halal meals, and services provided by
imams (among them North Africans known to Mohamed Bach Hamba) whose sermons and
publications encouraged prisoners to join the Ottoman war effort. The “Half-Moon Camp” at
Wünsdorf (outside Berlin), for example, has been the focus of several recent studies.16 Leaflets
and other publications were sent worldwide to spread dissent among the Entente’s colonial
soldiers, and agents with the Ottoman Special Organization armed small groups of rebels in
Morocco. While the impact of these propaganda efforts is hard to measure and was likely quite
limited, in a global and total war, subtle efforts to support the work of a select few pro-Ottoman
and pan-Islamist dissidents could be disruptive to the Entente war effort. German and Ottoman
networks proved decisive in helping spark an uprising of Indian soldiers in the British army
stationed in Singapore in 1915, for example.17 Even if few significant uprisings occurred, and
even if few Muslim prisoners of war were ultimately recruited into Ottoman ranks, such efforts
could, given the right circumstances, tie up precious French resources and manpower.

The Brothers Bach Hamba
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Affinities with the Ottoman center were not the impetus but part of the backdrop of public
demonstrations of dissatisfaction with the colonial order in Tunisia just prior to the First World
War. In autumn 1911, in particular, deadly violence broke out in Tunis following the plan by the
French-dominated municipal council to survey (and perhaps repurpose) part of the Muslim
cemetery of Jellaz. The violence implicated not only Protectorate forces and Tunisians, but also
residents of the Italian quarter, who fired shots from their homes into the crowd of Tunisian
protestors. Tensions between Tunisians and Italians reached a breaking point when, early the
following year, an Italian-driven streetcar struck and killed a Tunisian child. These strains were
compounded by the fact that Tunisians had long been excluded from employment by the
tramway company, and protests and boycotts of the tramway system ensued. The resulting
French crackdown led to death sentences for at least seven Muslim Tunisians, the expulsion of
several reformist leaders, and the imposition of a state of emergency, which would restrict the
press and political gatherings until after the close of the First World War.18 To an extent, these
events catalyzed the trans-Mediterranean trajectories of the brothers Mohamed and Ali Bach
Hamba.
Mohamed Bach Hamba had been born Mohamed Ben Ali Chérif in 1881 and came from
a family of Turko-Arab background, his father having served as an assistant of the Tunisian
Grand Vizier Mustapha ben Ismail.19 An aspiring lawyer, Mohamed studied French and Arabic
at the prestigious Collège Sadiki, a progressive school established by Khayr al-Din Pasha in
1875. He later served as a functionary in the Tunisian Protectorate’s tribunal courts,
distinguishing himself enough to be awarded the Nichân al-Iftikhar (Order of Glory) by the Bey
of Tunis. His older brother Ali (1878-1918) was if anything even more politically prominent in

18
19

Lewis, Divided Rule, 141-42.
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pre-war Tunisia. He cofounded the Young Tunisians, a heterogeneous group of reformers whose
publications and meetings are often pointed to as the foundation for Tunisian nationalism. At this
early stage, the group called for rather modest and gradual reforms but were targeted for their
support of the Jellaz and tramway disturbances in 1911 and 1912, and Ali and his cofounder
Béchir Sfar were expelled from Tunisia in 1912. Ali first visited his brother who had been
staying in Aix at the time, and the two attempted to obtain authorization for the elder to return to
Tunisia. Failing this, both brothers decided to emigrate instead to Istanbul. Ali left first while
Mohamed attempted to bide his time, but the latter was refused a leave of absence by his French
superior in August 1913, and in time made his way to join his brother Istanbul. Their friend
Hassan Guellaty, one of the reformers to be discussed in Chapter Five, attended to Mohamed’s
affairs in his absence and helped sell his home in Tunis.20
Ali was decisive in his shift toward the Ottoman center, allegedly writing to the president
of the Collège Sadiki that he had “definitively broken all relations with Tunisia,” though he later
expressed hope for a return to an independent Tunisia.21 Ali went on to play a prominent role in
the Ottoman war effort. He served as an operative in the Ottoman Special Organization (Teşkilâtı Mahsusa) with the blessing of Shakib Arslan, a Lebanese Druze notable and protégé of Cemal
Pasha who after the war became one of the most widely-known pan-Arab and pan-Islamist
activists.22 The Special Organization was a notorious special forces division that worked to
undermine Arab separatism and fight Western imperialism from Syria to Libya during the war
and is perhaps best known for its role in the Armenian Genocide.23 During the war, Arslan was
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tasked with enlisting the support of tribal and Bedouin leaders in support of the Ottomans’ 1914
campaign against Egypt, and led a contingent of some 110 Druze men in support of Cemal
Pasha’s Hijaz campaign later that year.24 Ali was known to be particularly active in Tripolitania,
where he helped coordinate a rebellion against the Italian occupation while bolstering Ottoman
legitimacy there; he later served as the First Chief of Eastern Affairs in the Ottoman Ministry of
War.25 With few sources available to shed further light on Ali’s activities in the Special
Organization, little has been written about his political outlook.26 Ali’s trajectory will suffice as
something of a backdrop against which to compare his brother Mohamed’s wartime activism.
While both eventually called for an end to French colonial rule in the Maghrib, Ali’s vision for
the future clearly called for some form of Ottoman involvement in political change in the
Maghrib.
Mohamed, on the other hand, looked to the establishment of an independent state based
on liberal principles of self-determination and liberty. He was in general more ambivalent about
the prospects of life abroad and about whether exile in the Ottoman Empire would serve his
aims. There were personal costs: his wife refused to emigrate with him, choosing to remain in
Tunis.27 His attempt in late 1913 to settle on land near Konya, where Arabic was more widely
spoken than in Istanbul, was unsatisfactory.28 Like Khayr al-Din Pasha, his limited command of
Turkish language skills proved an obstacle to life in Anatolia. He even attempted to return briefly
to Tunisia in January of 1914 with his sister, but with most press outlets and meeting circles
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banned under the state of emergency, he found little space for the sort of work to which he
aspired. In April Mohamed left Tunisia for good, passing through Istanbul before settling in
Geneva, where he founded the Comité Algéro-Tunisien.29
Why Switzerland? Why not France, or the Ottoman Empire? Thinkers such as Rifa’a alTahtawi had long traveled to Paris in search of insights into social and political reform. Later
anti-colonial and nationalist activists such as Messali Hadj, founder of l’Étoile Nord-Africaine,
flourished there in the late 1920s and 1930s. Yet during the First World War, amid heightened
French suspicions and with censorship measures in effect, France and its colonies proved stifling
for someone like Mohamed Bach Hamba. And why not Istanbul? Having already traveled to his
brother Ali’s new home there, Mohamed Bach Hamba enjoyed many connections to the Ottoman
elite – his family, after all, drew from Tunisia’s centuries-old Turko-Arab nobility.30 A number
of other Arab reformers, in fact, did settle in the Ottoman capital for the duration of the war,
pinning their hopes on the assertive reformism of the Committee of Union and Progress.31
However, residency in Istanbul might have limited Bach Hamba’s political horizons for a truly
independent North Africa, perhaps compromising his attempt to present a non-belligerent
Tunisian face to the international community. Or perhaps Mohamed determined that with his
brother already working in Istanbul, his presence would be most beneficial closer to Western
Europe, with better access to the deliberations taking place there.32 Lacking specific archival
details about Mohamed’s motivations for choosing Geneva, we may explore instead the apparent
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fruits of exile in this emergent international hub.

The Spirit of Switzerland
Geneva had a long history as a sanctuary for innovative or subversive exiles, from Jean Calvin
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to Giuseppe Mazzini and Mikhail Bakunin.33 In the early twentieth
century, La Suisse Romande (Francophone Switzerland) attracted thinkers and dissidents from
beyond Europe, making it what Harald Fischer-Tiné calls a “transnational anti-imperialist
ecumene.”34 Simon Jackson’s study of the global Syro-Lebanese community’s relationship with
the League of Nations argues that the League acted as a “political ‘distillation column’” through
which Syro-Lebanese could “reformulate and amplify a more dynamic type of belonging” while
enjoying the wide and constant press coverage of goings-on in Geneva.35 Here, I propose
expanding Jackson’s lens to all of Francophone Switzerland, and to the period immediately
surrounding the First World War. Cities such as Geneva, Lausanne, and Neuchâtel presented
perhaps the only neutral havens in which French was spoken, state repression was limited, and
access to Europe was relatively open.36 Even before the establishment of the League of Nations,
Switzerland, centrally located and linguistically diverse, had become an important arbiter of
international negotiation despite its neighbors’ immeasurable bloodshed over national
boundaries. The Geneva-based Red Cross, for example, carefully managed the demands of both
sides of the war while arranging POW camp inspections, facilitating prisoner exchanges, and
delivering post and aid to prisoners. International organizations such as the World Alliance of
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YMCAs and the Universal Postal Union also made their homes there.37 Moreover, Switzerland
was a growing destination for socialist, anti-militarist, and anarchist leaders. In 1915, for
example, the Zimmerwald Conference convened prominent socialist leaders from across
Europe.38
Some prominent Swiss nationals proved sympathetic to the fate of non-Europeans. René
Claparède, for example, supported the controversial Egyptian National Congress in Brussels in
1910, was active with the Bureau international de défense des indigènes in criticizing atrocities
in Leopold’s Congo, and exchanged letters with W.E.B. DuBois and Blaise Diagne.39 He played
a prominent role in the 1916 Congrès des Nationalités in Lausanne, claiming in his opening
statement that “the Swiss people must concern themselves with oppressed peoples, because
otherwise Switzerland would be unworthy of its own name.”40 After the war, Claparède drew the
attention of French agents for his connections with Tunis-based socialist Robert Louzon and with
the Committee of Syrian Union in Geneva.41 Another Bureau activist, an anarchist identified
only as Sussan, was marked by French agents for having published works in Geneva
condemning French colonization in Algeria and having built a network of couriers in North
Africa to circulate such tracts in the aftermath of the war.42 By 1918, one Swiss journalist was
moved enough to highlight the “very curious fact of the ‘nationalities’: since the war began, our
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country has become, as we know, the forum for all national grievances.”43 What contemporaries
called the “spirit of Geneva” after the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 may have in
fact been part of a broader “spirit of Switzerland,” and one which fostered thought that went
beyond the horizons later offered by the League.44
All manner of political actors both renowned and obscure filtered through Switzerland
during the war and its aftermath, and we know this thanks to the diligent work of French
consular and intelligence agents. But how “neutral” was Switzerland, and how could it remain so
facing a constant flow of mobile dissidents working against British and French colonial rule?
Despite the increasing weight given to Switzerland’s role as a humanitarian hub and an honest
peace broker during the First World War, there was evidence of overwhelming sympathy for the
German Empire in the German-speaking majority of Switzerland. From 1917, moreover, a new
“foreigners’ police” was established alongside a relative tightening of immigration policy. In
some quarters both German and Francophone, Swiss intellectuals and politicians began to
question their country’s suitability for an influx of “uncivilized peoples.”45
Some activists in exile dedicated themselves to peace and independence whether from the
Entente or the Central Powers. Bach Hamba was said to have been in contact with Shlomo
Tagger, a Palestinian Jew who had served as Grand Rabbi of Turkestan (based in Tashkent and
Samarkand) before working within European pacifist circles and who, during the war, took up
the cause of Palestinian independence and constitutionalism.46 Other figures with whom Bach
Hamba associated implicated him in a more intricate and controversial world straddling the
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German-Swiss border.47 For example, he fostered connections with Mahmud Muhtar Pasha, an
Ottoman military officer who had served as Minister of the Navy and briefly as the Empire’s
ambassador to Germany at the start of the war before being ousted in 1915 by a distrustful CUP
leadership.48 Muhtar Pasha settled in Switzerland in 1915 but continued working with the Young
Turks in Geneva to defend Ottoman interests, a link that led French intelligence to label Bach
Hamba a “violent Germanophile.”49 Neutral Switzerland in this sense provided political
dissidents the additional benefit of access to German support should they desire it, and some did
seize this advantage. This was a tenuous and ambiguous link, not least because it could suggest
to the international community that these dissidents had a partisan stake in the war’s outcome, or
that Switzerland itself, by hosting these groups, could no longer serve as a viable neutral broker.
Perhaps more than any other group of reformers, it was the example of Egyptian activists
that would set the stage for Bach Hamba’s work in Swiss exile, as well as the accusations that he
served German masters. Tunisia had long drawn intellectual inspiration from Egypt, with
important visits by Muhammad ‘Abduh to Zitouna University in 1885 and 1903 occupying
recent memory.50 Egyptian anti-colonial dissident Mansour Rifa’at, a critic of British rule and of
the Egyptian Khedive’s acquiescence to it, had worked briefly with Shyamji in Paris and was
likely to have heard of the benefits of working in Switzerland.51 Rifa’at settled in Geneva in
early 1914, starting the Club des Patriotes Egyptiens and their newspaper La Patrie Egyptienne.

47

Daniel Brückenhaus, Policing Transnational Protest: Liberal Imperialism and the Surveillance of Anticolonialists
in Europe, 1905-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 42-72.
48
Ulrich Trumpener, “The Ottoman Empire,” in The Origins of World War I, eds. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger
H. Herwig (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 346; see also: Barbara Flemming and Jan Schmidt, The
Diary of Karl Süssheim (1878-1947): Orientalist Between Munich and Istanbul (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,
2002), 115-35; Sükrü Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 33-70.
49
CADN 89PO/1/490: “De notre envoyé spécial,” 23 Apr. 1919.
50
See “La question Egyptienne: discours et mémoire, présentés par la Délégation Egyptienne à la IIIme Conférence
des Nationalités,” (Lausanne: Librarie Centrale des Nationalités, 1917); Perkins, A History of Modern Tunisia, 6566;
51
Fischer-Tiné, “The Other Side of Internationalism,” 226-28.

128

Rifa’at and his supporters came to be explicit in their recognition of Geneva as a safe haven for
revolutionary thinkers, celebrating in a speech on the city’s Centennial the place which now gave
“asylum and sympathy to the Rousseaus of the Orient, whose writings and teachings are sure to
precipitate similar revolutions in the East in the near future.” Moreover, Rifa’at linked the
Egyptian nationalist cause to other nationalist struggles, such as that of Irish nationalists against
British rule – a move that influenced Mohamed Bach Hamba.52 But Rifa’at was also active with
the German Nachrichstelle für den Orient (Intelligence Bureau for the East), writing and
translating propaganda articles in support of the Central Powers.53
Other Egyptians in Switzerland who interacted with Bach Hamba explored the possibility
of a return to the Ottoman fold with more trepidation. Muhammad Farid, a leader in the Egyptian
nationalist Watani Party, had fled to Istanbul in 1912, having been jailed previously by British
colonial authorities. Farid, like many exiles from British and French colonies, moved rather
freely between Anatolia, Switzerland, Germany, and even Italy from 1912 until the conclusion of
the First World War. An influential presence at the Egyptian delegation to the Congrès des
Nationalités at Lausanne in 1916 (more on this below), he questioned any articles which ordered
the world by races or level of “civilization.” He claimed that the British, for example, had no
criteria for determining just what a “half-civilized nation” was and simply defined Egypt as such
in order to justify its continued rule by force. Hierarchical language of this sort, he claimed,
could simply be used by the powerful against the weak in perpetuity.54 Would an Ottomancentered federation yield a better future? Perhaps like Mohamed Bach Hamba, Farid only
appeared willing to work with the Ottomans as a means to achieve independence from European
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rule. His vision was not simply to replace British ministers with a Sultan in Istanbul.55
Farid had previously tried to work with Khedive ‘Abbas Hilmi II to achieve the
evacuation of British forces from Egypt and the adoption of a constitution, but the Khedive
balked when the British put new limits on his power. The Khedive, after having been deposed by
the British in 1914, settled in Switzerland from 1915 to 1917 and was the subject of considerable
courtship (and surveillance) by French and German agents.56 He established an Office musulman
international in Lausanne, positioned himself as a rival of Farid, and worked to win restoration to
the Egyptian throne, but ultimately failed to build much legitimacy after his ouster from Egypt. 57
Other conspicuous reformers from the India and from the Arab world also spent time in
Switzerland during the war. Indian revolutionaries Shyamji Krishna Varma and Ajit Singh made
their home in Switzerland a few years before the outbreak of war, finding in it the ideal balance
between freedom from British repression and access to European circles of journalists and
intellectuals. Salah al-Sharif and Ismail Sfaihi found similar refuge between Germany and
Switzerland.58 Al-Sharif was born in Tunisia in the 1860s to an Algerian family, and he later
became a prominent teacher at the Great Mosque in Tunis. Around 1906 he emigrated through
Tripolitania to Istanbul, where he began to assert his criticism of the deteriorated state of Islam in
North Africa.59 In 1908 he left for Damascus, where he was said to have clashed with the
reformist Syrian scholar Rashid Rida’.60 Later, with the Italian invasion of Tripolitania in 1911,
al-Sharif accompanied Enver Pasha to Cyrenaica (eastern Libya) to support the local resistance
movement there. By the outbreak of the First World War, he had clearly proven his commitment
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to the Ottoman cause.61 Ismail Sfaihi, his future colleague, had been employed as a teacher and
administrator at the Collège Sadiki at the turn of the century. He grew to become one of the
Tunisian ‘ulama most vocally opposed to the French Protectorate, and he decided in 1906 to
make the pilgrimage to Mecca with his family before settling in Damascus as the inspector of the
city’s Umayyad Mosque. Around 1910 Sfaihi moved again, this time to Istanbul where he joined
al-Sharif and formed the group “L’Association fraternelle d’aide et de soutien moral entre les
Algériens et les Tunisiens.”62 During the First World War Sfaihi and al-Sharif found themselves
in service to the German and Ottoman military and were directly involved in leading propaganda
efforts through sermons and leaflets distributed to the captured Muslim prisoners being held at
Wünsdorf. At most about a thousand of these prisoners joined the Ottoman Army’s lines in the
Middle East.63 French reports from interviews with North African soldiers did occasionally
confirm the suspicion that some were reluctant to fire on German lines for fear that they might
kill Ottoman soldiers – fellow Muslims – in the ranks.64
Bach Hamba does appear to have encountered and even worked with al-Sharif and Sfaihi,
though the latter were based primarily in Berlin. It was this connection that likely led French
officials and agents to characterize Bach Hamba as a German puppet and perhaps, in so doing,
attempt to delegitimize him in the eyes of the French Empire’s Muslim subjects. Al-Sharif and
Sfaihi’s 1917 tract La Tunisie et l’Algérie attacked their “enemies, the French, English, Russians,
and Italians,” while noting quite favorably the German stance towards North Africa. They
claimed that at any moment now, the Muslim people would gain their liberty from France and
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claim their love for the Ottoman caliphate.65 Al-Sharif even hosted a tea party for a number of
visiting Muslim dignitaries and Turkish and German officers at which he expressed Muslims’
sympathies for Germany.66 Tunger-Zanetti describes him as the Tunisian most engaged with the
Ottoman Empire since the statesman Khayr al-Din Pasha.67
Bach Hamba, on the other hand, was decidedly less publicly proactive in his support for
the Central Powers’ war effort. One Revue article affirms that “we know nothing of Germany. It
was only the war that revealed them to us [...] We challenge anyone to prove the existence of
relations between Germans and Algerians or Tunisians.”68 Bach Hamba’s nuanced and careful
view of the international political situation is comparable to that of Muhammad Farid. Heine
suggests that it was Farid’s residence in Switzerland that placed him in a better position to
evaluate the “political, economic, and military situation of the powers involved in the war” than
al-Sharif, whose vehement opposition to France and rigid pan-Islamic outlook left little room for
political alternatives in Tunisia other than a return to the Ottoman fold.69
There is no doubt that Swiss cities, with their openness to foreign activists of all stripes,
helped foster the kind of thinking and collaboration central to the work and political vision of
Bach Hamba. But did the safety afforded by La Suisse Romande come with the cost of being
insulated from the North Africans on whose behalf Bach Hamba campaigned? On the one hand,
Bach Hamba might well have been divorced from popular political developments in Tunisia, and
even more so from those in Algeria. On the other hand, at a time when repression and censorship
in Tunisia had effectively silenced many of the venues for intellectual exchange and political
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dissent, Bach Hamba enjoyed the space and safety to offer new possibilities for North Africa and
circulate them to a receptive international audience. We need not fixate only on the social
“impact” of this kind of work. To a certain extent a multilingual, federalist, and neutral
Switzerland, free in many ways from the strains of war, served as a clean slate upon which exiles
and traveling political figures could illustrate their visions for the future in dialogue with their
analogues from all over the world. But with conspicuous connections with Ottoman and German
intelligence operations, Bach Hamba’s political activities continued under the careful watch of
British and French consular agents.

Congrès des Nationalités, 1916
We have little evidence of Bach Hamba’s intellectual output in Swiss exile until 1916. It was in
late June of that year that Lausanne played host to the Congrès des Nationalités, a conference in
which leaders claiming to represent twenty-three different “oppressed” nations and peoples
gathered to share their grievances and to build a unified voice on the international stage. Those
attending hoped to have a stake in the postwar world, however it might look. The host
organization, the Union of Nationalities, counted among its backers prominent political figures
such as French Minister for Public Instruction and Inventions Paul Painlevé (who later served
two brief terms as Prime Minister of France), leading at least one historian to deem its stance
pro-French.70 To a certain extent, the large numbers of representatives from German- and
Austrian-dominated eastern and central Europe (such as Czechs, Poles, and White Ruthenians)
would suggest their hope for an Entente victory as the best promise of winning independence.
Certain moments in the recorded minutes of the Congrès reveal a rather casual dismissal of anti-
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colonial possibilities, as when the Union’s president Paul Otlet, a Belgian peace activist and
director of the Institut bibliographique of Brussels, remarked simply and briefly on behalf of an
absent Syrian delegate that “because of the gentleness of the French regime, the Syrians had
asked to be placed under a French protectorate.”71
The assumption of the Congrès’ pro-French stance, however, is complicated by the fact
that delegations also represented a number of peoples and “nationalities” seeking greater
independence from Entente powers, including Irish, Egyptians, and of course, North Africans.
Bach Hamba attended as the sole representative of Tunisia and Algeria (“the Algero-Tunisian
people”). Such “representatives” were often those well-connected intellectuals who happened to
be available. Czechs and Serbs, for example, were represented by Swiss intellectuals as
proxies.72 Nonetheless, the assertive and vocal demonstrations of these delegations tapped into
the emergent minorities regime that would later inform Woodrow Wilson’s exhortations to
uphold the right of all oppressed peoples to self-governance and, eventually, the legal basis of
the League of Nations.
Bach Hamba’s voice does not appear to have featured very prominently in the
proceedings of the conference, but what has been recorded reveals a concern for selfdetermination and the upholding of “justice.” He echoed members of Muhammad Farid’s wellorganized and influential Egytptian delegation who, through the conference organizers, were
able to publish a booklet entitled “The Egyptian Question.” The question of how to categorize
certain “races” was a difficult one for the Congrès representatives. Bach Hamba was particularly
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impressed by Farid’s request that paternalistic language about “half-civilized” peoples in the
proposed Article 5 be abolished, the latter reminding the Congrès attendees that Egypt was one
of the oldest civilizations in the world. The ensuing debate reflected a range of divergent
opinions, including that of a certain M. Ferrières, a Swiss education reformer, who argued that
some “minority races” had indeed been mistreated by whites but that something had to be done
to develop and civilize them. A Lithuanian representative added that certain exceptional
“civilizing” measures had to be taken toward cannibals, for example. René Claparède boldly
replied that “whites sometimes behaved worse than cannibals,” pointing to the atrocities
committed against the Congolese and the indigenous peoples of Peru. Edmond Privat, a Swiss
proponent of Esperanto, offered the concession that some races with “a civilization and a past”
could be excluded from the term “indigène.” Farid refused, arguing that the phrase “la Protection
des Indigènes” recalled too closely “la Protection des Animaux [animals].”73 Ultimately Article 5
was removed.
Bach Hamba’s “declaration” in the official publication of the conference expressed the
hope that those powers who had promised to “struggle for equal rights, for the respect of the rule
of law, and for peace in the entire world” would renounce “conquest by brutal force against these
populations who only ask to remain free.”74 Otherwise, as he explained during a discussion at the
Congrès on 20 June 1916, autochthonous and indigenous people such as his own would continue
to suffer at the hands of settlers and colonial functionaries. It was the former whose hard work
and taxes were used to pay for the schools, roads, and other projects that benefitted the latter.75
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In this early stage of his life in exile, Bach Hamba did not articulate an explicit demand
for independence or an end to colonial rule. Rather, Tunisians’ and Algerians’ demands,
according to him, included an end to the regime of exception under French rule, the teaching of
Arabic in public schools, equality with Europeans before the law, and a relaxing of unfair land
policies in rural areas – “in a word, we reclaim the common right for all, justice and liberty.”76
Bach Hamba only asked that France simply fulfill the promises it had itself made and which the
Tunisian and Algerian people deserved as human beings. This was not a significant departure
from the pre-war demands of the Young Tunisians.
La Revue du Maghreb and the “Algero-Tunisian People”
Bach Hamba elaborated on his position at the Congrès des Nationalités in the earliest articles of
La Revue du Maghreb, which he began editing in 1916. These and other writings were later
compiled into the volume Le Peuple Algéro-Tunisien et la France and published in Geneva in
1918.77 The Revue was well-circulated enough to draw the concern of French censors,
particularly those issues that arrived, illicitly, on Tunisian shores.78 Its claims, however,
increasingly went beyond Tunisia and appealed to the wider international sphere in which Bach
Hamba had begun to immerse himself. If it was the liberal, neutral space of Switzerland that first
allowed him to articulate and disseminate critical views toward French colonialism, it may have
been the most brutal aspects of the war itself that propelled him towards demands for complete
independence. Béchir Tlili, one of the few historians to explore La Revue du Maghreb in any
detail, first noted this trajectory in 1978, claiming that while the Revue had picked up roughly
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where the Young Tunisians had left off in 1912, the “upheavals in global power relations”
wrought by the war provoked an expansion of Tunisian demands.79
In mid-1916 Bach Hamba focused mainly on economic exploitation, the disappearance of
the North African bourgeoisie, and the generally arbitrary nature of French colonial rule.80 But as
the war began to reveal new weaknesses in the French Empire, the French continued to demand
ever more from their colonial subjects – especially the “blood tax” of military conscription,
which consistently featured in the pages of the Revue. With waves of wounded or resting soldiers
coming off the front, Bach Hamba, like many, had begun to hear stories of the inequalities
suffered by the hundreds of thousands of young colonial conscripts fighting on the Western
Front. He indicated that by the outbreak of war in 1914 no convention between France and
Tunisia existed regarding the use of Tunisian soldiers beyond Tunisian borders. A 1904 law only
provided for their mobilization in “the defense of the territory.” Bach Hamba claimed that this
had already been violated when, in 1912, Tunisian soldiers were deployed to assist in France’s
occupation of Morocco. In the same piece, he also criticized the conscription exemption
extended to Tunisian Jews.81 As for Algeria, Bach Hamba wrote that the forcible conscription
policy imposed upon Muslims was made even more “odious” and “criminal” given the fact that
they were already subject to the code de l’indigénat.82
In a June 1918 issue, Bach Hamba wrote, “What is atrocious in this war is that some
people have been obligated to fight for a cause that is not theirs – very well, for the triumph of
their oppressors! What interest do the Algéro-Tunisian people have in spilling their blood for a
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power that conquered them by force, and imposed on them this regime? None, surely.”83 Similar
iterations of this sentiment made their way into multiple articles and pamphlets written by Bach
Hamba or signed by his Comité Algéro-Tunisien. A February 1917 article of the Revue notes the
injustice that French widows were to receive a pension of 563 francs compared with only 413 for
their Tunisian counterparts – “such is the condition of the Muslim soldier: inequality even in
death.” Bach Hamba goes on to detail the inequalities faced even by North African prisoners in
German camps, revealing the words of French prisoner Émile Moussat who, from a German
camp in Limburg, spoke out on behalf of his “Muslim comrades” who unlike European captives
had few visitors and little contact with marraines (women who often served as “pen pals” or
“Godmothers” to young soldiers).84
Bach Hamba and La Revue du Maghreb were most vocal in advocating for common
Tunisians in the face of the “blood tax.” In response to an article in the settler daily La Dépêche
Tunisienne calling for French recruiters to explain to potential Tunisian conscripts that they were
fighting “to save the existence and wellbeing of all humanity, including that of Islam,” Bach
Hamba outlined the hypocrisy of the French position exposed by their colonial rule in North
Africa. Pointing out that Tunisians “are obligated to serve a cause that is not their own,” he
wrote, such proclamations served only to mock them:
Our villagers and farmers, who are not naïve, smile snidely when hearing such a claim.
[They reply:] ‘If only you would begin by making us happy! If only you respected our
rights and liberties! If only you ceased arbitrary administration! If only we were left alone
on our lands instead of being expelled by force to make way for settlers, who have
become our masters and dispose of Tunisia and Tunisians as they please! If only you
opened schools for our children instead of spending our money for the benefit of
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settlers!’85
Bach Hamba’s acknowledgment of the Tunisian villager, even as he speaks on their behalf, takes
a decidedly different course from other Tunisian activists and political leaders who commented
on the experience of common people at war. Here, those Tunisians perhaps most negatively
impacted by the First World War – residents of small rural towns in the Tunisian interior – were
depicted as intelligent and sarcastic in their criticism of French colonialism. This picture stands
in stark contrast to the one later painted by other Tunisian activists such as Abdelaziz Thaalbi
and Mukhtar al-‘Ayari, who made claims based on the wartime suffering of the Tunisian
conscripts they described as “poor wretches” and corruptible “mercenaries” unable to resist their
French recruiters.86 Bach Hamba’s decidedly more sympathetic take on common Tunisians was
no less isolated by geographic distance than other would-be spokesmen were by class
differences. Yet these thinkers each attempted to “recreate representative authority in a world
torn apart” and even the “slightest influence over the perception of reality in the spheres of
power” made their words and actions worthwhile, to borrow McDougall’s terms.87 In this way
we afford attention to the liminal and fleeting spaces into which Tunisian voices were pushed by
historical circumstance, rather than by an inevitable nationalist victory.
La Revue du Maghreb also demonstrated much about Mohamed Bach Hamba’s access to
the international press in Switzerland, including publications relevant to North Africans’
grievances against French rule. He had more access to such materials than perhaps any
intellectual living under wartime censorship in Tunisia or Algeria, and perhaps more than his
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brother Ali did in the Ottoman Empire. With respect to his criticism of French conscription in
North Africa, for example, Bach Hamba printed long excerpts from a piece written by Charles
Gide, the well-known progressive professor of law at the University of Paris whom he had met at
the 1916 Congrès des Nationalités.88 Gide would later serve as Vice President of the reformist
Comité d’action franco-musulman. Writing for L’Emancipation in 1916, Gide claimed that
honors and vague recognition would not be enough to compensate for colonial soldiers’
sacrifices at war:
What we owe them are no longer mere considerations, but rights. It is unacceptable for us
to continue to consider as an inferior race those who have had the honor of fighting for us
and dying for our sons. I know well that assimilation is neither possible nor even
desirable – but some rights can be equal all while being of a different nature […] The
current war must be for a result, according to the solemn declarations of all the heads of
state of the Entente countries, the restitution of the rights of nationalities.89
Gide explained that France had the option either to recognize that North Africans constituted a
distinct nationality and therefore deserved as many rights as Poles or Czechs, or to admit that
they have no other nationality than French nationality; to leave them suspended as mere
“subjects” would be untenable. Gide added that one should not call North Africans “les
indigènes, an expression which can be humiliating, but which makes no sense – are we not also
‘indigènes’ in France?”90 Bach Hamba here, as he often did, simply quoted the passage in its
entirety without commentary or response. Likewise, in the closing section of his 1918 compiled
publication, he quoted a proclamation from 1916’s conference of the Ligue des droits de
l’homme, a republican organization founded in 1898 in part to defend Alfred Dreyfus. The
proclamation upheld “the right of the nations, small and large, to independence,” and stated the
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Ligue’s demand that future peace treaties “dedicate the right of peoples to dispose of themselves
and raise up all the oppressed nations, assuring to each one of them a government conforming to
their manifest wishes.”91
Distance from the French Protectorate’s press censorship also allowed Bach Hamba to
weigh in on relevant issues beyond Tunisia. In one article in La Revue du Maghreb, he critiqued
the Italian journal Carriere della Sera’s coverage of Italy’s ongoing efforts to occupy Libya, an
issue with which educated urban Tunisians like Bach Hamba and Albert Samama-Chikli were
deeply concerned.92 Another article addressed the “folly” of Sharif Husayn and the Arab Revolt.
Bach Hamba described the latter as nothing more than “grotesque” interference by Western
Powers in the religious affairs of Muslims who, at any rate, did not recognize Sharif Husayn as
Caliph. Bach Hamba applied to the Muslim world the adage that emperors who had tried to make
popes had only ever failed. Going further, he even cited Lord Cromer, once “uncontestable” in
his authority over Egypt, who “dissuaded his country [Britain] from intervening in the religious
questions of Muslims.”93 Bach Hamba’s readers were thus trusted to understand the hypocrisies
and contradictions at play, and more importantly, to recognize that even within European circles,
colonial oppression was being questioned. That their struggles were apparently shared by all
oppressed peoples, furthermore, emphasized the global stakes of North Africans’ cause.
To what extent, then, can we speak of a “Wilsonian Moment” for Bach Hamba? Bach
Hamba quoted an excerpt from Wilson’s January 1917 address to the U.S. Senate in the header
of an April 1918 article in La Revue du Maghreb: “The world can be at peace only if its life is
stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of
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spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.”94 Bach Hamba wrote of the growing
acceptance of Wilson’s terms, even among the French leadership and intellectuals. Rather than
finding cause for optimism and faith in this mechanism for anti-colonial change, however, he
accused France of using “[Wilson’s] principles as a weapon against their enemies,” one that they
had no attention of applying to themselves. In fact, to Bach Hamba, Wilson offered no new
awakening to North African peoples. Rather, he claimed that Tunisians and Algerians had
protested against French rule from the beginning, and that they would continue to do so until
they controlled their own fate. He concluded the piece by calling for a referendum of the nations
of North Africa to determine their own future.95 In this case, Wilsonian rhetoric and its French
analogues could serve as a foil, rather than simply as a source of newfound inspiration. This
legalistic language was appealing in its relative universality and consistency, even if it was
unevenly applied. The historical circumstances of the war and its conclusion meant that
preexisting claims, now more radical, could be given international attention.

Paris Peace Conference
In the aftermath of the war, Bach Hamba and the pro-Ottoman Salah al-Sharif collaborated in
drawing up a declaration to be presented to the world powers at the Paris Peace Conference in
1919 (al-Sharif had left Berlin just after the armistice and settled in Switzerland).96 This
declaration exhibited many of the grievances outlined above, from illegal conscription and land
seizure to a lack of governmental representation and uneven economic development. Signatories
included Bach Hamba, al-Sharif, and five other exiled North African intellectuals. Notably, the
document went beyond Bach Hamba’s typical use of the “Algero-Tunisian people,” a vague
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pronouncement of their shared struggle. The 1919 declaration began with the claim that “Algeria
and Tunisia, since the Muslim conquest, have always made up a single country with Tunis as its
capital,” evoking a concrete territorial basis for the claims to come with the implication that this
would entail a return to historical unity.97 The declaration as a whole reads as a chronicle of
colonial oppression that had derailed past North African and Muslim prosperity, reflecting the
Ottoman orientation of al-Sharif. It appealed directly to Wilson’s “memorable manifesto” of
January 1917 in which all nations, regardless of race or religion, would have the right to
determine their own destiny. The declaration also pointed to the guarantees extended by the
international community to other formerly “oppressed peoples,” such as Czechs, Poles, and
Latvians. Characteristic of Bach Hamba’s work in La Revue du Maghreb, the declaration used
Wilsonian rhetoric to amplify the exhortations of various French intellectuals and socialists in
support of the rights of colonized peoples. The piece concluded by asserting that “The AlgéroTunisian people claim their complete independence, which they have never renounced,” as if to
suggest a continuity rooting their current demands in an autonomous, pre-colonial Tunisia and
Algeria.98
Beyond independence and the territorial unity of Algeria and Tunisia, it is unclear
whether the signatories shared specific expectations for a postwar future. Through the body of
Bach Hamba’s work, Tunisian and Algerian independence appeared to be based on liberal protonationalist promises: constitutional, representative government and a territorial basis which went
no further than Algeria and Tunisia (and in fact appeared to leave room for each country to either
remain independent or unite together). For al-Sharif and others, a return to some sort of pan-
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Islamic (if not always explicitly Ottoman) sovereignty was still compelling. Like the declarations
in many Arab and nationalist appeals made to the Entente victors in Paris in 1919, theirs fell on
deaf ears. On the one hand, one might characterize Bach Hamba’s decision to partner with alSharif as politically naïve, given that the latter had openly sided with the now-defeated Central
Powers. On the other hand, their collaboration suggests how the great promise of the postwar
negotiations could unite activists whose political trajectories and visions had once differed.

Conclusion
Mohamed Bach Hamba found himself on his deathbed in Berlin in 1920.99 He allegedly passed
his dying breaths in the arms of Shakib Arslan, the Lebanese Druze notable subsequently dubbed
the “prince of eloquence” for his work in the 1920s and 30s to link liberation movements across
the Arab world.100 Prior to this moment, there is little evidence that the two had worked together
in the past, making this intimate scene a surprising one. But given the influx of reformers and
activists into Switzerland after the defeat of the Central Powers,101 it is less than surprising that
Bach Hamba at the end of his life was positioned to pass the baton to the next generation of
border-crossing Arab reformers such as Arslan. Though initially a steadfast proponent of
Ottoman rule in the Arab world and no supporter of Arabist separatism, Arslan would in the
wake of the war grow to support Arab nationalism through his continued opposition to European
domination in the Middle East.102 Through the 1920s, with the Mandate system in place, Arslan
led the Syrian-Palestinian Congress in Geneva, and came to be considered the diasporic leader of
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the Syrian Revolt of 1925.103
In Switzerland Mohamed Bach Hamba found, like Arslan and many other reformers of
various anti-colonial, anti-militarist, and nationalist persuasions, a neutral space at once
Francophone and international for the exploration of the political possibilities born of the war. In
exile, he faced the challenge of distance from the Algéro-Tunisian constituents for whom he
advocated, but nevertheless he managed to harness his connections with activists representing
“oppressed peoples” from Europe, the Arab world, and the Muslim world more broadly. Despite
Bach Hamba’s liberal nationalist outlook, however, his trajectory and his personal connections
also reveal that French accusations of his sympathy toward the Ottoman Empire were not wholly
unfounded. His publications made few explicit references to the Ottoman Empire and made no
direct appeal for the reinstatement of Ottoman rule in the postwar Maghrib. But by triangulating
his associations with Salah al-Sharif, Shakib Arslan, and other pro-Ottoman and pan-Islamist
itinerant operatives moving through Switzerland during the war, a picture emerges of an
ambiguous orientation on the part of Bach Hamba. He struggled to reconcile an independent
nationalist future based on Wilsonian and French republican principles with the longstanding
cultural, political, and personal ties linking Tunisia with Istanbul.
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5. CONSTRUCTING “THE JEWISH QUESTION” IN TUNISIA
The end of the First World War, with the armistice declared on November 11th, 1918, should
have brought relief to the residents of Tunis, and to the more than a hundred thousand
demobilized conscripts and forced laborers now returning home. Yet the celebrations in the
streets of Tunis were tainted by bloody brawls involving individuals from nearly every segment
of the city’s population. On the day after the armistice, two veterans led an enthusiastic crowd
accompanied by several cars adorned with Zionist and French flags down the Avenue de
Carthage, reportedly chanting “Long live France! Long live the Allies! Long live Palestine! Long
live the Jews!” and singing Hatikvah, adopted as the anthem of the First Zionist Congress in
1897.1 As it passed the Café du Casino, the group was met with opposing chants: “Down with
the Jews!” [“A bas les juifs!”]2 The ensuing scuffle, which pitched the Jewish demonstrators
(including Tunisians, Algerians, and European settlers) against a collection of European settlers
and Muslim Tunisian participants, resulted in dozens of hospitalizations and at least one death.3
The chaos spilled over into the back streets and markets of the city, causing the closing of several
shopping districts for days and requiring the deployment of police and soldiers around the city;
similar violent episodes continued sporadically into the following year.4 These disturbances, the
culmination of both supposedly long-held animosities and new wartime tensions, would be
addressed by the press on both sides of the Mediterranean and by French police reports, with
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implications for intercommunal relations and postwar political discourse in Tunisia.5
The November 12th episode was not an isolated or unexpected outburst, nor was it limited
to Tunis: similar incidents had unfolded over the course of 1917 in Cap Bon, Sousse, Kairouan,
Sfax, and Gabès.6 Over a hundred reports on intercommunal violence and tensions were
compiled in a dossier entitled “War of 1914-18 - Jewish Community” in the French diplomatic
archives in Nantes. In truth, the dossier, despite its name, includes little information about
anything but what are categorized as “anti-Semitic incidents.” As it often will, the label
obfuscated more than it clarified. A deeper reading reveals how the French colonial “politics of
protection” set the stage for the construction of a Jewish minority and a crisis of “anti-Semitism”
at a time when France was positioning itself on the international stage for an important role in
governing the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Tunisia’s diverse Jewish population, in
turn, was not silent in the face of these violent incidents or of France’s role in creating or
exacerbating them. A chronicle of tensions, debates, and aspirations quickly unfolded in the
popular press, as Jews in Tunisia envisioned a range of political futures, from renewed loyalty to
France through volunteer military service to participation in Tunisia’s burgeoning leftist and
Zionist movements.
This chapter examines the French construction of a “Jewish Question” in Tunisia during
the war and its immediate aftermath, within the emergent international context of minority
regimes that would inform membership in the League of Nations and its justification for the
French Mandate in the Levant. In turn, I investigate how Jews in Tunisia responded to
intercommunal violence and the upheavals of the colonial war, with a particular focus on new
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transnational political visions. What particular circumstances led to the naming of “anti-Semitic
incidents” as such? How and why was a “Jewish Question” constructed? In what terms did Jews
themselves make claims for justice? And how did transnational connections and the international
community figure into these claims? Drawing from the popular press and colonial archives, this
chapter demonstrates the breadth of different political visions among Jews in Tunisia at the war’s
end: far from a monolith, some pled for increased cooperation with France and French Jews,
some sought protection in the hands of new international bodies, and others looked to various
configurations of the Zionist promise of a new life in Palestine. Others still looked to a leftist
vision or to a nationalist Tunisian one.
Here I also advance a call to bridge historiographical divides between North Africa and
the Middle East. I argue that the similarities in the moral and legal justifications for French
tutelage, as well as comparable conditions of wartime mobility, link the study of Tunisia to that
of the Middle East (especially Syria and Lebanon) through questions of the emergent
international order and the ascendancy of “minority questions.” A focus on Jewish men in
Tunisia, in particular, helps us to understand how conscription, mobilization, and demobilization
exacerbated divisive colonial policies, posing new questions to Jews about their sense of
belonging or of difference. These questions loomed large as they considered their political
options for the postwar future.

Archival Considerations and the Minority Question
Abdelmajid Hannoum has warned against reproducing the “textual violence” of the colonial
archive, particularly when writing about identity.7 The very organization of its documents and
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materials produces narratives which are divorced from the historical context in which they were
produced, grouped, and ordered by terms made legible by the practice of colonialism. Despite
historians’ best intentions to read “against the grain” of the colonial archive, making sense of
seemingly self-evident or representational categories (whether of religious identity, political
crises, or violent conflicts, for example) can be challenging. Temporality is a concern, too:
Hannoum gives the example of Algeria’s “Kabyle Revolt of 1871,” labeled as such in the boxes
of the French Archives d’Outre-Mer (Overseas Archives).8 Even before reading a dossier’s
contents, the historian already knows the end of the story, so to speak – a “revolt” or
“insurrection” ends in failure, and the restoration of a preexisting order; if it had gone differently,
it might have been labeled an “uprising” or more likely a “revolution.” The result is that we read
these documents not as if they voiced an unsure and contingent present, but as if they
foreshadowed reasons for the eventual historical outcome. We must always be aware of how the
organization of archives, whether for political reasons, for ease of access, or for some other
reason, can reproduce the very colonial categories which used fixed notions of “identity” or
“mentality” to divide indigenous peoples and justify military intervention.9
Any historian working with colonial archives will be quite familiar with the problems in
accepting such clean-cut categories of identity such as “the Jewish community” (communauté
juive).10 In the 1980s and 1990s writing about “communities” in Tunisian history, while focused
on those who arrived in Tunisia from the north shore of the Mediterranean during the nineteenth
century, came to include Sephardic Tunisian Jews, many of whose backgrounds (and economic
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and cultural ties) could be linked with Italy and Spain. According to David Bond, this coincided
with the “restorative nostalgia” of Ben Ali-era efforts to co-opt his political opposition through
conservational, architectural, and historiographical projects highlighting the contributions of the
various Mediterranean “communities” (Italian, Jewish, and otherwise) to the Tunisian patrimony.
As a result, Bond argues, histories of modern Tunisia and Tunis came to presume simplistic
consistency and continuity among and between these groups along the grain of nationalist
historiography.11 In this way, it is argued, a state-supported narrative cultivated a reading of a
timeless Tunisian cosmopolitanism that could account for its contemporary openness and
progressiveness.12
Even seemingly self-evident historical events such as “anti-Semitic disturbances”
(désordres antisemites) must be approached with a critical eye, particularly given the
aforementioned context of colonial constructions of the “Jewish question” and minority
protection across the Arab world, as well as the heightened stakes of the postwar international
negotiations.13 This chapter thus proceeds with the tensions of such questions, even as it
occasionally relies on other generalizing terms – “Tunisian Jews” in particular – for the sake of
convenience and flow. It should not be presumed that there was a single or coherent “Jewish
community” in Tunisia, nor was there a consistent outcome despite the similar challenges Jews
faced. Terms such as “the Jewish Question” and “anti-Semitism,” however, need to be taken
apart further before proceeding, emerging as they do in Tunisia with deeply imperial and global
implications.
In spite of the fact that presumptions of timeless and inevitable sectarianism continue to
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abound in contemporary discussions about the Arab world, Middle East historians of the past
two decades have made considerable headway in revealing the role that imperial powers played
in exacerbating and politicizing differences among various groups in the region.14 The Levant
has been a particular focus of historians hoping to understand the link between imperial
expansion and sectarianism. Ussama Makdisi has shown, for example, that sectarianism in the
Ottoman Levant was neither primordial nor inevitable, but rather was “actively produced” in the
nineteenth century by European meddling as well as by Ottoman responses and tanzimat reform
efforts, which overturned existing economic and social hierarchies between and among millet
communities.15 On the twentieth century, Max Weiss and others have argued that colonial
French rule in Lebanon was crucial to the creation of an “institutionalized” Shi’i minority,
paving the way for a fragile sectarian politics that was carried over into post-independence and
contemporary Lebanon.16
The First World War generated a flurry of negotiations among the Entente powers about
the fate of Arab lands should the Ottoman Empire fall. It was clear that postwar arrangements
would not bring an end to the French and British presence in the Arab world. In fact, these
powers insisted on an expanded presence in the name of tutelage, civilization, and the protection
of minorities. Benjamin White explains that if the newly established League of Nations was to be
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the arbiter and “gauge” of states’ viability and independence at the war’s end, then “the legal
protection accorded to ‘minorities’ might be seen as the needle.”17 This preoccupation dated back
to the nineteenth century when independence of states depended upon their commitment and
capacity to guarantee the protection of minorities.18 This included states such as Greece and
Serbia, which had seceded from the Ottoman Empire, often with the prodding or direct support
of the Russian, British, and French empires. The common refrain of imperial officials was
criticism of the Ottomans’ alleged repression of its non-Muslim subjects.19 After the First World
War, these states, as well as new states that had acquired substantial “non-national” populations,
were subject to a Minority Committee and the International Court of Justice overseen by the
Entente victors. Such was a condition to these states’ admission into the League of Nations.20
Through the mandate system, France and Britain were given the role of tutor over the
peoples of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, ostensibly guiding them towards
such a day that they would be able to govern themselves as “modern,” “civilized,” and “stable”
nations. This arrangement ignored numerous emergent nationalist and other movements, which
proclaimed their willingness and ability to self-govern. Some of the findings of the American-led
King-Crane Commission, which surveyed of the views of the peoples of the defeated Ottoman
Empire’s Arab provinces, confirmed as much.21 Nonetheless, mandatory powers justified their
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continued presence in the Arab world as arbiters of intercommunal tensions and violence, despite
their own role in creating or exacerbating conflicts. In the French and British imperial
imaginations, it was minorities who had been long oppressed by the old empires that had now
collapsed; the possibility that Jewish and Christian minorities of the Arab world might once
again be oppressed by the Muslim majority – particularly in the emergent ethno-religious
political configurations – was justification enough for their continued imperial presence.
Historians have agreed that the mandate system itself exacerbated intercommunal tensions and
even worked to construct or institutionalize sectarianism where it had not previously existed.22
People living under Mandate rule, as a result, came increasingly to view the postwar
arrangements as “an arbitrary game which handed out rule to some and servitude to others,” as
Hannah Arendt put it.23
The existing literature on the role of imperial powers in the construction of sectarianism
and the Mandatory regime of “minority questions” restricts itself to those lands to which the
mandates were officially applied. French holdings in North Africa were never included in
negotiations for the mandate system. After all, the civil regions of Algeria had been integrated
into France itself since 1848; Tunisia and Morocco, as Protectorates, were nominally and
theoretically independent states whose sovereigns accepted French administration over their
military and external affairs. As far as the League of Nations was concerned, there was no need
for a “civilized tutor” where one already stood. Yet despite the fact that Morocco, Algeria, and
Tunisia did not fall under the purview of the League of Nations and were not granted any further
measure of self-determination, the moral justification for a French presence there shared much in
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common with France’s bid to mandatory authority in the Levant. Sometimes that link was even
made explicit: General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in Syria and Lebanon,
triumphantly addressed welcoming crowds in Zahla after the defeat of Prince Faysal’s army in
the summer of 1920:
France has always found pleasure in this gift, to see marching by her side her adopted
children like her own children. Who could believe that these Moroccans and Senegalese,
after having spilled their blood for four years on the battlefield, would sacrifice
themselves again yesterday, if France were not a true mother to them?24
This direct reference to other colonial subjects under the same colonial “mother” begs a
historiographical question about the divide between scholarship on the Maghrib and the Mashriq:
given the similarities in French and international justifications for the North African
protectorates and Middle Eastern mandates, the literature on the construction of “minority
questions” and the politics of protection in the Middle East should be expanded to include a
discussion of French approaches to “indirect” colonial rule in Tunisia and Morocco (if not
Algeria), as well as British rule in Egypt.25 After all, as Weiss notes, French legal scholars
explicitly acknowledged the semblance: “‘The Mandatory also gives international protection to
states under Mandate resembling that which is applied to countries under protectorate.’ Colony,
protectorate, and mandate: less and less distinguishable versions of outright foreign
domination.”26 North African historiography certainly stands to benefit from this expansion, and
it need not remain isolated from debates about empire and minorities in the eastern
Mediterranean. The construction of a “minority question” is in fact central to understanding how
a “Jewish question” emerged in a Tunisian society that had not, before the outbreak of WWI,
known significant intercommunal strife or sectarianism.
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The “minority question” in North Africa also needs to be placed in the context of antiSemitism as it stood and was understood in France at the turn of the century. The Dreyfus Affair,
having been concluded less than a decade prior to the outbreak of the First World War, loomed
large in the French political psyche. The Affair had revealed the limits of French republican
idealism and laïcité, to say nothing of the contradictions of its promise of equality. French
national identity, at the turn of the century, was more narrowly defined than the Third Republic’s
universalist ideals proclaimed, and public displays of anti-Semitism had been legitimized or
encouraged by figures such as Édouard Drumont.27 The Affair also spurred on the development
of Zionism as a viable political movement: Theodor Herzl wrote with increasing urgency from
1895 and on about the “Jewish question” in Europe.28 Like the phenomenon itself, the term
“anti-Semitism” also entered popular usage by the turn of the century, with Émile Zola decrying
in his famous 1898 broadside an “odious anti-Semitism.”29
At the same time, Dreyfus’ vindication in 1906 marked the powerful momentum of
liberal republicans as a political force around groups such as the Ligue des droits de l’homme,
who after leading the defense of Dreyfus proclaimed more loudly than ever the steadfast values
of the republican tradition.30 Daughton argues that the “anticlerical tirade” in France even picked
up steam in colonial administrations, leading to a reevaluation of the role of missionaries in
France’s far-flung empire. These developments came amid increasing accusations that
conservative Catholics (among others) had spawned a virulent anti-Semitism.31 Famous anti-
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Semites such as Drumont and Henri Rochefort, for their part, railed against colonial expeditions
as the costly and oppressive machinations of greedy Jews. And while republicans and
Dreyfusards were increasingly critical of the more brutal aspects of colonialism, they did not
question the colonial enterprise itself and instead reasserted their confidence in the righteousness
of France’s mission civilisatrice and its paternal care for the “sons” of the Empire, in Tunisia as
anywhere else.32 This was also an important discourse among reformist French Jews, who
claimed to protect and uplift their less fortunate “indigenous” coreligionists, as will be explored
below.

Tunisian Jews and the Ambiguities of Protection
There are many pitfalls associated with the study of Maghribi Jews, and historians of colonial
North Africa have in general highlighted the ambiguity of Jews’ place in both colonial societies
and postcolonial nation-states. One approach has been to depict North African Jews as agents of
Western colonialism, particularly after the Crémieux Decree of 1870 made French citizens out of
Algerian Jews regardless of their disposition towards the colonial state, while it excluded
Muslims from citizenship.33 A Eurocentric approach goes even further, suggesting that French
colonialism had liberated Tunisian Jews from “the shadow of Islam,” claiming that it was both
the source of the [Tunisian] Jews’ security and their means of release from the degradation of
Islam.”34 While such an argument is clearly problematic, other scholars warn against a “rose-
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tinted” view of a romanticized Ottoman or pre-colonial utopian tolerance of Jews.35 Recent
research on Jews of the Maghrib has provided a more critical and fruitful lens through which to
analyze the ideologies and practices of colonialism. In the Algerian case, for example, Joshua
Schreier argues that despite Jews’ attainment of French citizenship in 1870, “the French applied
nominally similar standards of modernity and civilization to both Jewish and Muslim subjects.”36
Some Moroccan Jews, according to Alma Heckman, embraced leftist anticolonial movements,
particularly after the Vichy regime’s imposition of anti-Semitic laws during the Second World
War.37 Needless to say, the reality of Jewish life in North Africa occupied a decidedly more
ambiguous and shifting place than sweeping narratives of the past can accommodate. The stakes
of this ambiguity would only become more pronounced with the upheavals of the First World
War.
Notwithstanding the promising literature on Jews in Morocco and Algeria, historians
have had relatively little to say about Jews in Tunisia in this period, and even less of their
experience during the war and their shifting relationships with their neighbors. Despite
citizenship laws that were different from those in Algeria and Morocco, Jews in Tunisia similarly
occupied a more variegated and ambiguous position with regard to the colonial state than did
Tunisian Muslims. In theory, the Protectorate system meant that Tunisia’s hereditary ruler, the
Bey, would remain nominally in power and would oversee domestic affairs while France would
control external diplomatic and military affairs. This form of indirect rule came about in some
ways as a response to the violence, high cost, and difficulty of France’s conquest of neighboring
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Algeria.38 In practice, however, the diversity and mobility of Tunisian subjects (especially in
coastal cities) often undermined French attempts to walk the fine line of the Protectorate
arrangement. The legal pluralism and ambiguous nationality codes inherited by the Tunisian
Protectorate were never fully resolved, leading the French to employ a more direct form of rule
by the turn of the twentieth century and eventually providing the impetus for resistance to French
rule in the early twentieth century.39 Through the practice known as “forum shopping,” Jews,
along with subjects of Maltese and Italian descent, frequently appealed to a number of different
jurisdictions and consular protections in order to secure the best possible outcome for legal cases
ranging from inheritance and divorce to taxation and criminal proceedings.40 At the same time,
many of Tunisia’s poor urban Jews lived in homogeneous and segregated quarters in old city
centers, and did not enjoy the same social and physical mobility as middle class Jews did. The
hara of Tunis, on the northeastern edge of the medina, was often described by reformist
Francophone and wealthy Tunisian Jews as an overpopulated, unhygienic, and dangerous
neighborhood suffering from neglect.41 Ambiguities thus hung over the conscription policies
facing Tunisia’s various Jewish communities, with serious consequences for intercommunal
relations.

Jews, Muslims, and Conscription
Prior to 1914, there were few intercommunal disturbances to speak of in Tunisia. Ottoman
tanzimat reforms such as the 1856 edict had inspired Tunisia’ 1861 Constitution, which
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established legal equality among residents of Tunisia, including Muslims, Jews, and many
settlers of European origin. The Constitution had been adopted under pressure from French and
British officials and was rescinded after uprisings in 1864. But intercommunal relations
remained largely peaceful – rebels had directed most of their anger toward the Tunisian state for
its imposition of the majba, personal taxes raised to cover its debt to European banks.42 Rare
outbreaks of tension or violence such as those in May 1897 were orchestrated largely by
European settlers; indigenous Muslims pressured to serve the aims of European settlers often
refused.43 Moreover, at the turn of the century, incidents such as these tended to be more
religious than political. During Holy Week in 1901, for example, it was Italians who received a
representation of the Passion with shouts of “Death to the Jews!” Stephen Wilson, echoing
Cohen-Hadria, argues that “the virulence of anti-Semitism in North Africa varied according to
the degree of French or European penetration.”44 Daniel Goldstein noted that through the early
twentieth century, the Protectorate administration tended to exacerbate the exclusion of Jews
from public life, even “systematically” dismissing them because of their perceived economic
advantages. It was this position that led Henri Tridon, an editor with La Tunisie Française, to
speak of an antisemitism “born of the administration.”45
With the outbreak of the First World War, conscription policy under the French
Protectorate proved a divisive force. Male Muslim Tunisians had been periodically, though
inconsistently, subject to conscription since the mid-19th century, before the French occupation,
though residents of the capital were largely exempt because of their economic importance to the
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country.46 The Protectorate administration argued that it could issue a call to conscription into
the French Army on behalf of the Bey. However, whereas Algerian Jews had been naturalized en
masse by the 1870 Crémieux Decree, making Jewish men a pool of potential military recruits,
Jewish subjects of the Tunisian Bey remained exempt from military service under the French
Protectorate, though they were permitted to volunteer for service.47 A continuation of precolonial practices, this arrangement was perhaps due to the fact that Jews in Tunisia had long
sought protégé status from foreign consulates such as those of Italy, England, Spain, and even
France. Such was the nature of the Ottoman “capitulations,” even long after the Tunisian Bey
had secured de-facto autonomy from Istanbul. Many Jews in Tunisia had family origins in Spain
dating back to Inquisition-era expulsions, and this grana community, as they were locally
known, had roots in and maintained connections with the Italian coastal regions between Livorno
and Genoa, an important trade conduit dating back to the early modern period.48 At the start of
the war, with Italy still neutral, some Tunisian Jews, under the patronage of Italian settlers,
appeared to benefit financially from the economic panic. But when Italy joined the war in August
1915, some Jews began to engage voluntarily in the war effort as soldiers and workers.49
French officials were at times divided about conscription policy in the Tunisian
Protectorate. In October 1916, French Minister of War Pierre Roques wrote to Tunisian Resident
General Gabriel Alapetite suggesting that male Tunisian Jews be made subject to military
recruitment, much as their coreligionists in Algeria had been. Roques noted that Algerian Jews
were in general devoted to France, and that at least four or five hundred of Tunisia’s roughly
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100,000 Jews must be fit for service.50 Alapetite, writing about three weeks later to report on
Roques’ inquiry, rejected the comparison to Algeria, noting that as a Protectorate, Tunisia’s
traditional policy of treating Jews much like a protected “foreign colony” had to be maintained.
The comparison, in fact, was dire: “Nothing would be more fatal than pursuing the gradual
assimilation of Tunisian institutions to Algerian institutions.” To do so, Alapetite continued,
would be to undermine the Bey and therefore the very juridical and ideological basis of the
Protectorate, thereby forcing the French administration to rule Tunisian Muslims by force alone,
as was the case in Algeria. He added: “Tunisia was not conquered like Algeria, tribe by tribe,
tent by tent, by a military struggle whose fury stretched out for half a decade.”51 The Resident
General set forth an explanation that Tunisian Jews were at any rate considered inept at war, and
that when compared to their Muslim counterparts, they would show little more loyalty to France
than they would to any other Christian nation. Rather, their community was “closed, nearly
impenetrable,” living tightly as a mass that only “tightens even more with the arrival of bad news
from the outside.” What united them, to the highest official in the French Protectorate, was “a
close solidarity in economic struggle against other races.”52 Despite the differentiation of
Tunisian Jews from other North African Jews, Alapetite’s declarations about their nature drew
from a familiar European set of stereotypes and abstractions about Jews in general.
Conscription, however, was not the only factor in growing tensions between Tunisian
Muslims and Jews. What of their relationship while serving in France, and of the implications of
their shared experience at war? Ethan Katz has pointed to a few examples of cooperation and
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affinity between North African Jews and Muslims around the First World War. In particular,
they sometimes fought in the same military unit such as the Armée d’Afrique, which was based
in North Africa but notably served on the Western Front during WWI and which faced some of
the first chlorine gas attacks of the war. And just as a shared loyalty to the French war effort may
have been characteristic of some of these soldiers (though the evidence is limited), Katz argues
that Jews’ and Muslims’ struggles with their ambiguous legal and racial position in the eyes of
French commanders may have marked some common ground.53 North African Jews and other
foreign-born Jews, including some 30,000 Eastern European Jewish volunteers, usually served in
separate units from Frenchmen, including French Jews.54
Muslims’ experiences in the French army were probably marked just as much by a sense
of profound inequality, not just compared with European soldiers, but also with Jewish North
African soldiers. Non-citizen Jewish volunteers in the French army numbered just about 8,500,
with about 2,500 of them recently arrived Ottoman Jews.55 The remainder, most presumably
from Tunisia and Morocco, made up a very small minority, particularly when dispersed into
colonial North African units.56 Moreover, many of them served in specialized support roles,
perhaps given their access to a level of education largely unavailable to Muslim North Africans.
Some North African Jews served as officiers interprètes – intermediaries between French
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officers and their Muslim subordinates.57 While this role did entail a certain amount of care and
compassion on the part of Jewish soldiers for Muslim conscripts (beyond just interpretation and
translation), it also involved surveillance, censorship of postage, and other elements of colonial
and racialized control that was characteristic of the French Army’s treatment of tirailleurs as
described elsewhere in this dissertation.58 As discussed in Chapter Two, this treatment stemmed
from prevailing French discourses which held Muslims to have innately zealous, violent,
pathogenic, hyper-sexualized, and often irrational “mentalities.”59 The same presumptions about
North African Muslims in the army were mobilized during the First World War to explain their
penchant for violent attacks against Tunisian Jews, who, although not without their faults in
French eyes, were a vulnerable minority whose survival was said to depend on French
protection.

Details of the Armistice Incident
Given this background of juridical and imperial ambiguities, let us examine the details of the
brawl on November 12th, 1918, as described by participants, victims, and witnesses whose
testimonies were collected by police agents. The brawl began when a couple of apparently
drunken, wounded veterans passed by Café du Casino in downtown Tunis in the early afternoon,
chanting “Down with the Jews!” and “Get rid of the Jews!”60 Minutes later, Simon Sadik, a 29
year-old Jewish soldier on convalescence leave, ran into a Mr. Jules Bonan, a man later
identified by French officials as the leader of a “Zionist Committee.”61 Jules asked Simon and his
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brother Victor, also wounded in the war, if they wanted to take a ride around town. Simon, in his
statement to police, noted that Jules had been carrying a “Zionist flag” at the time, presumably a
variant of the flag used at the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897.62 According to Victor,
Jules told them, “This flag will be carried with dignity, since you are Tunisians and wounded
soldiers.”63 The brothers, accepting, were soon followed by Jewish Algerian soldiers and a large
number of Tunisian Jews. According to one of the participants, the group sang a “Zionist hymn”
– perhaps Hatikvah – between cheers of “Vive la France! Vivent les Alliés! Vive la Palestine!
Vivent les Juifs!”64
This last detail, however, was contested by conflicting witness reports: Mr. Raucher, an
insurance broker, noted that some French patrons and Italian soldiers criticized the procession for
not chanting “Vive la France,” “Vive l’Italie,” or “Vive les Alliés.” In their disgust, they
remarked that the “Zionist flag” should not be mixed with the Allied colors. Another Frenchman,
Revolon, noticed that a “Jewish flag” lay draped atop the lead car of the procession, and that a
French flag had been placed in a lower position. He noted the outrage of many onlookers,
including members of the Consultative Conference,65 who would have expected the French flag,
“which symbolizes no religion,” to occupy the top rung.66 Revolon also disparaged the
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approaching crowd, describing the vast majority of them as “thugs from El Hara and SidiAbdallah-Guèche. In this mass, I saw not a single one of the young middle-class Jews.”67 He
continued that when the group approached the Café de Paris, he said to the veteran leader, “My
friend, come on in; you were wounded in the war, and if you are afraid of the crowd, you may
seek shelter in the café.” Revolon then blamed the “Jewish crowd” for having attacked the café,
throwing chairs through the windows and starting a brawl. For their part, witnesses identifying as
Jewish indicated that Revolon had as much a hand in provoking the fight as had any other
participant that day.68
A shouting match soon escalated into a brawl, when fists, canes, chairs, saucers, and
carafes started flying. It took the deployment of French police and soldiers around Tunis to
disperse the roughly 300 people involved that afternoon, though many smaller groups broke off
and reprisals continued to occur into the night, one resulting in the death of Victor Cohen of the
hara, allegedly at the hands of four Muslim assailants.69 Brawls and looting occurred
sporadically throughout the remaining weeks of 1918, generating a stir among local merchant
communities, French authorities, and both the Tunisian and metropolitan press.

French Anti-Semitism at Armistice
It is not clear from the archival evidence who was most immediately responsible for the violence
on November 12th, 1918. What the archives do reveal, however, are the ways in which the
victims, witnesses, and the police tasked with gathering their statements conceived of the wider
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stakes and causes of this incident. The arrangement of the police investigation, with officers
present and taking notes, introduced a certain filter to the responses in each report: some agents
displayed open disdain for Jews, while others were quick to blame Muslim soldiers who were
presumed to be innately violent. Interviewees, in turn, voiced their sides of the story, and many
of their editorialized comments, colorful identifiers, and claims of broader injustices are
preserved in some translated or summarized form. It is these comments that suggest the broader
implications of an incident which, if isolated, might only have been a grim footnote to the
exuberance of worldwide armistice celebrations.
French settler witnesses zeroed in on the aforementioned notion that Jewish subjects of
Tunisia, having been exempt from military service, did not deserve to celebrate the Allied
victory, much less parade their Zionist ambitions on the day after the Armistice.70 Raucher’s
testimony, already noted above, concluded: “I don’t believe I need to explain any further all of
the details of this manifestation carried out by Tunisian Jews who haven’t known, like I do, the
horrors of war.”71 Similarly, at the end of his police interview, Revolon blamed the
demonstration’s organizers: “They should have thought to keep their religious banners in their
temples on the day that the Allies celebrated the heroism of their glorious soldiers. No Catholic
ever brought out the Pope’s flag that day, under the pretext that there were priests among the
soldiers.”72
Such views were not just the opinions of a few isolated civilians; they permeated the
colonial administration’s discourse about Jews and intercommunal strife in general. For example,
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the Civil Controller of the province of Kairouan, writing in August 1917 about “Anti-Jewish
troubles” in the cities of Sousse and Kairouan, offered an explanation of earlier episodes of
violence:
The Jewish population, in general unsympathetic, has proven in recent months to have an
insufferable arrogance. They have not contributed to the war nor have they paid or given
any goods in kind. On the contrary they have profited.… The daily sacrifices that the
whole world has consented to have been avoided by [the Jews], but I don’t know how.
We lack flour and grain, but the Jews have it; even when petrol runs out, they are able to
get it….73
Such a conviction would later be repeated in explanations of the violence on November 12th,
1918: Commandant Burat, of the Gendarmerie of Tunisia, wrote that “in Tunis, I’ve been alerted
that a certain effervescence reigns within all the European, Jewish, and Muslim milieus. The
Jews have had an arrogant attitude which, at any given moment, can reignite a conflict.”74 French
police agent Calmer Marius echoed this telling of the events, describing the organizer of the
Jewish procession as an “insolent provocateur.”75 It was amidst such an environment, noted the
Alliance Israélite Universelle’s journal L’Univers Israelite, that a French police officer, shortly
after calm was restored, is alleged to have remarked to his friend: “I smacked around some Jews
yesterday, and I’m proud of my son, still only in high school, who did the same.”76
Some French officials, however, demonstrated a grasp of the situation less clouded by
complaints about Jews’ alleged provocations. It seems that the final evaluation by the French
police official Mattei ultimately did not assign blame for the violence on November 12th to any
particular side, noting the aggressive chants on both sides as inflammatory – though he believed
that the first chairs had been thrown by the European patrons of the Café de Paris.77 A few days
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after the incidents, moreover, Resident General Alapetite acknowledged the challenge of
wartime exigencies and French demobilization policies. Despite Protectorate efforts to stagger
the repatriations to soften the jarring effects that the return of so many veterans could have on the
economy, social relations, and other aspects of daily life, Alapetite limited his judgment to
advising that “it is also important that the Jews be prudent and not agitate with the flag of
Zionism.”78
Silences in the colonial archive often reveal much about existing epistemologies and
assumptions. In this case, it is striking that French officials wrote of a growing “anti-Semitic
movement” among Muslim soldiers while failing to acknowledge their own prejudices, nor those
of the French settler community. More than just an ironic omission, this is in fact at the heart of
understanding both the reasons for the outbreak of intercommunal violence and the
categorization of these incidents as “anti-Semitic” attacks – each helped build towards a “Jewish
question” in Tunisia. Such a question could explain the intercommunal violence in Tunisia
without acknowledging the colonial inequities and wartime brutality that contributed to them.
More importantly, the “Jewish question” could justify French suzerainty not just in Tunisia but
also in the former Ottoman territories on which the French had designs in the postwar
negotiations.

Constructing the “Jewish Question” from Across the Mediterranean
The construction of a “Jewish question” did not unfold in a colonial vacuum, nor was it simply a
French imposition; Jews on both sides of the Mediterranean had plenty to say about the targeted
incidences of violence at war’s end. Even during the war, well before the armistice violence, the
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perceived plight of Tunisian Jews had already attracted the attention of political and religious
figures in France. One such figure was André Spire, the French intellectual who earlier in his
career had contested Drumont’s anti-Semitic La Libre Parole during the Dreyfus Affair. As the
recent founder of La Ligue des Amis du Sionisme, Spire raised the question of recruiting
Tunisian volunteers for an “expedition to Palestine,” presumably with the goal of permanent
settlement there. Spire ventured that this would help alleviate the “special situation” that
Tunisian Jews were likely to face after the war by demonstrating to Muslim Tunisians that their
Jewish compatriots had, in fact, participated in the war.79 However, Resident General Alapetite
would later express his doubts that Tunisia’s Arab Muslims would be pleased, commenting on
the events of November 12th: “It is no doubt that what resembles a conquest of Palestine by the
Jews would be very disagreeable to our Arabs.”80 The Young Tunisians, for their part, had
condemned Zionism as a French lure to entice Jews to join the army.81 Perhaps Spire thought
Maghribi Jews might be more open to Zionism than French Jews, who he generally believed
“cannot be anything other than French.”82 At any rate, French Jews remained divided on Zionism
throughout the war, dues in part to the efforts of the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), the
Paris-based Jewish organization aiming to modernize and “civilize” Middle Eastern Jews,83 and
the Consistoire central, France’s state-sanctioned Jewish governing body, to characterize
Zionism as a charitable cause in support of foreign Jews rather than as a viable impetus for
French Jews’ emigration.84
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In November 1917, a series of smaller attacks on Jews in Tunisia were reported by
French and Tunisian Jews living in France. French censors tracked correspondence related to the
matter. Joseph Boutboul, writing in a letter to a family member in Tunis, claims to have “made a
lot of noise in Paris on the subject of the anti-Jewish troubles in Tunisia,” soliciting support from
influential figures such as Gustave Hervé, a politician who allegedly promised to write some
short articles about the issue.85 The Secretary of the AIU in Paris, writing to the AIU branch
director in Tunis, noted that he had previously written to Resident General Alapetite about the
Jewish “troubles of Bizerte,” a northern port city and a key staging point for mobilized and
demobilized soldiers.86 A Jewish soldier serving at the Western Front in the Oran-based 2nd
regiment of zouaves asked in a letter whether his friend in Tunisia had also “suffered from the
barbarism of the tirailleurs and spahis [mostly-Muslim North African cavalry] which are equal
in savagery to the Germans against whom we are currently fighting until definitive and complete
victory.”87
As the work of Richard Fogarty, Gregory Mann, and others have shown, French colonial
soldiers increasingly made claims to French citizenship based on their service in the First World
War, a call at times supported by Senegal-born French deputy Blaise Diagne.88 Katz reminds us
that for French Jews, too, WWI came at a “ripe time” to prove their civic participation so soon
after the Dreyfus Affair, which was resolved less than a decade before the outbreak of war and
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still loomed large in the discourse of the French public.89 A similar phenomenon developed
among the Ottoman Empire’s Jewish communities during the 1912-13 Balkan War, with
Ottoman Jewish journalists calling upon their audiences to honor the new universal conscription
laws the same way they had volunteered during wars with Russia in 1877 and with Greece in
1897. These public displays of patriotism came amid the increasingly assertive ethno-religious
imperial identity that reached its peak after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution.90 Much in the
same way Ottoman Jews had, Jews in Tunisia understood the increased scrutiny they were facing
in a changing political landscape.
Fulfillment of “the ultimate sacrifice for one’s country and nation” had, perhaps since the
Revolution of 1789 and increasingly over the course of the nineteenth century, been one of the
key duties of French citizens.91 Notably, however, the path to French naturalization and
citizenship for Jewish subjects of the Tunisian Bey had long been narrow and limited. It was not
until the 1923 Morinaud Law that the naturalization of non-French residents was expanded,
leading some 5,000 Tunisian Jews to seek French naturalization over the course of the ensuing
decade. This measure was handled on an individual, case-by-case basis since it had mostly been
aimed at the Italian residents of the Protectorate who, still far outnumbering French colons, the
French Protectorate hoped to co-opt and remove from Italian consular jurisdiction.92
Some metropolitan Jews expressed their belief that Tunisian Jews’ sacrifices needed to be
more visible if they were to prove their loyalty and avoid discrimination at the hands of
demobilized French settlers and Muslim Tunisians. It was not enough that some Tunisian Jews
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such as Victor Sebag and Moise Bessis, whose experiences have been explored briefly by
historians, volunteered for military service.93 As early as September 1917, the Grand Rabbi of
Marseille wrote in a letter of praise to a Tunisian Jewish veteran who, remarkably, had enlisted
in the army at the age of 52:
Let it be said between you and me: it is deplorable that many of your young compatriots
have not imitated your example. [Military service] could be a solution to the Jewish
question in Tunisia, and a very elegant one at that …. at first glance it appears to me the
young Jews of Tunisia would have an excellent occasion by which to reaffirm and
demonstrate that they are worthy of the French naturalization that they lack. Like you, I
hope that in the coming year, the nightmare will be gone, and that fortune shall reign
once again in the world.94
It is notable that a metropolitan Grand Rabbi had the occasion to write to a Tunisian contact
living across the Mediterranean as early as September of 1917. At first glance, it speaks to the
extent to which information was shared across the Mediterranean, perhaps in this case through
the French and Tunisian Jews who had crossed the sea as part of their military service.
Even more striking is the Grand Rabbi’s invocation of “the Jewish question in Tunisia,”
and one which could be solved were Tunisian Jews to volunteer in greater numbers. This
metropolitan religious leader, tied into the nationalist cultural milieu of post-Dreyfus French
Jewishness, understood that he could mobilize his authority as a colonial agent of sorts, in this
case in the name of a patriotic and militaristic Franco-Jewish loyalty that could be exported to
the overseas empire. Metropolitan Jews’ efforts to extend their vision of French civilization to
North Africa in fact dated back to the liberal idealism of the July Monarchy and the first two
decades of the French conquest in Algeria, when reformers such as Adolphe Crémieux and
Jacques-Isaac Altaras campaigned to give the Consistoire central in Paris the authority to appoint
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rabbis and lay members of new consistories in Algeria.95 One might also consider the gendered
context of the Grand Rabbi’s statement: Erin Corber has argued that during the war, the French
rabbinical establishment came to embrace an image of the rabbi as a “man of action” whose
heroism on the front and behind the lines would regenerate both Judaism and the French nation.96
The Grand Rabbi of Marseille, perhaps envisioning such a role for himself, might have felt it his
duty to cross the Mediterranean in pressuring his constituents into service.
By the early twentieth century, members and teachers of AIU had become particularly
implicated in the French “mission civilisatrice” throughout the Muslim world, and at times took
on a role as “the protector of the Jews” by monitoring and reporting on their “sufferings” from
Iran to Morocco.97 The AIU’s activities were largely educational, and they established schools in
which French language and culture were taught. Though relevant historiography has focused
mainly on Algeria and Morocco, there are archival fragments which speak to the Maghrib-wide
struggle to “enlighten” indigenous Jews. Sometimes, AIU teachers exhibited aggressive disdain
for their North African constituents. For example, Gabbay Benayaoun, an Iranian-born teacher
with the Alliance Israélite school in Tunis, wrote to a colleague in Bandar-Abbas about the
community he was responsible for educating:
Tunis is a very pretty city which I love passionately, but not so much its inhabitants, most
of all the Jews who here are veritable scoundrels; it’s a shame in this time of war that
they speculate and steal the widows and orphans of the war, whether Italian, Arab, or
French; they dress like gentlemen though they have empty heads, and walk ostentatiously
on the avenues right past poor amputees and blind Frenchmen and Italians, which causes
anger; also nobody here likes them, including myself and the other Alliance teachers.
These are the least affable people, the least welcoming, the most egotistical and the most
hypocritical in the world; if they flatter you a little, it’s only so that they can rob and skin
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you.98
This trans-Mediterranean relationship could therefore evoke more than just Francophone Jews’
sympathetic concern for their Tunisian coreligionists. Here is a dramatic example of just how
pervasive a racially-informed view toward North African Jews could be. It demonstrates the
widespread purchase of a stereotype of Jews in Tunisia as disloyal war profiteers, one
complicated in this case by multiple layers of intercultural relations.
News of intercommunal violence even alarmed and intrigued some Muslim Tunisians
abroad, and French intelligence agents compiled their correspondence on the matter into reports
categorized under the rubric of the “Jewish Question.” One such report from the ministry of war
from November 1917 recorded Muslim soldiers’ comments, which ranged from curiosity or
concern to schadenfreude. For example, Mohamed, a soldier in the 8th Regiment of tirailleurs,
wrote to Moktar el-Djemmal that “there are rumors that the Jews have made a big story in
Tunis… please let me know if it is true or not.” Mohamed ben Ahmed Elferchinchi similarly
wrote of rumors of “riots and brawls.” Abderrham el-Halaf of Degache (in southern Tunisia)
alleged in a letter home that “at first we fought with the Jews… the French then suspended our
leave… The colonel said, ‘There are no permissions to leave at all; you are French soldiers yet
when you go to Tunisia, you fight with the Jews!’” El-Halaf then claimed that some twenty
soldiers defected to the German side, prompting the colonel to reinstate leave permissions. His
letter concludes, “You would do well, if you come across a Jew in Degache, to beat him on his
sides, because those people, even after a hundred generations, will never become loyal to us. One
part of our worries and troubles comes from the Germans, and the other from the Jews.”99
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Word of the intercommunal strife spread beyond the empire itself, reaching Switzerlandbased Tunisian exiles including Mohamed Bach Hamba and his Comité Algero-Tunisien, first
explored in Chapter Three. The Comité was alarmed by what it called the “campaign of hate”
unfolding against Jewish compatriots. In its journal La Revue de Maghreb, Bach Hamba
criticized French colons for their incitement of violence “be it by pen or by word” against Jews,
and blaming the Protectorate authorities for failing to prevent such actions.100 Bach Hamba,
while critical of French conscription of Tunisians for their own wars, understood clearly the
contradictions that led Clemenceau to give up his initial interest in subjecting Tunisian Jews to
conscription: while Clemenceau concluded that they could not be conscripted since they were
not French citizens, Bach Hamba, exposing the hypocrisy of this arrangement, asks: “But then,
are the Muslims French citizens?”101 Beyond the French press – he cites articles in Colon
Français, for example – Bach Hamba also pointed to the profusion of “anonymous tracts and
malicious voices which, in sum, have created a heated and calumnious discourse” against Jews.
As for the Muslim soldiers implicated in the attacks and looting against Jewish communities in
1917 and 1918, Bach Hamba argued only that these soldiers, “in their simplicity, are left to be
influenced by these troublemakers.”102 This glib dismissal notwithstanding, Bach Hamba pointed
out that the newspaper Colon Français’ sudden appreciation for Muslim soldiers’ loyalty relative
to Jews was suspect: “In the past, this journal of hate has never missed an opportunity to insult
and slander Muslims. Today is the Jews’ turn. The method has not changed: lies, insults, and
slander are the favorite weapons of these gentlemen!”103 Bach Hamba, with a critical perspective
from exile, could see clearly that contradictory colonial conscription policies, along with French
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settlers’ familiar prejudices, had contributed to an unprecedented degree of intercommunal
violence in Tunisia.

Le pouvoir de l’uniforme…
As voices from beyond Tunisia lent momentum to the construction or realization of a “Jewish
question,” Jews in Tunisia engaged in their own dialogue in order to make sense of
intercommunal tensions. Testimony from Jewish witnesses and victims of the incidents in
November 1918 demonstrated an acute sense of the stakes of the violence in Tunis, noting the
injustice they felt that the wartime sacrifices of Jewish volunteers and their families had gone
ignored. In seeking justice for episodes of intercommunal violence, some Tunisian Jews made
claims primarily based on wartime loyalty to France, highlighting the fact that some had
volunteered for military service despite their exemption from conscription. Most glaring in their
testimonies is the importance given to participants’ military status, particularly as wounded
veterans. In fact, nearly all of the dozens of reports filed by victims, apparent perpetrators,
witnesses, and police agents deliberately specify that each side of the incident included soldiers
or veterans. Certain individuals, too, are identified as “mutilés de guerre” (wounded in battle),
“permissionaires” (on leave), “tirailleurs,” recipients of the Croix de Guerre, and so on.
This fixation on military status is expected of a society having just emerged from four
years of war but was given added gravity by the accusations that Jews had not pulled their
weight in the war effort. That the Jewish interviewees confirmed the chants “Vive la France” and
“Vive les Alliés” in their accounts of the November 12th procession, despite other accounts
refuting this, may speak to an awareness of the pressure to reaffirm their loyalty. They thus
acknowledged the social and political capital of military service and in confronting the
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suspicions of Jewish disloyalty. Isaac Bonan, before being injured in the brawl, had reminded
other café patrons that some Jewish parents, in a way, had participated in the war by having lost
a son at the front.104 Darius Bonan, one of Isaac’s brothers, describes having stepped in to help
his wounded brother as they were pursued by a crowd who chanted, “Kick out [enlevez] the
Jews! Death to the Jews!” A third Bonan brother, Henry, came across the same crowd; pleading
with them not to carry on with such chants, he reminded them “that among the Jews there were a
great number who fulfilled their duty to France, and I won’t allow you to insult me, because I am
both Jewish and French.”105 He was subsequently attacked, but was quickly rescued by a passing
soldier from the 4th regiment of Zouaves. Henry Bonan’s testimony, like those of the other
witnesses, does not end with the narrative details. He adds:
I will point out to you, Mr. Commissioner, that I am French, enrolled in the [army] class
of 1920, but deferred on 2 Oct 1918 for general weakness of constitution, and that my
brother has been at the front for nearly 2 years, and that my father is mobilized with the
15th Territorial Battalion in Tunis. I don’t understand how in Tunis, where many Jews
did their duty for the French homeland, these men, as Jewish as they are French, would
be attacked in the middle of the street in view of happy passers-by who could hardly care
about my French status, having not hesitated to attack me in great numbers (I recall about
50 people), even though my family’s blood had been spilled for France.106
Here, Henry Bonan appealed to multiple layers of belonging, from his own individual status as a
French national and to his family’s military service, to the Jewish community’s collective loyalty
to France. The tone of the statement seems to suggest that these were not isolated incidents, but
in fact part of a larger societal ill which had struck Tunisia. The French Protectorate had failed to
protect those who were loyal to it, leaving them vulnerable to prejudicial attacks.
Another violent incident between Jews and tirailleurs broke out in July 1920, less than
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two years after the events at Café du Casino. An article in the Jewish periodical L’Evolution
Tunisienne assured the good conduct of Jews in the cafes and restaurants of Tunis, criticizing the
colon daily La Depeche Tunisienne which, “as usual,” had accused Jews alone of stirring up
trouble. The article also criticized the Muslim tirailleurs, some of them non-commissioned
officers, for failing to maintain order in the city. While this incident was not reported on as
widely as the November 1918 conflict, it seems that those hurt included French and Italian
settlers as well as a couple of Jews of unknown origin.107 For some Jews, that violence of this
kind could occur well after the conclusion of the war was a reminder that intercommunal
tensions had not disappeared with the end of the war.
Jews in Tunisia were also concerned with the challenges faced by demobilized soldiers in
finding work upon their reintegration into Tunisian society. This was one area, moreover, in
which common ground between Jewish and Muslim grievances against the French colonial
administration could emerge.108 One Jewish periodical, Le Sémaphore de Tunisie, made the fate
of all veterans a central concern, its editor-in-chief J. C. Ganouna writing in its first issue:
Admittedly, we live in a time when the recent agitations of the great bloody tremor we
have just suffered have not yet been calmed. Those who have suffered morally and
physically for six years may find it hard to understand that when they return home, they
still live under the yoke of speculators. Speculators and profiteers, they are everywhere,
among the French, the Jews, as well as the Arabs, great and small…109
The journal described itself as “reformist” and “intelligently socialist,” waging war as it did not
only against speculators but also against “abuse, favoritism, and wastefulness” and “the
demagoguery of revolutionary socialism and the Third International.”110
A few weeks after its launch, Le Sémaphore ran a front page article detailing the

“Les troubles de La Goulette – Les Responsables,” L’Evolution Tunisienne, 24 July 1920.
DeGeorges, “A Bitter Homecoming,” 57.
109
J. C. Ganouna, “Notre programme,” Le Sémaphore de Tunisie, 7 October 1920.
110
Ibid.
107
108

178

misfortune of a Tunisian veteran of Maltese descent who had come to its editors: having served
over four years on the Western and Macedonian Fronts, he had to pay 400 francs for his own
passage back to Tunis. Once home in May 1920, he found work with the Bureau of Maritime
Transportation, only to have the position revoked that October; though vacant posts in the
Bureau remained, his requests for a new position there fell on deaf ears. The author of the article
and the journal’s political editor, Jean Siger, doubted whether such a precedent “would
encourage those who wanted to serve France” in the future, writing that the Maltese soldier had
been “cheated by the representatives of France” despite their “formal promise” that he “would be
treated like a native of France” and certainly “treated better than a foreigner.”111 The next day, Le
Sémaphore ran another article praising veterans’ contributions and calling for Tunisians to
support orphans and widows.112 The accusation that France had misled or even “cheated” its
loyal and vulnerable subjects was familiar not only to urban Jews, but also to Muslim veterans
such as Mukhtar al-‘Ayari, who experienced discrimination both during his service on the
Western Front and in the war’s aftermath. Both communities claimed to have fulfilled the
patriotic duties asked of them, only to have their sacrifices go unrewarded and unrecognized
beyond ceremonial niceties.
At least from the perspective of these Francophone Jewish periodicals, then, Tunisian
Jews appeared uniquely to face not only neglect from the French administration but also
demonization by French settlers and the Muslim Tunisian majority. Set in the context of the
French colonial politics of protection, however, the characterization of intercommunal tensions
as part of an endemic “anti-Semitism” was part of the construction of a “Jewish minority” in
Tunisia. It is not that “Tunisian Jews” did not exist at all as distinct group (whether religiously,
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culturally, or legally) prior to the First World War or to the French occupation of Tunisia. It is
that the growing tensions and incidences of violence cannot be separated from, and were
explicitly made legible to, France’s colonial and international aims. A self-fulfilling logic was at
play: first, wartime manpower needs led France to commit further to a divisive conscription
policy which, alongside its racial and imperial hierarchies, exacerbated the disillusionment of
Muslim conscripts and their targeting of Jews. But when intercommunal tensions emerged, racial
and colonial discourses could be mobilized to blame these groups and their “timeless” ways.
Much in the same way that such tensions were exploited in the Eastern Mediterranean, France’s
broader postwar ambitions could be justified by Tunisia’s need for the tutelage of an enlightened
and stabilizing power.

Jews, Wilson, and the International Community
While French and colonial discourses were influential in developing a “Jewish question” and
demonstrated to some Jewish Tunisians the need to reaffirm their loyalty and sacrifices to the
empire, Protectorate archives reveal that this moment of tension and uncertainty had incited
discourse surrounding new political futures for Tunisian Jews. The emergence of these
alternatives reflected the increasingly international orientation of reform movements around the
world towards the end of the war.
One such possibility involved an appeal to Woodrow Wilson and American rhetoric of
liberty. For example, three days after the armistice brawl outside the Café du Casino, a group of
Jewish merchants from the old city, having shuttered their shops out of fears of further attacks,
decided to keep them shut until they had received a response to a telegram to President Woodrow
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Wilson asking for his protection.113 On the same day, a remarkable censored letter from one H.
Fellous to an unknown recipient revealed that in the afternoon after the brawl on November 12th,
a group of Jews led by the Grand Rabbi of Tunis demonstrated briefly near the Resident
General’s office before marching to the American embassy, where they chanted, “Long live
Wilson, long live America, cradle of liberty [berceau de la liberté]!” Fellous’ letter, written in
French, is nonetheless signed “Cordially yours” in English. Fellous also prayed that his letter
would not be censored, but correctly feared that it would be, because “only truth hurts,” and that
the censor would see “too much truth” in his letter which “will be wiped away by his black
brush.”114
The shockwaves of attacks against Jews were generally evident in the Jewish press,
where articles circulated between the metropole and the Protectorate. Metropolitan Jewish
periodicals such as Archives Israélites and L’Univers Israélite fought a constant battle against
anti-Semitism in France and its colonies throughout the war through weekly exhortations of the
heroic deeds of Jewish soldiers.115 In Tunisian newspapers, weeks and even months after the
armistice attacks in Tunis, articles repeatedly surfaced criticizing the French Protectorate’s
failure to protect Jews in Tunisia and condemning the European press for stoking the flames of
anti-Semitism.116 In the bi-weekly Tunisia, a Tunis-based journal aimed at a broad audience of
Jews in North Africa, a front page article on January 24th, 1919 reprinted several articles and
letters dealing with “The Incidents of Tunis.” One of them, reprinted from the AIU’s L’Univers
Israélite, claimed that the French authorities were suppressing articles about the incidents, while
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another article accused conservative settler journals in Tunisia such as Le Colon Français of
inciting their readers against Jews by depicting them as shirkers of military duty. The article
accused Resident General Alapetite of ignoring these incidents for fear that they would spoil his
last few days in Tunis before taking up his appointment as French ambassador to Spain; his
delusion, they claimed, was that “Tunisia was a paradise for all the races of the world.”117
Another article in Tunisia (also printed under the title L’Égalité) reported on a municipal
planning meeting for a public armistice celebration in Mateur. The meeting devolved into
discord when three angry French committee members, whose “biased feelings are known,”
angrily demanded that Jews be excluded from participating, presumably because they believed
that Jews, exempt from military service, did not deserve to celebrate.118 The author of the article
remarked with a mixture of cynicism and optimism:
And they say we’ve entered into a Wilsonian era…. France, who is the center of civilized
humanity, cannot tolerate such injustices in a country that it protects. The governments
have affirmed that the Jews fought for law and justice. We mustn’t forget that several
thousand Jews went to spill their blood for the Allied cause…. We stand in a critical
moment in history. The arc in the sky of peace is drawn to the horizon. Here is the day of
alliance and reconciliation. We must be united in this unique work.119
Reference was made once again to wartime sacrifices, but more than anything, the passage
looked to the future: peace had been promised, but it hinged upon Jews’ ability to hold French
civilization to its own ideals and to attract the attention of the international community.
Ultimately, the resulting vote did not exclude Jews from the festivities in Mateur. Still, of the
twenty-one committee members, the nine who had been “rotten with anti-Semitism… suffered a
forced bath.”120
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Tunisia’s invocations of Woodrow Wilson suggest that the “Wilsonian moment,” as some
have dubbed it, indeed reached Tunisia. This was far from the only such instance, with other
journals such as Le Sémaphore de Tunisie providing regular updates about Wilson’s health,
speeches, and political rivals.121 To a certain extent, the name Wilson, along with terms such as
“liberty” and “equality,” were now in wide circulation and given a new weight in Tunisia by
1919; so too, apparently, was the term “anti-Semitism.” Jewish leaders in Tunisia clearly
understood that these terms could mobilize their own community and draw the attention of
French or even American authorities. This is not to suggest that ideas such as the protection of
minorities, political equality, or national liberation were new, foreign imports. The claim of
“protection” from various layers of authority, including foreign powers, was a longstanding
practice among Tunisians, according to Julia Clancy-Smith.122 Mohamed Bach-Hamba’s Comité
Algéro-Tunisien, as we have seen, wrote in vain to Wilson and the leaders at the Paris Peace
Conference, using Wilsonian language to highlight France’s failures to live up to its own
republican ideals. Jews in Tunisia, like the reformers exiled in Switzerland (or indeed Egyptian
and Syrian reformers), may have used this sort of discourse as a means to amplify their
grievances, hoping to win greater attention from French authorities by stoking additional scrutiny
from the international community.
Discussions about the armistice incidents persisted long after late 1918, and some took on
wider implications than simply the prevention of future violence. An August 1920 article of the
Francophone Jewish newspaper L’Evolution Tunsienne lamented that those incidents had not,
despite their hopes, “dried up” the “Judeophobic wickedness” of the perpetrators. The author, E.
Suzgertoret, went further: “May I remind you that the son of a nation that since 1789 was made
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the champion of liberty should respond to the call of a people who aspire to see Wilsonian
principles applied, and whose keen desire is to live within a Palestinian state in good
understanding with all its neighbors.”123 “Wilsonian principles” were carried beyond the desire
to force the French Empire to protect its Jewish constituents. Here, they extended to the
American president’s support for concepts of self-determination, particularly after the Balfour
Declaration had in theory supported the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine.
Suzgertoret’s article was published just days before the war’s participants finalized the Treaty of
Sèvres, which stipulated the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and paved the way for the
creation of the British mandate in Palestine, signaling a new possibility for some Jews in Tunisia.

The Appeal of Zionism in Tunisia
It is in this context – that of the emergent international stage upon which all manner of
grievances and claims could be played out, with varying degrees of success – that the Zionist
procession in Tunis’ ad-hoc armistice celebrations can be revisited. What is the significance of
the fact that this parade, headed by wounded Jewish Tunisian veterans, carried a Zionist flag at
its head while the anthem of this nascent movement was sung out loud? What led Jews in
Tunisia to join such a group, and what was really at stake in their dreams for a homeland in
Palestine?
The war’s upheavals helped provoke various articulations of an international Jewish
community, and that included those who supported the Zionist movement. Through the 1910s,
Zionist organizations, including Agoudat Tsion (Zionist Union), were founded in seven different
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Tunisian cities.124 In August 1918, the Commissariat Général des Affaires de Guerre FrancoAméricaines noted that both peaceful and “agitated” Zionist groups were active in Tunisia, and
that they were in contact with larger Zionist organizations in France, suggesting that the
Francophone colonial connection was an important conduit for the popularization of Zionist
ideas.125 Some Jews looked even further afield in imagining a transnational community: popular
Jewish periodicals such as Tunisia featured news updates on the Jewish Congress in New York,
as well as pieces reprinted from the international press which boldly supported Zionism. One
such article even celebrated the unsubstantiated “fact” that Charlie Chaplin – the “King of Film”
– was Jewish.126 While these trends hardly yet represented a coherent popular movement, it is
against this backdrop that we need to consider the processions of November 12th which chanted
“Vive la Palestine,” as well as the ambitions articulated in their aftermath.127 The war appeared
to do much to encourage a new configuration of the trans-Mediterranean connections long a part
of life for Jews in Tunisia. It is not at all surprising that the Zionist procession held in Tunis the
day after the armistice was led by, and featured prominently, wounded Jewish soldiers.
Tunisians’ interest in Zionism picked up steam in 1920, after the easing of wartime press
restrictions and the wider opening across the political spectrum among Tunisians. What form this
“movement” would take was still very much up in the air, however. Some were skeptical: in
May, Edmond Fonessy wrote in L’Evolution Tunisienne that the British mandate recently
established in Palestine was only a “half victory” since it imposed an “international character” on
what was supposed to be a national home. He lamented further that “they tell us that oppressed
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Jews can simply leave for Palestine,” when clearly many remained unable to do so while
suffering in their home countries. Jews deserved rights wherever they might live and not just
half-baked promises from the international community.128
The ideological and occasionally messianic appeal of a “return” was given a new
immediacy not only with the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Zionism, but also with
the deterioration of intercommunal relations in Tunisia and of faith in the ability of the French
Protectorate to protect.129 As a result, others were more optimistic about a future in the land of
Israel. Jewish leftists and their supporters, for example, called for a socialist brand of Zionism,
engaging with a vigorous debate within the Zionist movement from its earliest days.130 Lucien
Monray, drawing inspiration from the influential French-born settler Joachim Durel’s blending
of socialism with patriotism, argued that the same sentiment could apply to Zionism. In a June
1920 article in L’Evolution Tunisienne, Monray praised the work of a new Tunisian branch of
Workers of Zion, a Jewish working-class socialist confederation based in Bern, Switzerland. The
main group, having agreed to adhere to the Third International at a conference in Geneva in
August 1919, stood as proof to Monray that Zionists could be “socialist and ‘Bolshevik’ at the
same time.” He continued:
By Zionism, I do not mean the establishment of all Jews in ancient Judea, the creation of
another nationalism thirsty for territorial conquest, but, simply, the creation of a national
home for those whose right to citizenship in their birth homes has been contested, where
they live as pariahs, in miserable ghettos.131
It is unclear whether Monray was referring specifically to Tunisia’s Jewish quarters as
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“miserable ghettos,” but this was one popular way to evoke Jews’ widespread exclusion from
participation in nationalist movements or, in this case, colonial civic life – like the dystopian
hara where Albert Memmi was born, and which he would later describe in La statue de sel, for
example.132 To Monray, the Zionist solution for “the eternally wandering Jew” lay with “love for
one’s family, homeland, and humanity,” along with compassion for the pain of those who
suffered persecution from Poland to Ukraine.133 It was taken for granted that Jews had not been
(and might never be) sufficiently incorporated into Tunisian life, whether under a French
Protectorate or in an independent state.
After summarizing the historic and Biblical glories of the Jewish people, Monray
described an encounter with a Jewish friend the day that the San Remo Conference “approved
the creation of a Jewish national home.” His rhetorical friend explained:
Though I love Tunisia, the country where I was born and grew up, beside parents who
cared for me and friends who were fond of me; though I am irresistibly attracted to Paris
and its hundred thousand lights; and though I feel no desire to walk along the banks of
the Jordan River, I am completely happy to know that the idea of a national home has
been approved by the San Remo Conference….
I remember from my childhood, when at the ‘kouttab’ the rabbi spoke to us of the
Messiah and of our future return to the Promised Land, I would tell myself, if only I
could live to see the happy day when we would return to the land of our forefathers… I
also remember Passover evenings when we would hold the Seder, singing Next Year in
Jerusalem, knowing well how long it could be until we would return to Palestine.134
Departing with a firm handshake, Monray’s friend said, “Long live progress! Long live Jewish
Palestine!” While few made concrete plans for emigration to Palestine, and others watched
warily as the war’s victors wrangled over the fate of former Ottoman lands, many could not help
but be optimistic that a “return” to the Promised Land appeared to be transforming from a
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timeless legend into a concrete possibility. But this still depended on cooperation between
French authorities and Tunisians and solidarity among socialists. A few weeks later, in July,
Monray linked the Zionist cause to that of Tunisian leftists, writing that the Young Tunisians,
including socialist Hassan Guellaty, were right to seek “the same rights as the French.” He called
on “liberal, discerning” Frenchmen to grant Tunisians their rights despite the fact that some
“fanatics” might be threatening Tunisia’s cohesion and peace.135

Conclusions
Various iterations of Zionism, especially those of the leftist, anti-militarist sort, did continue to
be debated into the mid-20s and beyond.136 In the brief period of uncertainty during the war and
in its immediate aftermath, some Tunisians earnestly pursued a range of visions and possibilities,
including Zionism and appeals to Woodrow Wilson. We know in retrospect that few Jews in
Tunisia would emigrate to Palestine before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 or
Tunisian independence in 1956; only after the Six Day War in 1967 did a majority of Jews leave
Tunisia.137 We also know, of course, that their pleas to Wilson and the international community
fell for the most part on deaf ears, much like those of other anti-colonial reformers from around
the Arab world.138 The French Protectorate, for its part, moved to co-opt those Jews who fell
under Italian protection by paving the way to naturalizing some 5,000 as French nationals with
the 1923 Morinaud Law. In part this might be viewed as a measure aimed not only at reducing
the long-irksome Italian meddling in Tunisia but also at shoring up support and patronage among
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Jews in the midst of facing an increasingly assertive anti-colonial movement by the mid-1920s,
which counted Jews among its ranks.139 Several prominent Jewish lawyers supported the Dustur
from its earliest days, including Jacques Scemama, who later helped defend Thaalbi against
French repression, and Elie Zirah, who participated in the former’s delegation to Paris.140
Set in the international context of the First World War and French aims in the Ottoman
Arab provinces at war’s end, the conflicts and debates outlined above reveal “anti-Semitism” and
“the Jewish question” not to be self-evident realities nor eventualities. Rather, these were
categories constructed in part by a French colonial administration hoping to make legible a
minority community which, if vulnerable to an indigenous Muslim Arab population, could
provide justification for France’s continued tutelage as a “protector.” This chapter argues that
one cannot, in fact, understand the politics of protection and the insistence on a “Jewish
minority” in Tunisia during the war without an understanding of the international stakes of
France’s postwar aims and the treaties and the League of Nations’ mandates to which it was a
party. The oft-overlooked link between North African and Middle Eastern historiographies, in
this case, proves not only fruitful but necessary for situating the stakes of colonial rhetoric
surrounding Tunisia’s Jewish “minority.”
I do not suggest here that anti-Jewish sentiments did not exist in Tunisia prior to the First
World War. More to the point is that concerned parties from around the Mediterranean, including
French and Francophile Jews, emerged from their own context – one in which Dreyfus’ struggles
to assert a proudly French Jewishness, one which celebrated military duty, a universal and anticlerical republicanism, and a mission civilisatrice around the empire were in vibrant circulation.
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Attacks on Jews did occur at the hands of demobilized French and Muslim soldiers, in the
columns of the French settler press, and in the police and administrative documents of
Protectorate authorities. Fluid wartime circumstances, combined with an unequal conscription
policy and Jews’ sometimes ambiguous legal status in the Protectorate, incited a new and diverse
discourse among Jews in Tunisia about possibilities for the future. Some Jews, of course,
remained steadfastly rooted to Tunisia, their place of birth, demanding international protection or
doubling down on their exhortations of loyalty to France. Others merged messianic traditions
with the newfound potential of a realized homeland in Palestine. But even Tunisian Zionists
disagreed about the orientation of such a movement in its early incarnations, and about the ideal
role Wilson, the French government, or other international parties. What was shared was a
decidedly transnational conversation and imagination among Jews in Tunisia which extended to
France, the United States, and the eastern Mediterranean.
Whatever degree of intercommunal equilibrium may have long existed in Tunisia was
thrown into disarray by French conscription policies, increasingly impassioned discourses
distinguishing between Muslims and Jews, and the economic and social costs of the war. Yet
Jews looked beyond incidents of violence and injustice, revealing a variety of ways in which the
war and the mobility it demanded produced new horizons of expectation. They envisioned
increased ties with European Jewry, new international avenues to recognition and protection,
rhetorical support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, or actual participation in Zionist
movements. These diverse visions point to the productive power of violence, colonial discourse,
and claims-making in this “moment.”
In a certain sense, this has been an exercise in reorganizing the colonial archives: what
appears on the surface to be a story of violence and tensions between Arab Muslims and Jews
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actually reveals not only a story of divisive colonial policies but also a story of new possibilities,
communities, and solidarities. One might then ask how this incident might have been interpreted
differently, or even ignored, had it not been organized under a dossier labeled “War of 1914-18 –
Jewish Community” or referred to as part of an “anti-Semitic movement.” By placing these
incidents in the broader context of North African migration and the First World War, one avoids
disembodying Jews in Tunisia from their own historical contexts.
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6. THE POSTWAR TRANSNATIONAL LEFT
Despite the global political consequences of the First World War and the direct involvement of
some 70,000 Tunisians in combat in Europe, to say nothing of the countless others impacted by
the economic tolls of war, histories of Tunisia have had relatively little to say about the local
political effects of the war itself. Some historians of the Tunisian national movement have
characterized this moment as politically “lethargic,” which might be indicative of a tendency
common to nationalist history writing more broadly: a focus on the “contributions” of various
groups and individuals to a singular “national movement” presumed to have been inevitable, at
the expense of research on figures such as migrants, exiles, and minorities.1 Stuart Schaar
explains that during the long reign of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, for example, “no
serious scholarship could be published” on the histories of political groups or figures that had
rivaled Bourguiba’s Neo-Dustur movement, among them original Dustur co-founder Abdelaziz
Thaalbi and communist and labor activist Mukhtar al-‘Ayari.2
Recent transnational approaches to the war across the Arab world, however, have pushed
scholars to consider the sheer uncertainty and possibility characteristic of the war’s immediate
aftermath.3 Far from a foregone conclusion, Tunisia’s liberal nationalism was still in its
formative stages in the early 1920s, competing in a political field which also included strands of
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socialism, communism, Zionism, and a resilient Ottomanism. Some of these strands were
themselves woven back and forth across the Mediterranean through networks of intellectuals in
Europe, Egypt, and Turkey. Years before Habib Bourguiba’s Neo-Dustur nationalist party had
surpassed its rivals – Bourguiba would go on to serve as independent Tunisia’s first president
from 1957 to 1987 – several visions for the future were in play. In particular, during the First
World War and in its immediate aftermath, Tunisian leftists cultivated ties across the political
spectrum and reached out to French allies for support. In the early 1920s vigorous debates
unfolded about the prospects of trans-Mediterranean cooperation, the role of the international
community in ensuring self-determination, and the radicalism of political demands.
This chapter reconstructs this postwar “moment” as seen through the trajectories of two
political activists, their allies, and their opponents. A comparison of the “radical” veteran-turnedcommunist Mukhtar al-‘Ayari and the “moderate” socialist Hassan Guellaty will demonstrate the
ways in which the Tunisian political field was constructed and contested in the wake of the First
World War.4 These two figures’ transnational trajectories crossed and eventually diverged by the
mid-1920s, marking the narrowing of Tunisians’ political horizons that had been blown open by
the war. Their postwar careers, when presented on their own terms rather than within the longue
durée frames of Tunisian nationalism or French colonialism, provide an opportunity to
problematize categories such as “radical” or “moderate” – relative terms which cannot
sufficiently explain the uncertainty and contingency of this moment.
Such a comparison draws inspiration from several recent works on the complex
relationship between France and its African colonies at the end of empire in the mid-twentieth
century. In particular, in an effort to circumvent the anti-colonial Manichaeism that has
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understandably characterized many nationalist histories, scholars such as Frederick Cooper and
Gary Wilder have focused on African intellectual and political movements which envisioned a
wide range of futures, including those which held a place for a continued (albeit altered)
relationship with France. Cooper, examining the efforts of Mamadou Dia and Léopold Senghor
to negotiate various forms of postcolonial federation between West Africa and France, warns
against using anachronistic concepts like “nation-building” and “identity,” lest we project onto
people of the past our hindsight of the events we know would follow (in the case of West Africa,
the independence of sovereign nation-states).5 Wilder refuses to reduce Aimé Césaire, for
example, to a “political moderate,” calling his program of decolonization and
departmentalization in Martinique an “antifoundational, nondogmatic, and experimental
approach to truth and politics that refuses ready-made a priori certainties about the best means to
desirable ends” – those certainties surrounding the inevitability of sovereign nation-states.6
Here I attend to similar concerns not at the end of empire, but at the end of war. I take up
a brief period of political uncertainty during which socialist and communist currents had not yet
been stifled by French repression or co-opted by the Tunisian nationalist mainstream. The
chapter focuses on two political figures whose circumstances and legacies were decidedly more
ordinary than those of Bourguiba, Césaire, or Senghor.7 And as neither al-‘Ayari nor Guellaty
had quite the clout or opportunity to participate directly in metropolitan politics (as did Césaire
and Senghor), an examination of their trajectories opens a window into the ambiguous conditions
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of possibility that Tunisian activists faced in the wake of the First World War. Al-‘Ayari, as a
veteran, presents a particularly unique voice in this moment. Veterans, when viewed as migrants,
push historians to go beyond the analytical binary of either top-down state-centered narratives or
bottom-up resistance chronicles. Much like the liminal figures explored in the preceding
chapters, veterans complicate colonial categories and paint a nuanced picture of political
subjectivity and identity formation. Geographically, of course, they were extraordinarily mobile;
they were also interlopers within the colonial and military hierarchies, somewhere between
subject and citizen. Their deeper integration into these hierarchies gave them a basis upon which
to make certain claims for benefits or privileges, yet by nature of their profession and their
marginal position in the colonial hierarchy, they also stood to lose more than most by being
refused these claims, as they often were.8
As was the case in many colonial settings, Tunisia’s early socialist and communist circles
were markedly diverse. In earlier chapters, I demonstrated how the war reconfigured existing
cross-Mediterranean networks and Maghrib-Mashriq links, invigorating the exchange of political
ideas which could reach a broader swath of the Tunisian population than ever before. For those
who avoided military service, travel to emergent political hubs like Geneva and Lausanne
introduced them to anti-colonial activists from around the Arab world, expanding not only their
audience but also the scope of their claims. For those compelled to work and fight in France, the
opportunity to mix with other colonial subjects and French civilians could introduce a newfound
cultural affinity with France, if not a starker sense of its racial boundaries. Thus, even while
traditional outlets for political dissent in Tunisia were silenced by Protectorate censorship,
transnational experiences such as these burgeoned, with varied political and social effects.
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Immediately following the war Muslim and Jewish Tunisians worked alongside French
and Italian settlers as well as metropolitan French leaders to establish vibrant political meeting
circles and publications which presented early alternatives to a liberal Muslim Tunisian
nationalism. In such a moment of uncertainty, communism and socialism presented visions for
Tunisia’s future which to many were just as compelling or even more so than liberal nationalism
or pan-Islamic Ottomanism. But how and why did these alternatives emerge before subsequently
collapsing? I argue that early Tunisian communists’ and socialists’ evolving positions, even in
the midst of mounting anti-colonial sentiment, reflected the extent of trans-Mediterranean
cooperation in the early 1920s. Beyond deconstructing a nationalist teleology or resuscitating its
“forgotten heroes,” I propose that alongside the ascendance of an international sphere
characterized by the League of Nations and its Mandatory powers, another possibility emerged: a
transnational leftist sphere marked by its own range of contradictions, uncertainties, and
questions of inclusivity. An understanding of this sphere enriches debates about the nature of
communism in France amid its postwar split with the Third International and the nature of
communism in North Africa and the Middle East.

Mobile Beginnings: Guellaty and al-‘Ayari
Hassan Guellaty was, from an early age, well-connected and well-traveled. He was born in
Boghair (near Algiers), Algeria in 1880, and within a year moved with his father, a shari’ah court
interpreter, who had been transferred to Tunis.9 In this sense Guellaty was from one of many
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upper bourgeois Algerian families who settled in Tunisia throughout the nineteenth century.10 It
has been argued that these shared origins help explain the similarity between Algerian and
Tunisian activists’ grievances prior to the First World War despite their decidedly different legal
and political position in the French colonial apparatus.11 In 1903, Guellaty began practicing law
in Tunis after studying in Toulouse and quickly made the most of his connections with the
Algero-Tunisian elites through his marriage to Fatma Sfar, daughter of the reformer and judicial
administrator Béchir Sfar.12 Guellaty enjoyed French nationality thanks to his being born in
Algeria and made the most of his education and family connections to the Protectorate
administration.13 He served for a time as the president of the Khalduniyya Society, an institution
founded by his father-in-law (among others) that fostered Arabic-language learning on European
and global affairs.
Guellaty entered politics as a contributor to Le Tunisien, the first French-language
newspaper published independently by Tunisians. The journal, run by prominent intellectual Ali
Bach Hamba from 1907 to 1911, was the primary organ of the Young Tunisians who, though
reluctant to question the existence of the Protectorate itself, called for educational reforms and
legal equality. Despite his generally Francophone education and political orientation, Guellaty
like many Tunisian political figures at the turn of the century still looked to Istanbul, traveling
there in September 1908 to evaluate the implications of the Young Turk Revolution and its new
constitution.14 It was his partnership with Ali Bach Hamba, in addition to Guellaty’s involvement
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in the 1912 tramway strike aimed at securing equal treatment of Tunisian and European workers,
that resulted in his expulsion to Algeria later that year. In 1913 Guellaty visited Ali in Istanbul
where he is said to have purchased the greater part of the library of Ali’s brother Mohamed Bach
Hamba.15 He was able to return to Tunisia shortly before the outbreak of war, unlike Ali and
Mohamed Bach Hamba, who could not.16 Guellaty continued to enjoy the support of number of
prominent contacts in Tunisia, Algeria, and France, including progressive thinkers such as the
military doctor Georges Saint-Paul, who in 1912 praised Guellaty and his kin as “a beautiful
Muslim family of scholars and soldiers” while urging his French readers to support the Young
Tunisians.17
Details from Mukhtar al-‘Ayari’s early life are scant. Born in 1887 or 1889, he attended a
Franco-Arabic school in Tunis and held a series of small jobs, hoping to one day become a police
officer. He enrolled voluntarily in the army a couple years prior to the start of the First World
War, perhaps hoping that it might facilitate or accelerate his acceptance into the ranks of the
Protectorate government.18 He was overshadowed by such towering nationalist figures as
Abdelaziz Thaalbi and Habib Bourguiba. Al-‘Ayari has been something of a “pariah” to
nationalist historians, thanks to his communist associations and rather short-lived political
career.19 The little we know of al-‘Ayari’s wartime experience comes from his writings and
recorded comments after the war. Historians have argued that North African soldiers such as al‘Ayari were deployed disproportionately as “cannon fodder,” justified by French conceptions of
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their “warlike mentality” and “savage ardor,” even while they earned less than half the salary of
French soldiers of equal rank, faced segregation from French civilians, and were rarely
considered for promotion.20 Recall, moreover, that French authorities held that behind the lines,
North and West Africans, biologically and culturally unable to resist the corrupting influences of
metropolitan society, threatened the gendered and racial hierarchies underpinning the French
civilizing mission.
With these realities in mind, that al-‘Ayari would describe his war experience in
overwhelmingly negative terms following the war comes as little surprise. He claimed at a 1922
communist meeting surveilled by police that despite heroic and distinguished service in battle
that had earned him a Croix de Guerre and despite his ability to speak both French and Arabic,
he was never promoted because to do so would violate the colonial order by placing him on par
with French non-commissioned officers.21 Indigenous noncommissioned officers were in fact
seldom if ever promoted to command units at the company level or higher, and multiple North
African lieutenants were never allowed in the same company. All communications between them
had to go through a French superior, undermining the potential for concerted resistance or
claims-making during a war in which mutiny was a real concern.22 Moreover, the few Tunisians
who were placed in positions of authority usually came from an elite background, reflecting the
French policy of “association.”23 It was presumed that these elites, used to commanding their
“social inferiors” and unlikely to grow dissatisfied with their position, would not make claims
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against the very colonial hierarchy that sustained their elevated position.24
In the French Army, then, al-‘Ayari had run up against two dynamics of colonial
difference: a lack of French nationality and a modest social upbringing which together had
conspired to create obstacles to advancement. In attempting to understand how these
disappointments with French hierarchies impacted his political engagement after the war, we
must account for his expectations. It would not be unreasonable to presume that, prior to the war,
al-‘Ayari was quite aware that he was not “French,” whether in the legal sense or otherwise.
Although it is not laid out explicitly, however, we can deduct from his postwar commentary that
his wartime experiences had indeed come as a shock: an aspiring Protectorate police officer prior
to the war, he had far less sense of what exactly his exclusion from both the French and elite
Tunisian spheres would mean for his lived reality. Perhaps it is in this regard that we can speak
more authoritatively about al-‘Ayari’s political shift: disappointments and shattered expectations
at war catalyzed unexpected visions for the future.

Contentious Homecomings
Demobilization presented social and economic challenges for Tunisians. Returning veterans
were involved in violent and occasionally deadly altercations, some targeting Tunisian Jews and
other groups said to have profited from their exemption from conscription, as discussed in the
previous chapter.25 It is unclear whether these tensions were behind police allegations in spring
of 1921 that al-‘Ayari, while working as a tram operator, slapped a Jewish passenger simply for
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asking the price of a ticket, leading to his dismissal by the tramway company.26 Demobilization
also created hardships for the many veterans who had come from rural areas and had little formal
education. Correspondence with remote villages was unreliable, and documentation requirements
for widows and orphans to claim their pensions could be onerous. Similarly, Mann writes that for
West Africans, just becoming a veteran could be a “full-time occupation” due to the gap between
metropolitan bureaucratic requirements and administrative realities. Veterans often had to travel
days to fill out a form, only to have to return months later to complete paperwork before
receiving a pension.27
Yet despite the horrors the war visited on so many, it did catalyze a number of new
opportunities for Tunisians to think not only beyond colonial borders but also across class and
religion, a phenomenon familiar to the different groups thus far examined in this dissertation.28
Early forms of Tunisian communism and socialism, in particular, highlight the extent to which
the war’s upheavals opened up new concepts of political community which might stretch beyond
traditional categories of identity (nationalist, loyalist, and so on).
We can say with some certainty that al-‘Ayari’s experience in the trenches of France and
Belgium were jarring. Moreover, having witnessed the very real boundaries imposed by
colonialism, al-‘Ayari arrived home in Tunis prepared to take a path quite different from the one
he had once envisioned as a policeman or soldier. He soon began working as a tramway operator,
and became Secretary General of the tramway’s union during the difficulties of Tunisia’s
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postwar economic crash.29 North African soldiers such as himself had learned from French
workers’ labor activism in the depots and ports of France during the war.30 By 1921 al-‘Ayari
also began attending meetings of Tunisia’s new Communist Party, lending his oration skills and
working-class appeal to a political vision he believed might align with his tramway union
work.31 Schaar writes that while al-‘Ayari’s grasp of French was not as strong as that of his
better-known communist colleague M’Hammed Ali, his “working class style of delivery added
authenticity to his persona and made him more valuable” to the movement.32
For Guellaty, on the other hand, home might have had multiple meanings over the course
of his life prior to the First World War. He had traveled with his family from Algeria, studied
law in France, and drew from a long tradition of Mediterranean elites crossing seas and land
borders, not unlike the reformers Salah al-Sharif and Muhammad al-Khidr Husain.33 There is
little evidence of his wartime activities, and while his brief exile may have provided the space for
a more assertive approach to reform, he faced none of the extremes of combat, discrimination at
the front or in French hospitals, or the sudden discovery of colonial boundaries to citizenship or
promotion. Rather, Guellaty returned to Tunisia to find that many of his Young Tunisian
colleagues had quickly resumed their political activities, particularly with the lifting of the state
of emergency in 1919.34 He joined with former allies Abdelaziz Thaalbi, Ahmad al-Safi, and
Khairallah ben Mustafa to found Le Parti Tunisien whose aim was to establish a constitution and
secure legal equality for Tunisians. Thaalbi and Ahmad Sakka’s publication of the influential and
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controversial tract La Tunisie Martyre in late 1919, however, alienated Guellaty. He held its
wholehearted indictment of the French Protectorate administration to be a mistake, as it left little
room for accommodation and negotiation with France.35

Tunisia and the Transnational Left
Despite these disagreements, the immediate aftermath of the First World War was in many ways
a moment of optimism when it came to the promise of overseas political cooperation. Guellaty’s
outlook was no exception: while active in the early incarnation of the Dustur’s nationalist vision,
he also remained connected to socialist reformers, both French and Tunisian. Even during the
war, despite its restrictions on the press and political associations, Guellaty continued to cultivate
ties with foreign-born intellectuals. Many of Tunisia’s early socialists and communists were in
fact settlers of French or Italian descent or came from among the middle-class Jewish
communities of Tunisia’s coastal cities.36
Guellaty’s longtime colleague André Duran-Angliviel, a representative in Tunisia’s
Consultative Congress, was a settler from southeastern France.37 Guellaty also forged a
relationship with Benjamin Frederick Dawson, an American cousin of Pierpont Morgan who had
earned a Croix de Guerre for his volunteer service as a driver in the French Army early in the
war. Dawson, after being wounded in action, was monitored by Protectorate authorities during a
visit to Tunisia while on convalescence leave in early 1917. A lawyer, he took great interest in
Tunisian intellectuals’ political activities, attending the clandestine meetings of the “Cercle
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Tunisien” and visiting Guellaty at his study several times during his stay.38 It appears that this
was the same Dawson who would go on to write as an activist and journalist, notably publishing
The French in Syria anonymously for the Brooklyn-based Independence Party of Syria following
a 1926 visit to Syria amid its anti-colonial rebellion.39
The rise to power of the Bolsheviks in 1917 provoked controversy and would reveal the
extent of uncertainty among competing visions of reform in Tunisia from both sides of the
Mediterranean. For the first time, a communist vision had been embraced by a major world
power, and French leftists moved to come to terms with the implications of such events for their
own aspirations as well as those of their counterparts in France’s overseas colonies. Guellaty and
Angliviel served as Tunisian delegates to the 1920 Congress of Tours, held with the aim of
determining whether French socialists of the Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière
(SFIO) would adhere to the Third International. While the majority voted to join the Third
International and form the Section française de l'Internationale communiste (later becoming the
Parti communiste français), Guellaty and Angliviel voted against it.40 This path stands in notable
contrast to the example of the young Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh), who supported the Third
International while criticizing France’s colonial enterprise. The end of the First World War
offered no foregone conclusions as far as the exact shape of reform or revolution was concerned,
even within leftist circles.
The Third International’s eighth article stipulated that member parties would work

38

CADN, 1TU/125/29: Note de Sureté Publique, 10 February 1917; CADN, 1TU/125/29: Note de Sureté Publique,
5 February 1917. The Cercle was a small group of intellectual elites who had met regularly in Tunis since the turn of
the century to discuss political affairs in private.
39
B. F. Dawson, The French in Syria (Brooklyn, Independence Party of Syria, 1927). On Syrian nationalism in the
Americas, see: Stacy Fahrenthold, “Sound Minds in Sound Bodies: Transnational Philanthropy and Patriotic
Masculinity in al-Nadi al-Homsi and Syrian Brazil, 1920-32,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46:2
(2014), 259-283.
40
Mahjoubi, Les Origines du mouvement national en Tunisie, 188-189.

204

actively to end imperial oppression and liberate colonized peoples. In this sense, then, Tunisian
revolutionaries could in theory count on the support of the international communist movement.41
At first glance, al-‘Ayari, much like Guellaty, was exemplary of this optimistic transMediterranean political collaboration. The Italian settlers Enrico and Mario Costa worked closely
with al-‘Ayari and were frequently on hand at communist meetings, the latter being condemned
in 1922 for publishing a pamphlet attacking colonial rule in Tunisia.42 Tunisia had in fact long
served as a haven for Italian reformers – Giuseppe Garibaldi notably stayed in Tunisia in 1834
and 1849. Al-‘Ayari worked closely with French allies as well, one of his being the French-born
settler Robert Louzon, a vocal Dreyfusard and union activist who after the war became president
of Tunisia’s branch of the Communist Party. Louzon was a vociferous critic of colonialism and
he frequently drew the attention of Protectorate police.43 Louzon’s presses supported a variety of
different publications, ranging from reformist socialists to revolutionary anti-colonial
communists; he seemed to have a particular concern for Tunisian veterans. For example, he was
tried alongside the veteran and communist poet Abderrahman Kefi for preaching “attacks against
the rights and powers of the French Republic in Tunisia” in early 1922.44 Louzon had helped al‘Ayari publish his journal Habib al-Umma, “lover of the nation,” which ran at least two dozen
issues in late 1921.45 Schaar speculates that al-‘Ayari might not have been the primary author
and editor of the journal given his lack of an advanced education, and that his name on the
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masthead was more valuable to the Communist Party. That much is unclear, but historian Habib
Kazdaghli credits al-‘Ayari with having written at least six major articles for the journal.46
Although its lifespan was cut short by order of the Resident General, it had a lasting impact: as
Tunisia’s first popular Arabic-language communist journal, Habib al-Umma paved the way for a
number of journals such as Al-Umma and Le Moudhek.47
In the first issue of Habib al-Umma, al-‘Ayari positioned the journal as an alternative to
the nationalist mainstream, quipping, “Without entering into any of the infighting that one can
find amongst the different groups of the Tunisian nationalist movement, Habib al-Umma
supports the efforts of all those who demand the expansion of the rights, freedom, justice, and
education of the Tunisian people.”48 From the outset, al-‘Ayari envisioned himself, through the
words of his journal, to be transcending the limitations of nationalist politics. Later issues of
Habib al-Umma grew more outspoken in their rhetoric, its grievances maturing from vague
manifestos into targeted attacks on the French Protectorate and its policies. A 29 October 1921
issue began with an article entitled “A Social Grievance” in which al-‘Ayari attacked the
Protectorate’s lack of concern for the orphans and widows of Muslim soldiers killed in Europe.
He wrote:
The issue of widows and children of the Muslim soldiers who quickly answered France’s
call to war has slowly been fading from our attention. The soldiers were thrown into the
fiery oven by Lyautey, falling prey to the emotions stirred up at the Academy in Paris.49
They committed themselves to a covenant with the French, who promised to recognize
and protect the rights and interests of these soldiers, both in life and after death… but the
soldiers died, and the French broke their promise!
Let there be no question about the unfortunate situation that afflicts the survivors of those
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heroes who gave their lives, and everything they have, only to see their widows and
children facing starvation…50
A personal and emotional call from al-‘Ayari to remember the heroic sacrifices of veterans such
as himself are juxtaposed with the harsh reality familiar to nearly any postwar generation: the
survivors, as much as the war dead, were soon forgotten by a society longing to leave its darkest
days behind. In this case, “Muslim soldiers” had held up their end of this “covenant” only to see
France break its promises. Given the bureaucratic obstacles to veterans and surviving family
members seeking their pensions, as well as the new taxes which primarily benefited returning
French veterans, one can understand al-‘Ayari’s critical impulse.51 His approach, moreover,
resembled those of Mohamed Bach Hamba and of some Tunisian Jews in that it used French
promises as something of a mirror turned toward a contradictory liberal discourse. Far from
naïve, such an appeal was to demonstrate to a Tunisian audience that to wait for French promises
to come to fruition was itself a lost cause.
Al-‘Ayari also directed reproach at the Protectorate’s alleged favoritism toward French
settlers, criticizing for example the French-run Municipal Council’s allocation of 240,000 Francs
to support European acting and theatre initiatives in Tunis. In La Tunisie Martyre, Thaalbi had
attacked a similar decision, claiming that in 1919, despite the economic devastation of the war,
the Municipal Council managed to find 150,000 Francs to support four months of French
theatrical works at the Municipal Theatre in Tunis, compared with the paltry 5,000 Francs
granted to a Tunisian theatrical society in 1913.52 Al-‘Ayari asked:
What does the spread of theatre matter to the orphan and the widow, when they have
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starving bellies? …Does it please a man to leave behind such weak offspring, children
who cannot find even a piece of bread or a spoonful of olive oil, while the fortunes of
entertainers and dancers rises in leaps and bounds, thanks to the government and its
supporters? Is this not, my people, a clear and blatant injustice, whose shame will be
inked in history?53
An illustration accompanying the above article depicts a large mound of skulls watched closely
by circling vultures with the caption, “War and its Horrors.” The sketch appears to have been a
reproduction of Russian artist Vasily Vereshchagin’s 1871 painting The Apotheosis of War:
Dedicated to All Conquerors Past, Present, and Future (Fig. 12 below).54 The choice is salient,
given the original subject of Vereshchagin’s work, which depicts the brutal aftermath of the
Russian colonial conquest of the Muslim region of Turkestan in 1867-68. Images and variants
such as these were circulated widely across the emergent international leftist press as a
condemnation of militarism.

Fig. 12: Vasily Vereshchagin, The Apotheosis of War, 1871
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Al-‘Ayari’s 1921 foray into the print media was short-lived, punctuated by censorship
and brief stints in prison. He continued his activities in support of the Communist Party by
inviting potential allies from France to hold lectures and meetings in Tunis. In March 1922, he
organized a visit from French parliamentary deputy Paul Vaillant-Couturier, a communist and
war veteran who had recently campaigned to spread the cause of anti-militarism. Al-‘Ayari and
Jean-Paul Finidori, the Tunisian communist party’s Corsica-born treasurer, helped arrange an
earnestly prepared reception and four speaking events for the deputy during his stay, each of
which apparently drew hundreds of attendees. Vaillant-Couturier highlighted, among other
topics, the “scourge” of global capitalism and its wars, as well as his activities with the
Association Républicaine des Anciens Combattants, an anti-militarist organization founded in
1917 seeking to defend the rights and interests of veterans. He also reportedly spoke on the
freedom of the press in a large courtyard to an audience of nearly a thousand attendees, including
many Tunisians who listened through an Arabic translator.55
The results of the communist deputy’s visit were mixed. Police surveillance reports wrote
dismissively about the impact of his speeches. Though al-‘Ayari worked hard to spread the word
in Tunisian coffee houses, police agents noted the scant presence of indigenous attendees at the
conferences – though the police may have been eager to dismiss such political efforts from the
outset.56 Vaillant-Couturier’s public talks were, moreover, marred by sharp opposition, not least
from the settler press. Some attendees boldly questioned what he, as a deputy, would do to
ensure that the Protectorate best served French settlers’ interests.57 Others asked about the
ongoing famine in Russia, which the deputy blamed on drought rather than on Soviet policy. He
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replied that “in the Tunisian south, this year’s harvest has been irreversibly ruined – are the
communists to blame for this too? Of course not.”58 European affairs seemed to dominate his
lectures, with praise heaped on the Bolsheviks for their perseverance despite widespread
condemnation (including that of his own government). An audience member, an employee of the
Popular Bank of Bizerte and one of the many White Russian refugees who landed in Tunisia
following the communist revolution, challenged this view, claiming that his personal experience
had better informed him of the suffering that Soviet rule caused.59 In their final analysis,
Protectorate authorities found little danger in Vaillant-Couturier’s conferences, noting that his
written publications, rather than his speeches, posed the greatest threat.60 If the deputy was as
disappointed as police reports suggest, one can imagine that al-‘Ayari too had been frustrated as
he and a small cadre of supporters saw the deputy to his port of departure on 1 April 1922.61
Wrapped up in debates surrounding the Bolsheviks’ shocking rise to power, there is little
evidence to suggest that Vaillant-Couturier ever questioned France’s colonial hold over Tunisia
during his weeklong visit.
A few months later, in June, al-‘Ayari helped arrange a five-day visit from another
communist parliamentary deputy, the lawyer and journalist André Berthon. Berthon hoped to call
upon the Resident General Lucien Saint, with whom he apparently had a friendly personal
relationship, to ease the “persecutions” against Tunisian communists which he claimed were far
harsher than those in Algeria. In the weeks prior to Berthon’s visit, the communist party of
Tunisia had been suspended by Protectorate authorities, and its leaders, including al-‘Ayari and
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Finidori, had been temporarily placed under arrest for threatening the security of the state.62
Meeting with Protectorate officials, Berthon claimed to have come not as an “agitator” but rather
to ensure the consistent application of the law. He distinguished the “spirit” of his visit from that
of Vaillant-Couturier, to whom officials had likened him. Berthon’s request to use a public
building for a conference entitled “l’Action Ouvrière” was also refused.63 Berthon ultimately
claimed to have reconstituted the Communist Party in Tunisia by the end of his visit, while the
Resident General proclaimed his satisfaction with the suppression of communist activities.
Whatever the case may be, al-‘Ayari’s ability to work effectively not only with settlers but with
political figures from across the Mediterranean for a shared cause points to a moment of great
potential for visions for the future that transcended geographic and colonial boundaries.64

Global Struggles, Local Debates
Despite these moments of trans-Mediterranean cooperation, French socialists and communists
remained bitterly divided on the issue of French colonialism through the early twenties, with
significant consequences for Tunisian anti-colonial activists. Even though a majority of French
socialists had voted to join the Third International at Tours in December 1920, no vote was held
on Lenin’s required 21 Conditions, including the eighth condition that called on its members to
speak and act against their own nations’ oppression of colonized peoples. A 1922 convention at
Sidi-bel-Abbès, Algeria, for example, voted against the Third International’s stance on
colonialism, arguing that the metropolitan workers’ revolution would have to come first, and that
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communist propagandizing to indigenous Algerians was “useless and dangerous.”65 In some
French leftists’ paternalistic imagination, Arabs, without continued French tutelage, might
otherwise succumb to an oppressive Islamic oligarchy.66 Al-‘Ayari’s close ally Louzon called
such a position “a repugnant hypocrisy.”67 Nevertheless through much of the 1920s and 1930s,
French communists, in their evolutionary and sometimes racialized views, saw anti-colonial
liberation movements as an impediment rather than an asset to the working-class struggle.68
While this schism among the French Empire’s leftists would be an important factor in the
trajectories of both Hassan Guellaty and Mukhtar al-‘Ayari, local Tunisian political
developments were just as critical, and in some ways anticipated this broader divergence. As al‘Ayari and the Tunisian communists organized the visits of Vaillant-Couturier and Berthon in
early 1922, Guellaty had grown weary of Thaalbi’s influence over the Dustur and its attempts to
woo the Bey to support the creation of a constitution and parliament. Guellaty, having been a cofounder of the Dustur’s predecessor, now parted ways with Thaalbi to found the Parti
Réformiste. At first glance, it can be said that Guellaty and the Parti Réformiste struggled to gain
much traction whether among the Tunisian public or in the eyes of the Protectorate authorities.
One wonders as well how the Algerian-born Guellaty’s status as a French national, rather rare
among Muslim Tunisians, might have influenced his views towards the Protectorate and its
critics. The editors of the French newspaper Le Figaro, for their part, questioned why Guellaty
even cared to support Tunisians’ emancipation in the first place.69 Kenneth Perkins attributes
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Guellaty’s struggles not only to his political ideas, but also to his upbringing and attitudes. The
historian describes Guellaty as a “highly Westernized” member of the elite who “clung to the
prewar notions of association and collaboration,” harboring “arrogant confidence in his
superiority to the likes of Thaalbi.”70 According to this explanation, the Parti Réformiste was
dismissed for its “sycophancy” and lack of popular support.71
This focus on the personal, however, overlooks the appeal of Guellaty’s ideas and
reputation as well as the continued openness of the Tunisian political field in the early 1920s.
Guellaty was not simply a holdout from another era, bound for failure in the new postwar world.
Recall that less than two years prior, Guellaty had allied with Thaalbi and a number of other
activists to form Le Parti Tunisien. The leftist press in Tunisia reveals that Guellaty was not
completely marginalized. An October 1921 article in the communist journal Le Moudhek sheds
some light on the schism between Guellaty and the communists:
What has motivated Guellaty to change so much that he has become our adversary? Is it
because he believes the heads of the Communist Party have committed some mistakes? If
such is his motive, he should have warned the Tunisian people as soon as it appeared to
him thus, so that we might have replaced those responsible. As for our grievances, they
remain sacred and unflinching.
We are equally heartbroken to see how the Arab press treats this man, whose intentions
are perhaps pure and who may have acted on a misunderstanding with the party heads. Is
there someone among us who can restore the peace between the two adversaries and cut
short this conflict? The situation is serious. We must not divide ourselves into parts and
fractions of parts, as this would be to play our enemy’s game; they would seize this
opportunity to harm us.72
Nowhere are the accusations of elitist arrogance or of clinging to a foregone era of pandering to
French authority. Rather, Le Moudhek’s communist editors call for unity in the face of a
common opponent, looking inwardly to try and understand the scope of this misunderstanding or
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even of the party’s own missteps. To simply describe a figure like Guellaty as a “Westernized
elite,” or worse, a “sycophantic” collaborationist, submits that the ends can explain the means –
in other words, that Guellaty’s eventual marginalization from the Tunisian national movement
was simply a matter of time given his character and upbringing. Such logic would hold that if his
“contribution” to the Tunisian nation cannot be traced back in a straight line, then he must have
been a thorn in that nation’s side. This would be to overlook the importance of this brief window
of possibility in which a Tunisian communist journal could defend and reach out to an Algerianborn French national who argued for continued accommodation with France.
Al-‘Ayari and his communist colleagues, while diverging from Guellaty and his new
Parti Réformiste, found it just as hard to maintain a united front with the Dustur and the
emergent mainstream of Tunisian anti-colonial politics. French communists who had declared
pacifism “a pillar of [their] colonial program” might well have been alarmed by al-‘Ayari’s
espousal of violence as a means to achieve revolutionary ends.73 At party meetings tracked
closely by police agents, he delivered speeches attacking the Protectorate authorities, particularly
for their raids on the homes and offices of fellow party members. He called for mass protests, a
refusal to pay taxes, and the destruction of public property like streetlamps.74 In April 1922,
police offered a 1,000 franc reward for al-‘Ayari’s arrest, to which he replied that he would, on
the day that Tunisians rose up to seize their independence, seek out the director of police and
break his neck.75 This was not the first time al-‘Ayari alluded to violence as a means to achieve
his revolutionary goals – at a Communist Party meeting in Tunis earlier that year, he told an
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allegory in which two rival kings had sent their servants to battle in their names:
Stopping the arm of his adversary, the servant asked the other servant why he wanted to
kill him. His adversary responded that he harbored no animosity towards him, but that he
had been sent by his master to kill his enemies. The servant then asked his adversary if he
was hungry, and if he wanted to share the provisions which he was carrying…. The
adversary accepted and, over the course of the meal, they both agreed to return and kill
their respective masters, who had not hesitated to make them kill each other while they
remained in their palaces.76
Al-‘Ayari suggested that his story could “serve as a lesson and show that with agreement and
unity, we can live happily. Let us save the unfortunate man whose land has been taken from him,
and oppose those who want to leave us in ignorance by wiping away our thoughts and ideas.”77
The allegory’s call, drawing perhaps from the veteran’s bitter experience on the Western Front,
is anything but subtle: unity amongst oppressed people, whether Tunisian or otherwise, must be
forged to bring about the end – even if a violent one – to capitalist colonial regimes. Few
Francophone leftists would have supported this position in the early 1920s, as many had built
their movements on the popularity of anti-militarist and pacifist sentiments coming out of the
First World War. Fewer still called for the dismantling of France’s overseas empire.

Wise Men and Poor Wretches
Despite his unrelenting view toward colonialism, class occupied an ambiguous position in al‘Ayari’s postwar vision. He had an upbringing decidedly more middle class than that of the
wealthy Guellaty, and he often aimed to set himself apart from more “elite” political
intellectuals. One such elite, Abdelaziz Thaalbi, had written in La Tunisie Martyre (1920) that
conscripts were easily misled and corrupted by their “slave drivers” (French and Tunisian
recruiters), setting off “without fear of betraying their morals, poisoned as they were by
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conquests void of ideals or morality.”78 To one of Tunisia’s most prominent nationalist
intellectuals, then, veterans were not exactly reduced to either collaborators or heroes – they
were empty vessels to be filled, in this case, by the false promises of the French Empire. Actual
veterans’ voices were in general conspicuously absent from the few public discussions about
veterans, due in part to the fact that residents of the capital, where most reformist debates were
centered in this period, were exempt from military service.79 This silence makes al-‘Ayari’s
writings and speeches, preserved in police reports and his journal Habib al-Umma, so unique. He
expressed a profound sense of betrayal not just at the hands of the French, but also by his more
moderate reformist countrymen. Al-‘Ayari wrote about the disparity between Tunisian subjects
and French settlers:
Perhaps some wise men thought this disparity would disappear with gradual
improvements in education, and from the lessons learned from the Great War about
fraternity and equality. Supporters of the war effort claimed that we needed to part with
the grudges and hatred which had served as the rallying cries for various nationalist or
other beliefs. They believed France, in particular, had learned from this war that
differences of nationality and belief did not prevent us from joining together as one in
order to counter the threat of the attacker.80
Here, al-‘Ayari mocks the unfulfilled French ideals of fraternity and equality, but he also
ridicules those Tunisian reformers who held on to hopes of gradually securing their rights in
recognition of Tunisia’s wartime loyalty. To al-‘Ayari, such an approach had by 1921 proven
hopeless. But if tirailleurs’ sacrifices had been for naught, how might he otherwise conceive of
their experience?
Al-‘Ayari distinguished himself from other Tunisian veterans, taking pity on the mostly
illiterate rural conscripts in much the same way as Thaalbi had. On at least one occasion, in a
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January 1922 meeting documented by French police agents, he revealed his views on rural
conscripts:
Tunisois [residents of the Tunisian capital] were exempt from military service because
they were educated in the study of social matters, and knew how to distinguish between
what is useful and what is not, whereas the fellahin, completely ignorant and having no
knowledge of real life, submitted easily to the demands of the rulers.
[Local recruiters] roamed their sectors, dragging behind them the poor wretches, leashed
like beasts who they then penned into the caravansaries with little concern for the retinue
of poor parents who trailed behind them. These Bedouins, under threat of imprisonment
and other tortures, were scared and gave in blindly.81
The animalistic imagery used to depict the very conscripts who fought alongside al-‘Ayari in the
trenches of the Western Front is striking. Perhaps drawing upon his own experience with the
French military hierarchy, he pointed to the ignorance of most conscripts:
The authorities knew well who to decorate with medals: that is to say, a Bedouin who, for
the most part, does not even understand why he is in the barracks. These Bedouins were
always scared, and showed more consideration for a Frenchman than for his coreligionist
non-commissioned officers. All this was a result of his ignorance.82
Even if al-‘Ayari did not literally carry out “directives from Moscow or Paris,” as Protectorate
authorities once claimed, it is clear that he had come to share some of the same convictions
French communists held with regard to North Africans’ stage of revolutionary advancement.83
Al-‘Ayari was resolute in his proposed solution: “Tunisois should inculcate in the minds of their
ignorant coreligionists the benefits of communism, which would give them equality and their
rights.”84
With a stance not far from that of the French communists at Sidi-bel-Abbès in 1922, al‘Ayari made comments about conscripted soldiers that reveal a similar position. He believed it to
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be the duty of the Communist Party to educate his simple countrymen, sharing in some ways his
French counterparts’ view that the poor rural Tunisians (al-‘Ayari uses fellahin and Bedouin
interchangeably) were not yet developed enough to achieve or benefit from a workers’
revolution. Given what we know about the position of most Francophone communists towards
anti-colonialism in this period, the language available to al-‘Ayari rather unsurprisingly
contributed to such conclusions. Thoroughly convinced of the transformative power of
knowledge, al-‘Ayari paints a picture not unlike Thaalbi’s portrayal of the rural conscripts. To
both urban activists, these poor masses lacked the tools needed to resist complicity in their own
exploitation.
At the same time, al-‘Ayari’s position cannot be reduced to mimicry of a paternalistic
French communist ideal. Rather, his self-assertion as an authoritative bearer of knowledge
echoes a longstanding notion of political representation in the Arab world in this period, one
claimed even by figures eventually marginalized by the nationalist mainstream such as exiles,
‘ulama, and the like. James McDougall notes that such figures claimed such a role “in the belief
that they, as bearers of an established socio-cultural authority, were naturally fitted to be the
spokesmen for their community.”85 Al-‘Ayari had a great deal to say about his frustrations at
being refused promotion despite his literacy and urban upbringing. He directly addressed these
two facts about himself in his writings and recorded comments, setting himself apart from the
vast majority of the North Africans with whom he had served in Europe – and did so explicitly
by contrasting himself with those he categorized as “ignorant” (illiterate) and “Bedouins” (rural)
coreligionists. Al-‘Ayari now spoke for those with whom he served but, crucially, never had the
opportunity to lead.
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Foreclosing Possibilities
Following the divergences and schisms within Tunisia’s leftist groups, both al-‘Ayari’s and
Guellaty’s political aspirations would be checked by the mid-1920s. Guellaty and his Parti
Réformiste never built the kind of popular support they had hoped for when he split with the
Dustur in 1921. Aside from interjecting its voice into a number of debates between French
authorities, the Dustur, and the Communist Party in 1924 and 1925, it remained largely
ineffectual. Al-‘Ayari and the communists, on the other hand, faced an abrupt set of obstacles to
their rising popularity. In 1924, Tunisian dockworkers in Tunis, Bizerte, and Sfax went on strike
seeking wage parity with their European counterparts of the same union, the Confédération
générale des travailleurs (CGT). European workers’ refusal to support this measure led Tunisian
workers, with the support of the Dustur and communist leaders such as al-‘Ayari, to found a
nationalist offshoot, the Confédération générale des travailleurs tunisiens (CGTT).86 The new
union, emboldened by this show of support, organized strikes across the country which were met
with a harsh crackdown by Protectorate authorities. The unexpected assertiveness of these
working-class actions, combined with the force of French repression of them, led to a further
splintering of Tunisian political alliances. The first to balk were the socialists and Guellaty’s
Parti Réformiste, but even the Dustur, before long, began to distance itself from the CGTT and
its communist base.87 Now exposed and with few significant allies, just as Le Moudhek’s editors
had feared in 1921, al-‘Ayari and his communist colleagues Mohamed Ali El Hammi and J. P.
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Finidori were arrested and exiled. The Tunisian Communist Party did not recover from this blow
for decades. Al-‘Ayari appears to have ended up in Cairo or Alexandria, taking jobs as a tour
guide, merchant, and cook, since his foreign nationality may have prevented him from working
with the Egyptian public tramway system. He later died in Paris, never having returned to
Tunisia.88
The preceding illustration of the convergence and subsequent divergence of two
individuals’ political careers in the early 1920s has been a demonstration of the range of political
possibilities catalyzed by the First World War. A focus on early iterations of communism and
socialism in Tunisia serves to highlight the degree to which migration and overseas cooperation
were important components of reform efforts, even as Tunisians increasingly attempted to define
themselves in terms free of French dominance after the war. This evolving and sometimes
precarious position reflected the extent to which Tunisia’s trans-Mediterranean connections,
despite the restrictions imposed by the state of emergency and the conditions of war, continued
to be viable conduits for the movement of people and ideas. Such ambiguity, as I have argued, is
not particularly well served by categories such as “moderate” or “radical,” terms deployed by
French authorities and contemporary scholars alike in an attempt to make legible those
individuals, ideas, and currents that could not be easily understood through narrow frames of
nation or empire. Instead, by placing Guellaty and al-‘Ayari into the same frame, and by
focusing on the fleeting points at which they converged and eventually diverged, we reveal the
very contingent circumstances that defined Tunisians’ political horizons – including competing
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forms of transnational communism and socialism – in the aftermath of the First World War.89
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7. CONCLUSION
After generations of sparse recognition of the colonial war dead in France, a number of
government-sanctioned commemorations have begun to honor their memory. President Jacques
Chirac, for example, dedicated a memorial for Muslim soldiers at Verdun in 2006, and President
Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled a temporary plaque dedicated to Muslim soldiers at the Great Mosque
in Paris in 2012.1 In 2014, the centenary offered an even greater opportunity for historical
reflection, and the moment seems to have taken on the burdens not only of the war but of a bevy
of other contemporary conflicts and debates. In 2015 Europe faced what appeared to be the peak
of a “migrant crisis,” largely labeled as such by commentators regardless of whether they would
welcome or reject the millions of migrants fleeing war and economic instability in the Middle
East and Africa.2 Now as a century ago, migrants bring with them a reminder of France’s
troubled past in the Arab world and in sub-Saharan Africa, of its contradictory promises, and of
the stubborn legacy of violent conflict.
Commemorations for Muslim soldiers serving in France during the First World War have
been marked by official rhetoric hopeful that remembrance of those who “sacrificed” and “died
for France” would help reconcile and integrate the second- and third-generation French North
and West Africans. President François Hollande, dedicating a permanent plaque to the Muslim
soldiers of both World Wars at the Grand Mosque in Paris in 2014, proclaimed that it was the
“fraternity of arms, born of the conflicts of the twentieth century, [that] has deeply rooted Islam
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in the republic, in the defense of its sovereignty and freedom.”3 Few would outright reject the
increased public and scholarly attention to a topic of such importance. Still, one must be wary of
the shortcomings of “soft reconciliations” of this sort, as they have a way of glossing over the
darker historical realities of colonial subjects’ experiences both in wartime France and
throughout the colonial period. Instead of critically examining the inequalities that tirailleurs
faced relative to their European counterparts – to say nothing of the violence of the colonial
condition as a whole – such commemorations engage in what has been called “récupération.”4 A
selective and sanitized remembering of the events would have it that these soldiers only ever
wanted to demonstrate their French patriotism and loyalty – “forgotten heroes,” to use the
parlance of many publications, websites, and exhibits created by academics, archivists, museum
curators, and interested members of the public.5 While survival in all its forms may be said to be
heroic in the context of the First World War, service to France was, for the vast majority of
North Africans, coerced and involuntary. More than that, the war initiated a wide and
unpredictable range of social and political outcomes for Tunisians. I have argued that their
experiences did not dictate a particular position on a “loyalty-resistance” spectrum.
There are similar processes by which historical experiences of human mobility can be
flattened out by the attendant political and contemporary stakes. While statistical snapshots of
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trans-Mediterranean migrations are important for building public awareness and international
policy, they sometimes boil migrants themselves down to an accounting of the dispossessed. Nail
deconstructs the historically popular water-related metaphors by which migrants and migrations
are typically understood, such as “waves,” “flows,” “floods,” revealing the extent to which these
“failed citizens” have been perceived as an unstable mass.6 Colonial subjects, mobilized by
conflicts such as the First World War, likewise readily fit the rubric of post-Enlightenment
writings on “crowds.” The theories of Le Bon and Freud, regardless of their academic or
historical reception, have proven remarkably resilient in characterizations of crowds as
inherently violent, animalistic, and unpredictable – a threat to a society otherwise based on the
primacy of the rational, settled individual.7 These images hardly reflect the range of Tunisian
experiences highlighted in this thesis. Far from just pitiful masses plucked or flooding from the
countryside, wartime experiences took many different forms, and created the conditions of
possibility for a variety of social outcomes and political horizons.
North Africans who served in the French Army during the First World War faced social
transformations shaped as much by their social position as by the contingent circumstances at
war. For the Tunisian and Algerian conscripts exposed to the worst aspects of imperial violence
and colonial discrimination at the Western Front, convalescence in French military hospitals
could well have embodied the worst excesses of racial segregation, medical experimentation, and
disciplinary violence. Instead, wartime shortages and a diversity of French approaches to medical
care and reeducation combined with North Africans’ own actions to produce humanizing
encounters and relationships, thereby setting the stage for further transgressions. Alternatively,
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for the elite photographer Albert Samama-Chikli, crossing the Mediterranean had been a family
tradition. Engagement in the war instead offered the journalistic and artistic opportunity of a
lifetime, propelling him into a pioneering postwar film career. Nonetheless, he too paid a price at
war, later succumbing to lung cancer caused by exposure to poison gasses at the Western Front.
For Tunisians who had long been politically engaged, the outbreak of war provoked
painful choices or even forced expulsion. Mohamed Bach Hamba and his brother Ali, both
involved in the reformist Young Tunisian movement in the early part of the century, shifted
during the war years toward more assertive stances against French colonialism. But whereas Ali
settled in the Ottoman Empire and led special operations in support of their propaganda efforts in
the Arab world, Mohamed, in neutral Switzerland, forged a more ambiguous path. He called for
outright independence for North Africa based on liberal nationalist claims rather than on panIslamist reincorporation into the Sultan’s realm, reflecting the influence of not only of proOttoman interlopers but also of numerous self-determination movements from around Europe
and Asia.
For some Tunisians, the war experience was revelatory of deep political and social
problems for which only new transnational political configurations could provide answers.
Mukhtar al-‘Ayari, before the war a willing volunteer and aspiring police officer, returned from
the French Army with an overturned view of the world order. Inspired by his experiences with
racial and class-based discrimination in Europe and by the Bolsheviks’ rise to power in Russia,
international communism presented a revolutionary reordering of society. While eventually
marginalized amid a French crackdown on labor mobilization, al-‘Ayari’s uncompromising
views, though not without their contradictions, appealed briefly to a segment of the Tunisian
political community who looked beyond colonial and national boundaries. And one did not have
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to cross the Mediterranean oneself to face the upheavals that the war had provoked. Jews in
Tunisia, exempt from military conscription, found themselves the target of returning French and
Muslim Tunisian veterans’ violent wrath. Intercommunal tensions were fueled, rather than
quelled, by the French construction of a “Jewish question” premised on the existence of
primordial violence among backward peoples. It was this question that could justify France’s
continued tutelage in line with the League of Nations’ emergent order. In this context, Jews in
Tunisia were spurred to seek new avenues for self-preservation, whether through appeals to
Woodrow Wilson or calls to support the Zionist movement.
In these ways and others, war experiences forged diverse social or political outcomes.
They did not determine any particular outcome any more than did one’s ethnic or religious
“identity” or upbringing. Given this perspective, we see that these outcomes were more diverse
and contingent than has been reflected in colonial narratives, nationalist histories, or broader
First World War studies. And even where Tunisians found themselves caught between, for
example, the new promise of affinity with French or Ottoman imperial cultures and a sharper
sense of the boundaries of colonial rule, these were not two poles at the ends of a spectrum.
Rather they were important realities that produced the conditions of possibility for Tunisians’
transformations into the 1920s.
Transnational studies of this kind present certain challenges, among them the potential
for any single piece of research to expand to an unwieldy geographic scope. It is my hope that by
highlighting cases originating in the relatively narrow geographical confines of the small country
of Tunisia, I have imposed feasible boundaries around this project, allowing for a deeper and
closer analysis of individual and quotidian experiences. All the same, there are countless other
experiences of war for which further research is needed, particularly for those who did not
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themselves cross the Mediterranean but were nonetheless directly and profoundly impacted by
movement: Tunisian women, tribes who crossed Tunisia’s Saharan borders with Libya and
Algeria, and children and orphans, for example. Nonetheless the transformations presented here
tell not a history of the First World War in Tunisia nor of “the Tunisian war experience” but
rather explore a diverse range of experiences evocative of both the unique circumstances facing
Tunisians and the consequences of mobility that effected peoples throughout the Mediterranean
during the war. In this way, this research contributes to a growing body of global histories that
confronts the geographic and temporal boundaries typically associated with the study of the First
World War and its aftermath.
I began this project not with a desire to create an overarching evaluation of Tunisian
mobility during the First World War but rather with a single individual’s story – that of Mukhtar
al-‘Ayari. Labeled a cantankerous and violent man in his thick file of Protectorate police records,
he proved too tempting not to explore further during my first visit to the Tunisian National
Archives in the spring of 2013. His dramatic transformation from a volunteer soldier to a
communist revolutionary might have been the subject of any number of interesting studies: of
Tunisia’s early nationalist or labor movements, of communism in the French Empire or Arab
world, or of colonial veterans of the First World War, for example. Instead, my ensuing archival
discoveries took me from Tunisia and France to Switzerland and Italy, slowly revealing a series
of seemingly disparate Tunisian stories linked by the common experience of trans-Mediterranean
mobility. As serendipity would have it, it was one of the very last figures I came across, the
photographer Albert Samama-Chikli, whose story was surprisingly and subtly woven through
nearly all of the other trajectories in my research. His run-ins with Italian police in 1911 and
1912 evoked the longstanding links between Tunisia, Italy, and Tripolitania; his love of tourism
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led to his partnership with the leftist French reformer André Duran-Angliviel, with whom al‘Ayari later worked; his photographs depicted daily life at war for Frenchmen and North
Africans alike. Samama-Chikli was not an overtly political figure, and his pursuits reveal a man
concerned more with adventure and travel than with empire or religion. His wealthy upbringing
and voluntary military service offered a stark counterpoint to the trajectories of the poor, young
Tunisian conscripts who found themselves at the Western Front. It was telling, however, that
their paths crossed not in Tunisia but in the small “Muslim hospitals” in the suburbs of Paris in
October 1916. Stories as much Tunisian as they were Mediterranean or French colonial, they
were linked by war and mobility – and for this historian, the unpredictable interpretive forces of
the archive.

228

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archives
Archives Nationales de Tunisie (ANT)
Bibliothèque de Genève, Papiers René Claparède
Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN)
Cineteca di Bologna, Albert Samama-Chikli Collection (Cineteca CFSC)
Etablissement de Communication et de Production Audiovisuelle de la Défense (ECPAD)
Service Historique de la Défense à Vincennes (SHD)

Periodicals
La Depêche Tunisienne
L’Egalité
L’Evolution Tunisienne
France Maroc: Revue mensuelle, organe du Comité des Foires du Maroc
Gazette de Lausanne
Habib al-Umma
Journal de Genève
Le Petit Parisien
La Revue du Maghreb
La Revue Israélite
Le Sémaphore de Tunisie
Tunisia
La Tunisie Francaise
Tunis Socialiste

229

Published Sources
Abdelmoula, Mahmoud. L'impôt du sang: la Tunisie, le Maghreb et le panislamisme pendant la
Grande Guerre. Tunis: Editions MTM, 2007.
Abel, Richard. French Cinema: the First Wave, 1915-1929. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984.
Abisaab, Malek. Militant Women of a Fragile Nation. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
2010.
Acton, Carol and Jane Potter. Working in a World of Hurt: Trauma and Resilience in the
Narratives of Medical Personnel in Warzones. Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2015.
________. “Negotiating Injury and Masculinity in First World War Nurses’ Writing.” In First
World War Nursing: New Perspectives, edited by Christine E. Hallett and Alison S. Fell,
123-138. New York: Routledge, 2013.
Ahmad, Eqbal and Stuart Schaar. “M’Hamed Ali: Tunisian Labor Organizer.” In Struggle and
Survival in the Modern Middle East, edited by Edmund Burke III and David Yaghoubian.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.
Akcam, Taner. The Young Turk’s Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic
Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Aksakal, Mustafa. The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: the Ottoman Empire and the First World
War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Allouche-Benayoun, Joëlle and Geneviève Dermenjian, eds. Les juifs d’Algérie: une histoire des
ruptures. Aix-en-Provence: Presses universitaires de Provence, 2015.
Alloula, Malek. The Colonial Harem. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
Al-Sharif, Salah and Ismail Sfaihi, “La Tunisie et l’Algérie.” Lausanne: Librarie Nouvelle, 1917.
Amster, Ellen. Medicine and the Saints: Science, Islam, and the Colonial Encounter in Morocco,
1877-1956. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013.
Andrew, C. M. and A. S. Kanya-Forster. “France, Africa and the First World War.” Journal of
African History 19, no. 1 (1978): 11-23.
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.
Armes, Roy. African Filmmaking: North and South of the Sahara. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2006.
Armstrong, Karen. “The Myth of Religious Violence.” The Guardian, September 25, 2014.
230

Arnold, David. Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in NineteenthCentury India. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Arsan, Andrew. Interlopers of Empire: The Lebanese Diaspora in Colonial French West Africa.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Ayalon, Ami. Language and Change in the Arab Middle East: The Evolution of Modern
Political Discourse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Azaiez, Boubaker Letaief. Tels syndicalistes, tels syndicats, ou, Les péripéties du mouvement
syndical tunisien (Tunis: Imprimerie Tunis-Carthage, 1980),
Bach-Hamba, Mohamed. Le peuple Algéro-Tunisien et la France, réédition préparée et présentée
par Mahmoud Abdelmoula. Carthage: Beït Al-Hikma, 1991.
Badrawi, Malak. Political Violence in Egypt 1920-1924: Secret Societies, Plots and
Assassinations. Surrey, U.K.: Curzon Press, 2000.
Bailony, Reem. “Transnationalism and the Syrian Migrant Public: The Case of the 1925
Syrian Revolt.” Mashriq & Mahjar: Journal of Middle East Migration Studies 1, no. 1
(Spring 2013): 8-29.
Baldinetti, Anna. The Origins of the Libyan Nation: Colonial Legacy, Exile and the Emergence
of a New Nation-State. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Barnard, Deborah. “Being Ghetto: The Hara as Heterotopia in Judeo-Tunisian Literature.” The
Coastal Review 1, no. 1 (2007).
Baron, Beth. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005.
Barry, Gearóid, Enrico Dal Lago, and Róisín Healy, eds. Small Nations and Colonial Peripheries
in World War I. Leiden: Brill, 2016.
Beaudry, Mary C. and Travis G. Parno, eds. Archaeologies of Mobility and Movement. New
York: Springer, 2013.
Behdad, Ali and Luke Gartlan, eds. Photography’s Orientalism: New Essays on Colonial
Representation. Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2013.
Beinin, Joel. The Dispersion of Egyptian Jewry: Culture, Politics, and the Formation of a
Modern Diaspora. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1998.
Belaïd, Habib. “La Révolte de 1915-1916 dans le Sud Tunisien à travers les archives du
protectorat.” In Révolte et société: actes. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1989.
Bessis, Juliette. La Méditerranée fasciste: l'Italie mussolinienne et la Tunisie. Paris: Éditions
Karthala, 1981.
231

Betts, Raymond. Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914. Lincoln
Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1960.
Boittin, Jennifer Anne. Colonial Metropolis: The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and
Feminism in Interwar Paris. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010.
Boughedir, Férid. “La communauté juive dans le cinéma tunisien.” Confluences méditerranée 10
(1994): 139-143.
Boum, Aomar. “From ‘Little Jerusalems’ to the Promised Land: Zionism, Moroccan
Nationalism, and Rural Jewish Emigration.” The Journal of North African Studies 15, no.
1 (2010): 51-69.
Branche, Raphaëlle. La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1962). Paris:
Editions Gallimard, 2001.
Bregoli, Francesca. Mediterranean Enlightenment: Livornese Jews, Tuscan Culture, and
Eighteenth-Century Reform. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014.
Brown, L. Carl. The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974.
Brückenhaus, Daniel. Policing Transnational Protest: Liberal Imperialism and the Surveillance
of Anticolonialists in Europe, 1905-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Burton, Antoinette. After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation. Durham:
Duke University Press, 2003.
________. Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial
India. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
________. At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in late-Victorian
Britain. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
Camiscioli, Elisa. Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the
Early Twentieth Century. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2009.
Campos, Michelle. Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in early twentieth-century
Palestine. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Carden-Coyne, Ana. Reconstructing the Body: Classicism, Modernism, and the First World War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Chourqui, André. Histoire des Juifs en Afrique du Nord: le retour en Orient. Monaco: Rocher,
1998.
Christelow, Allan. Algerians Without Borders: The Making of a Global Frontier Society.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.
232

Clancy-Smith, Julia. Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–
1900. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
________. Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters (Algeria
and Tunisia, 1800-1904). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Clancy-Smith, Julia and Frances Gouda, eds. Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and
Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
Press, 1998.
Clark, Hannah-Louise. “Civilization and Syphilization: A Doctor and His Disease in Colonial
Morocco.” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 87, no. 1 (2013): 86-114.
________. “Expressing Entitlement in Colonial Algeria: Villagers, Medical Doctors, and the
State in the Early 20th Century.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 3
(2016): 445-472.
Clement, Richard W. “The Mediterranean: What, Why, and How.” Mediterranean Studies 20,
no. 1 (2012): 114-120.
Cleveland, William L. Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic
Nationalism. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011.
Cohen, Julia. Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Cohen-Hadria, Élie. Du protectorat français à l’indépendance tunisienne : souvenirs d’un
témoin socialiste. Nice: Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 1976.
Compte rendu de la troisième Conférence des Nationalités. Lausanne: Librarie Central des
Nationalités, 1917.
Conklin, Alice. A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa,
1895-1930. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997.
________. In the Museum of Man: Race, Anthropology, and Empire in France, 1850-1950.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013.
Cooper, Alanna. Bukharan Jews and the Dynamics of Global Judaism. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2012.
Cooper, Frederick and Ann Stoler, eds. Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois
World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Cooper, Frederick. Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French
Africa, 1945-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.
________. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: University of
233

California Press, 2005.
Corber, Erin. “Men of Thought, Men of Action: the Great War, Masculinity, and the
Modernization of the French Rabbinate.” Jewish Culture and History 14, no. 1 (2013):
33-51.
Corriou, Morgan. “Tunis et les ‘temps modernes’: les débuts du cinématographe dans la Régence
(1896-1908).” Publics et spectacle cinématographique en situation coloniale 5 (2012):
91-129.
________. “Un nouveau loisir en situation coloniale: le cinema dans la Tunisie du protectorat.”
PhD diss., Université de Paris 7 Paris-Diderot, 2011.
Cresswell, Tim. On the Move: Mobility in the Modern Western World. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor &
Francis, 2012.
Dabub, Muhammad al-Adel. “Al-ra’i al-‘am al-Tunisi wa al-ḥarb al-‘alamiyah al-‘ula: namadhij
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